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Commonality is a system architecting strategy widely used to improve affordability and reliability
of families of products. However not all commonality is beneficial, and organizations must
balance commonality benefits and commonality costs to pursue a successful strategy.
The existing literature on commonality assumes that all commonality decisions are made within a
single organization. This is not the case for NASA's human exploration architectures which are
acquired through a network of prime contractors and sub-contractors. This thesis examines how
the acquisition strategies chosen for NASA's human exploration architectures affect the
realization of commonality in those architectures, and suggests ways in which acquisition
architectures can be planned to improve commonality outcomes.
The thesis synthesizes the requirements of NASA's exploration architectures and commonality
best practice from existing literature. It also examines the Federal Acquisition Regulations in
detail to assess the limitations on government acquisition structures in the United States, and
postulates a range of acquisition structures open to NASA.
New research data is presented which specifically targets the interplay between acquisition and
commonality. An assessment of practitioners' views on acquisition strategies for commonality
examines three detailed case studies as well as summarizing a broad range of shorter interviews
across NASA and DOD projects.
Each of the postulated acquisition structures is evaluated against the NASA acquisition
requirements and the synthesized commonality best practice.
The evaluation demonstrates that current NASA acquisition strategies are geared towards
commonality through reuse of existing components and systems, and forward-thinking
investment in future commonality opportunities is unlikely. New strategies which involve less
emphasis on competition between contractors in favor of greater continuity with experienced
contractors are recommended to improve commonality. However, the commonality advantages
from such strategies may be offset in a wider perspective by the costs of using such non-
competitive acquisition structures.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 MOTIVATION
Commonality is a system architecting strategy widely used to improve affordability and reliability
of families of products. However, not all commonality is beneficial and injudicious use of the
strategy can actually increase cost and risk. Thus commonality becomes a balancing act between
cost and benefit.
Such a balance has been achieved in many industries, among them familiar examples including
cars, aircraft and power tools, where a single corporation is in sole charge of producing a product.
The balancing act becomes more difficult as the number of organizations involved grows and as a
system becomes more complex. NASA oversees highly complex product developments which
involve many contractors, research organizations and government teams. Often the end goals are
tied to shifting political positions which move faster than systems to achieve the goals can be
built.
The difficulty of successful implementation in the space sector is perhaps only matched by the
potential benefits of commonality. Commonality reduces the number of development projects in
a space architecture, and the consequent capital cost and technical risk. Recurring costs likewise
reduce with commonality because fewer people are required to maintain the smaller number of
systems, and economies of scale and faster learning make manufacture cheaper. Additionally, the
uniquely high logistics and sparing costs involved in operating space projects like the
International Space Station mean that the cost savings of commonality during the operating phase
can be significant.
Previous studies of commonality have identified a range of tools for achieving a near optimum
level of commonality. Most of these studies have assumed that the developing organization has
total control over the product development process. In contrast, for the human spaceflight
architecture, NASA controls the development process through a network of contracts, with a
necessarily imperfect system of incentives and communication. This system of indirect
implementation led the 2009 Augustine Committee to find that "in many instances, one of the
more significant discriminators in development and operations costs is neither what NASA
procures nor who supplies it - but rather how NASA procures and operates a system" (Augustine
et al, 2009).
1.2 GENERAL OBJECTIVE
Motivated by the potential but unrealized benefits of commonality, this thesis examines better
commonality could be achieved across NASA's human spaceflight architecture by considering
commonality impacts when planning architecture acquisition.
This work is not intended to suggest that work should not be split between contractors in large,
complex, expensive endeavors like human spaceflight architectures - in fact such a split is both
practical and inevitable. Instead, this study examines the acquisition tools that will allow
commonality opportunities to be realized even when they occur across the systems of multiple
contractors.
1.3 BACKGROUND PRACTICE
Literature Review
In analyzing how acquisition methods affect the realization of commonality in complex
architectures, this thesis draws on three areas of literature. The first is the field of architecting for
commonality. From this body of work are drawn the processes, techniques, benefits and penalties
of designing architectures with commonality. The second is the literature on government
contracting. This field describes the permissions and limitations of government organizations'
acquisition processes, and the factors that lead to successful contracting. The final field concerns
the acquisition characteristics of space systems and the space industry. The products which the
space industry requires are unique in terms of acquisition characteristics.
This thesis draws together the three fields as shown in Figure 1. At the center point of the three
fields lies a successful commonality acquisition strategy for NASA.
Space
Architecture
Acquisitions
Designing Government
Commonality Contracting
Figure 1: Areas of literature review
The two works which are most closely connected to this analysis are Rhodes' study of the
management of commonality in NASA (Rhodes, 2010), and Scherer's detailed review of
economic incentives in government contracting (Scherer, 1964).
Rhodes offers detailed guidance on managing commonality, and draws on several case studies
both within NASA and outside of NASA. His conclusions are covered in more detail in section
2.2. Rhodes focuses on projects where the commonality was between products under the direct
control of a single project office, for example between two variants of a space suit. As such,
Rhodes is an important starting point for this thesis which expands the management lessons of
Rhodes to address the situation where the potential variants are being developed by different
organizations.
Scherer's work does not focus on commonality. Instead, it examines the raw metrics of
acquisition success: cost, schedule and performance. Scherer does look in detail at how economic
incentives in defense contracting can be used to improve project success. Broadly, he concludes
that the effectiveness of direct contract incentives is often overstated, and wider market forces
play a role in the way in which contractors deliver projects. Scherer bases his conclusions on a
quantitative study of the acquisition of complex systems including missiles and aircraft, and a
qualitative analysis of the economic incentives which drive successful acquisitions. As the
starting point for much of the analysis of contractor behavior in this thesis, Scherer's work is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.3.
Designing for commonality
The theory of designing for commonality has developed a rich selection of academic work. Ulrich
& Eppinger (2000) discuss commonality in the market-driven terms of platform planning,
commonality and differentiation. The place of commonality alongside other architecting
strategies was analyzed in the overview paper by Crawley et al. (2004). Recognizing that
terminology differs significantly between the different commonality applications, the RAND
Corporation produced a report suggesting a "commonality lexicon" (Held, Lewis, & Newsome,
2007). These theoretical overviews overlay a large number of more focused studies. In his 2010
thesis, Rhodes suggests distinguishing between the technical identification of commonality, the
economic evaluation of technically feasible commonality opportunities, and the implementation
of those opportunities which are both technically feasible and economically beneficial. This
distinction is used to partition the focused academic writing on commonality.
The largest selection of commonality-focused literature concerns the technical identification of
commonality. Generally, the technical methods involve functional decomposition of the concept,
and cost comparisons of the final architectures when the formal embodiment of the function is
common across variants (Gonzalez-Zugasti, Otto, & Baker, 2000), (Dahmus, Gonzalez-Zugasti,
& Otto, 2001), (Stone, Wood, & Crawford, 2000), (Robertson & Ulrich, 1998), (Simpson, Maier,
& Mistree, 2001). Hofstetter (2009) presented an architecting strategy specifically designed to
deal with systems where the formal embodiment of function cannot be fully specified before the
commonality decision needs to be made.
The evaluation of commonality opportunities covers both the development of a cost model for
commonality and the analysis of competing alternatives once armed with the cost information.
The literature in this area is scarce. Rhodes (2010) presents a detailed commonality cost model
which builds on the work of Boas. Thevenot & Simpson (2004) present metrics for measuring
the amount of commonality in a product family. One method of comparing competing
alternatives developed in the literature is the use of "real options". Gonzalez-Zugasti, Otto, &
Whitcomb (2007) applied options thinking to commonality. Rhodes (2010) demonstrated the real
options system as applied to commonality in architecting space hardware.
The third aspect of architecting commonality, managerial implementation, is rarely addressed in
the literature. There is less work on the implementation of commonality once technical
opportunities have been identified. In his doctoral dissertation, Boas presents heuristics to
manage two aspects of commonality, specifically time offsets between variants and divergence, a
term which he used to describe the movement away from common design over time (Boas, 2008).
Despite the depth of academic research, commonality is not explicitly treated in handbooks on
systems engineering. Neither the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook or the NASA
Systems Engineering Handbook mention planning for commonality specifically, although the
latter discusses the reuse of heritage products (INCOSE Technical Board, 2004), (NASA, 2007a).
In addition to those papers which focus on the architecting of commonality generally, many
papers describe the application of commonality methods to specific engineering problems.
Generally, the authors concern themselves with the identification of technical commonality
opportunities in their given systems. This thesis focuses on commonality in complex space
systems, an area in which there has been extensive technical analysis of commonality. For
example, many papers on technical commonality were written during the architecting phase of
what is now the International Space Station (Butler, 1987), (Fedor, Baune, & Waiss, 1986),
(Gould, Heck, & Mazanek, 1991), (Boeing Aerospace, n.d.), (Tremblay & Crites, 1988),
(Wensley, 1984), (Krauthamer, Gangal, & Das, 1990). Rhodes (2010) studied the
implementation of commonality through three NASA cases. Ground system commonality for
space architectures has been considered by Quinn (2008), Gilbert & van Leeuwen, (2003) and
Nadel, (2007) among others. Architecture commonality at a higher level was considered in the
development of space exploration architectures (Wooster, Hofstetter, & Crawley, 2005),
(Hofstetter, de Weck, & Crawley, 2005), (Hofstetter, 2004), (Hofstetter, Nadir, Crawley, &
Wooster, 2005). The architecture of the flexible path in the 2009 Augustine Report was based to
a large extent on commonality between the elements required in architectures for travel to points
in free space, small bodies like asteroids, the Moon and Mars (Augustine et al, 2009).
Space Architecture Acquisitions
The process of delivering large NASA projects has been the subject of several excellent books.
The acquisition strategies proposed in this thesis were evaluated against a distillation of the
processes and cultures presented in these books to ensure that the strategies did not require
unrealistic organizational change.
Bromberg's book "NASA and The Space Industry" examines the relationship between NASA and
it's circle of industry from the 1950s through to the 1990s (Bromberg, 1999). Of particular
interest is that Bromberg identified the very commonality problem this thesis addresses in her
research on the International Space Station. The following quotation summarizes the tension that
underlies the acquisition of common systems:
"Political considerations dictated that as many centers as possible get a piece of
the action. That would suggest that the station be divided into relatively
independent pieces so that each of the participating centers could work up its
part in relative autonomy. But [NASA Administrator] Beggs was promising a
low-budget station, only $8bn in 1984 dollars, and one way to economize would
be to standardize components common to all pieces and "mass produce" them. It
would also be cheaper if some systems could be centralized... all this necessarily
meant that the pieces doled out to the centers would be less independent. Each
center would have to design its part of the hardware so that it would fit with the
centralized systems and use standardized parts. Furthermore the job of
designing the centralized systems would also have to be divided up among the
centers. Whatever management team was put in place would have to deal with a
complex distribution of tasks among the centers and a messy set of interfaces
among the subsystems. " (p] 64)
In retrospect, the management framework for the International Space Station was unsatisfactory.
Bromberg documents a fragmented system where different centers developed their systems in
relative autonomy, and the result was unsatisfying: "It really took a toll to adjudicate the
disputes that arose between the field centers... they were constant, they were difficult, they were
sometimes vicious, and most of the time they were very parochial." The question remained
unanswered, even as International Space Station cost overruns strengthened the imperative to
improve the affordability of complex space architectures.
In the same vein as Bromberg, but without her assessment of the difficulties of commonality,
Levine offers an overarching view of the Apollo program in his work from the NASA history
collection "Managing NASA in the Apollo Era" (A. Levine, 1982). Similarly, Kelly and Mindell
describe the acquisition of particular Apollo systems, the Lunar Module and the digital flight
computers respectively, in detail (Kelly, 2001) (Mindell, 2008). McCurdy adopts a slightly
different approach in documenting NASA culture by capturing first hand perspectives from
NASA personnel (McCurdy, 1993). McCurdy's paper "The cost of space flight" is also a
valuable reference to the acquisition difficulties of space systems (McCurdy, 1992).
More recently, the characteristics of the systems NASA acquires, and the industrial-government
relations which underpin those acquisitions, were well described by Szajnfarber and her
colleagues. Szajnfarber's study of the dynamics of the space industry supported an investigation
into innovation across the NASA enterprise, rather than commonality (Szajnfarber, Grindle, &
Weigel, 2009) (Szajnfarber & Weigel, 2009).
Turning from historical and theoretical summaries to the practicalities of acquiring space systems,
NASA has produced literature of its own on the contracting process for space system acquisition.
Chapter 7.1 of the NASA System Engineering Handbook is titled "Engineering With Contracts"
and examines techniques for splitting work between contractors and NASA. It explains how the
steps outlined in "NASA System Engineering Processes and Requirements" (NPR 7123.1) should
be undertaken if a contractor is involved. It summarizes the major risks that can occur with
contracting out work, illustrating those risks with lessons learned by NASA in the past (NASA,
2007a).
There is little in the literature that deals with the nature of space acquisition outside the NASA
context. Amesse et al (2001) examine subcontracting in the Quebec aerospace industry from the
perspective of its effectiveness as a technology transfer tool. In doing so, they provide three
reasons why prime contractors subcontract: economy (subcontracting because the subcontractor
can perform the work more cheaply), specialization (subcontracting because the prime lacks the
resources, e.g. labor, to perform the work) and supply (subcontracting because the prime lacks the
technical capability to perform the work). In a rare example of quantifying the effect of
acquisition structures Koelle, (2010) deals with the cost effects of using subcontractors on
development projects in his work on estimating launch vehicle costs. The launch vehicle cost
models presented by Koelle utilize an adjustment factor which depends on the project acquisition
structure.
Government contracting
At the intersection of space acquisitions and government contracting there exist a few papers,
largely driven by the needs of the defense community. The most relevant is Moon's thesis
"Identifying Federal Contracting Policy Changes To Improve Government Acquisition of
Commercial Space-Launch Capacity" which suggests that allowing contractors to perform their
own analysis given government-specified mission needs would be the most efficient way to
deliver launch capacity (Moon, 1992).
The broader literature on government contracting is collected between two extremes. At one end,
highly theoretical economic literature attempts to assess the most efficient contract type for
particular applications. Examples of this type of analysis are Salanie (2005) and Bower &
Dertouzos (1994). These works have been not been used in this thesis for their detailed economic
analysis. Rather, the types of contract chosen for economic modeling were checked to see if they
presented any new alternatives. In addition, the observations on government contracting practice
made by the authors when comparing the economic model results to the established practice were
useful.
Scherer's excellent economic analysis of the Department of Defense's weapons acquisition
process throughout the 1950s, is grounded in empirical research and escapes the necessarily
simplifying assumptions of much of the theoretical economic literature. Scherer's analysis is so
central to this thesis that his work is examined in more detail in section 2.3 as the various forms
of contract are discussed.
At the other extreme are the practical guidebooks to government contracting produced for
acquisition professionals, which are focused on the process of contracting with little analysis of
how the process could be improved. For example, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (Defense
Acquisition University, 2011) provides "discretionary best practice" in the government
management of defense programs . Much of the analysis in chapter 2.3 is grounded in this
material. Rendon and Snider's book "Management of Defense Acquisition Projects" (Rendon &
Snider, 2008) is a recent summary of acquisition management aimed at the practitioner.
Also at this practical extreme are the policy adjustments recommended by government advisors
from time to time. The most significant participant in this exercise is the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and there is a vast body of work by the GAO on particular NASA
projects, and government contracting strategies more generally. A particularly relevant article
concerns "NASA Contract Management" (Government Accountability Office, 1993).
Between the two extremes sits a small body of academic literature that focuses on new contract
types. Bertran & Vidal (2005) examine the success of Public-Private Contracting for the Galileo
and Skynet satellite constellations. Hashimoto extends this analysis to include a more extensive
analysis of space projects including elements of the human spaceflight architecture such as the
Space Shuttle and the Kibo module (Hashimoto, 2009).
Most of the acquisition literature focuses on defense acquisition because its larger budget means
larger potential gains from new methods. From the NASA perspective, periodic updates to the
NASA acquisition community serve a similar function to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (for
example Dale (2008) and NASA (2007b)). These short memos outline best practice. No works
similar to Rendon and Snider which focused on NASA were identified, which is unsurprising
considering that the NASA acquisition task is only a fraction of that of the defense forces.
There are several works in the literature which address the problems of defense acquisition from
other "ility" perspectives. The closest to commonality is probably interoperability, which has
received much attention in the new "netcentric" vision for the US defense forces. The technical
report by Meyers et al (2005) "Including Interoperability in the Acquisition Process" is a good
example of this trend. An excellent example of design of acquisition structures for innovation is
the work of Birkler et al (2000) in their monograph on new acquisition approaches for innovative
systems within the DOD.
Gap Analysis
The conclusion of the literature review is that no previous work has answered the question of how
to acquire space systems that support commonality. However, there are extensive bodies of work
on the separate areas of commonality design, space acquisition, and government contracting. The
best approach for NASA to acquire systems with smarter commonality lies at the intersection of
these three fields.
1.4 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE
The specific objective of this thesis is to develop a rigorous evaluation of a range of acquisition
strategies for commonality benefit, and to conclude which strategies will best promote beneficial
commonality. A cartoon depiction of this analysis is shown in Figure 2. The difficulty in
analyzing the acquisition strategies was not so much a lack of acquisition options, as everyone
interviewed in the course of this thesis had an opinion on the best way for NASA to acquire its
space systems. Rather, the difficulty in this thesis was to present a traceable and transparent
analysis which captured the hunches of all of the interviewees, synthesized with formal
acquisition regulations and commonality best practice. To achieve this, the thesis develops a
"stoplight" chart for each acquisition strategy. The stoplight chart evaluates the facets of each
acquisition strategy and summarizes their effect on commonality as one of four categories:
helpful (green), uncertain (yellow), unhelpful (red) or no effect (grey).
It must be said at the outset that creating acquisition strategies is not able to achieve the same
certainties of design as the space systems thus acquired. Changes in the economy, the market for
defense products and the decisions of industry executives and NASA managers all play a part in
determining the effectiveness of an acquisition structure. Further, commonality is not the goal of
a government acquisition structure; rather it is to obtain products at value for the government
dollar. This means commonality may not be the best option in all instances. For example, there
is an essential tension in designing an acquisition strategy between promoting cost savings
through competition and cost savings through commonality. It is in part due to this uncertainty
that this thesis attempts to adopt a very methodical structure to the development of the preferred
acquisition strategies. Readers are invited to examine the assumptions which underlie each of the
recommended acquisition strategies and make use of those aspects most applicable to the case at
hand.
Technical, Political
and Industrial Constraints
on NASA's Exploration
Architectures
Points of best practice
in developing
commonality strategy
Acquisition strategies to be evaluated
----------
-------
------
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--
-------
Figure 2: Cartoon depiction of acquisition strategy evaluation
1.5 METHODOLOGY
Why in-depth case studies were chosen
There are, broadly, two possible methods that could have been undertaken to analyze the
interaction of commonality strategies with acquisition strategies. A study quantitatively
----- --
-------
~ ~--- 
examining many projects ("large-n") was rejected in favor of a small-n study which conducts
qualitative, in-depth, case studies after initial scoping interviews (Yin, 2009).
A "large-n" study covering many NASA acquisitions involving commonality was rejected despite
it having been successfully applied to contract structures by Scherer's analysis of Department of
Defense contracts through the late 1950s and early 1960s for several reasons. First, significant
difficulty was anticipated in gathering enough accurate data to support this approach. The
commonality strategy and acquisition structure of a project are both difficult to gage by easily
accessible metrics (Boas, 2008).
Second, with respect to measuring commonality performance, there is no external metric by
which the benefit initially anticipated and finally realized commonality of the system can be
judged. Commonality of itself is neither beneficial or detrimental, and changes in commonality
could indicate either a sound commonality strategy adjusting to the level of commonality which
gave maximum benefit, or a poor commonality strategy failing to control the amount of
commonality between variants. There are also significant differences between organizations as to
how to measure and cost commonality (Boas, 2008).
There are also difficulties in measuring the acquisition strategy of a program. No two acquisition
strategies are exactly alike, though similar approaches could be binned together. The detailed
acquisition structure of projects is infrequently reported in conference and journal papers and
sometimes confidential. Additionally, the acquisition structure can change throughout the
acquisition process as the in-vogue acquisition trends change.
A final, and very practical, difficulty with a large-n study within NASA projects was that at the
time of this study the Constellation program was drawing to a close and there was significant
organizational change within NASA. Major contracts were being terminated or under threat of
termination, which meant that NASA acquisition executives rightly had more pressing concerns
than helping gather data.
Therefore a large-n study of commonality was discarded in favor of a smaller number of in-depth
cases, focused on the interaction between acquisition structures and commonality results. Initial
scoping interviews were conducted to prepare for the in-depth cases.
Purposes of scoping interviews
Initial scoping interviews were conducted one-on-one with 17 system architects, project and
system managers and acquisition experts who work on complex aerospace systems. Additionally,
five presentations were given to larger groups with an interest in commonality. The interviews,
which lasted between about half an hour and an hour, had four purposes. Appendix A contains a
list of the interviews conducted during the scoping phase of this thesis.
First, the interviews asked whether the acquisition structure chosen to implement commonality
had an effect on the realization of commonality in the developed system. The interviews
indicated that acquisition structure was considered to affect commonality, which encouraged this
thesis to proceed.
Second, the interviews collected shallow data across a range of projects. Most often, the data
collected was a cloud of conclusions and residual learning gathered from past commonality
experiences. The data sacrificed for breadth of study was the background to developing those
conclusions. Therefore it was not possible to assess the reasons for the beliefs that the
interviewees held in the shallow study, but it was possible to assess the final viewpoint they
reached. This data served as a useful comparator with the conclusions of the in-depth case study
results.
Third, the interviews identified the areas of interest to the interviewees in the management and
acquisition of commonality. These areas were considered as points of focus when constructing
the semi-structured interviews for the in-depth case studies.
Fourth, the interviewees suggested possible case studies which could be examined in more depth.
The conditions of confidentiality under which two of the case studies in this thesis were
undertaken mean that it is not possible to state whether any of the scoping interviewees took part
in the broader case studies.
The process of conducting the scoping interviews took approximately 12 months. There was
some overlap between the commencement of the in-depth case studies and the conclusion of the
scoping interviews.
Summary of the in-depth case studies
In-depth case studies were chosen as the method to assess the effect of acquisition structures on
commonality. Three in-depth case studies were chosen.
The criteria for a potential case becoming a case study were:
- A family of end-products with common elements was acquired
- The end-products had similar technical difficulty to projects likely to be included in
NASA's human spaceflight architecture;
- Multiple corporations and / or government organizations were involved in developing
the family of end-products
- Accessibility to a range of people involved in the development of the family, ideally
including project managers, system engineers and project executives.
In addition to these mandatory criteria, a series of other comparisons were drawn between the
potential case study and likely elements of NASA's human spaceflight architecture. Table 1
shows a summary of these comparisons. The more similar comparisons, the more likely any
findings from the case would be applicable to NASA's human spaceflight architectures. It was
not desirable to have a complete match in all categories, however, because the likelihood of
finding different approaches to those currently used by NASA increases as the case studies move
further from being directly connected with NASA.
Conduct of the in-depth case studies
The case studies were generally conducted at the offices of the organization being investigated.
Prior to visiting the site, a point of contact was established who developed a pre-planned schedule
of interviews with personnel across the organization. Each interview lasted about an hour.
Follow-up telephone calls were arranged after the site visit.
Interviews were not recorded, but handwritten notes were taken during the interview process.
The short-form notes were typed into more comprehensive recollections of the interview, usually
within 24 hours.
CASE STUDY OF DOD RADIOS CASE STUDY OF LAUNCH VEHICLES
Comparison Similarity Notes CS2 CS3 Notes
Purpose of Medium DOD looks for interoperability, then affordability. NASA Medium Medium CS2 looks for reliability.
Commonality primarily looks for affordability. CS3 looks for flexibility.
Unit cost Low JTRS unit cost = $3,000 to $200,000 Medium Medium Unit cost of order $10 million
NASA unit cost = Order $100 million
Number of Low JTRS proposes acquisition of -250,000 radios Medium Medium Launch rates of approximately
units NASA will acquire high-value exploration architecture 10 per year
elements in order 10s.
Program cost High JTRS development cost estimated at -$5bn, total program High High Development costs are
cost -$37bn unknown, but similar hardware
NASA development budget for, eg Orion, -$5-1 Obn, then indicates likely similar cost
about $1 bn / flight on acquisition.
Technological High JTRS is an integrated hardware and software system High High Development costs are similar.
Complexity incorporating significant R&D. 1.6m lines of code in the most
advanced waveform.
Acquisition High Both are government acquisition projects Medium Medium CS2 and CS3 are commercial
environment projects.
Development Low The objectives of each organization (Warfighting and Space Medium Medium CS2 and CS3 most focused on
purpose Exploration) are different. LEO / GEO
Organizational Medium DOD has separate services which operate different platforms Low Low CS2 and CS3 are much smaller
structure in support of a common mission. than NASA
NASA has separate program offices which develop different
platforms in support of a common mission.
Issues with High Need to include commonality with heritage systems Medium Medium CS2 and CS3 do not have fixed
implementation Lack of centralized funding for common development yearly budgets, but do
of Variants are offset in development experience the other difficulties
commonality Policy changes disrupt development plans described at left.Plans executed on yearly budgets
Planning for future technology developments
Number and High The number of subcontractors able to build the software and Medium Medium Systems engineering done in-
type of hardware for the radios is small. The number involved in house by CS2 and CS3. More
contractors NASA programs is likely smaller, but not by much. Some of streamlined supply chains in
the same organizations are involved in both. CS2 and CS3 than in NASA.
1.6 OUTLINE
As stated in section 1.4, this thesis aims to produce a rigorous and transparent stoplight chart
comparing acquisition strategies. The structure of the remainder of this thesis is therefore best
conceptualized by Figure 3 which shows how each chapter contributes to producing the stoplight
chart.
Technical, Political
and Industrial Constraints
on NASA's Exploration
Architectures(Developed in Chapter 2.1)
Points of best practice
in developing
commonality strategy(Developed in Chapter 2.2)
Acquisition strategies to be evaluated(Developed in Chapter 2.3)
0
Evaluation(Chapter 5)
uses the
scoping interviews(Chapter 3)
and
detailed case studies(Chapter 4)
---- 0--
Figure 3: Each Chapter contributes to the Chapter 5 stoplight chart
Chapter 2 undertakes a synthesis of existing literature with observations made during the
interviews to determine three questions. One, what are the essential features of NASA's
acquisitions, especially those which distinguish a NASA program from other government or
industry programs? This research draws mostly on historical accounts of NASA programs and
culture. Two, what is the best practice strategy for commonality? This research summarizes
previous work on commonality practice and theory and develops process maps to more precisely
measure commonality performance. Three, what tools are available to the acquisition strategist in
crafting an acquisition strategy? This section analyzes the Federal Acquisition Regulations,
NASA policy documents and Department of Defense research.
Chapter 3 presents the results of the scoping interviews with a range of practitioners. It layers
over the theoretical analysis of Chapter 2 an appreciation for the important issues in practice. The
practitioners' views are used to answer six questions:
1. Have any acquisition strategies been used by NASA or DOD which focus on
commonality?
2. Which acquisition strategies - actual or potential - could affect the amount of realized
commonality?
------------
------------ I
3. To what extent do US Federal Government acquisition regulation and practices limit the
acquisition strategies available for commonality?
4. What types of NASA projects would most benefit from an acquisition strategy focused
on commonality?
5. What factors drive commonality success?
6. What are the obstacles to successful implementation of inter-contractor commonality?
Chapter 4 presents a search for better approaches through detailed case studies. Three detailed
case studies are presented, one on acquiring a family of software defined radios and two on
acquiring families of launch vehicles.
Chapter 5 then takes the acquisition strategies suggested by the literature and the case studies and
assesses how they perform against the best practice for commonality and the constraints of
NASA's acquisition needs.
Chapter 6 recommends acquisition strategies for NASA based on the analysis in Chapter 5.
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
Both the tasks of reading and of writing this thesis are helped considerably by agreeing to
standard terminology at the outset. Standard terminology helps make sense of discussions about
architecting, acquisition and commonality, all of which have particular concepts which become
confusing quickly without agreement on what to call them. The following definitions are used
throughout this thesis:
Engineering Aggregations
Program: A program is the highest level development effort, for example the Apollo program or
the Constellation program. It contains several projects which work in concert to produce the
program outcomes.
Project: A project is a development effort aimed at producing a product or a family of products,
for example, the Saturn launch vehicle project or the Altair lunar lander project.
System: A system refers to any aggregation of hardware and software that produces a functional
output, and is at a more detailed level than a project and a less detailed level than a component.
For example, a life support system.
Component: A component is used to refer to the smallest useful parts of systems, for example
bolts or flight computers.
Element: An element is a term used in this thesis when a statement made could apply equally
well to systems or components.
Commonality
Family: A family is a collection of projects or elements with commonality. A family comprises
a set of variants, each of which have some unique features which distinguish them from other
family members.
Platform: The platform refers to the elements which are common across a family.
Acquisition Structures
System Integrator: The system integrator is responsible for system engineering at the program
level. The system integrator may be NASA or a corporation under contract to assist NASA.
Prime Contractor: A prime contractor is responsible for a project. Usually a prime contractor
reports to the government, but if a sole prime structure is used the prime contractor may report to
that company.
Sole Prime: The term "sole prime" is used to describe a contractor responsible for an entire
program.
Sub-Contractor: A contractor at a level below a prime contractor.
Contractor: Either an organization with a direct contract with NASA, or a generic term to
describe any organization working on the architecture.
CHAPTER 2: SYNTHESIS OF NASA's COMMONALITY AcQUISITION TASK
In the literature review of the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that no studies have
examined how NASA's acquisition strategies can be used to improve commonality.
Nevertheless, much can be synthesized simply based on the existing information. This chapter
examines existing works on NASA culture, commonality best practice and government
acquisition to synthesize the tradespace within which acquisition strategies must function. It is
important to understand each of these aspects, because a commonality acquisition strategy must
stand on all three pillars. A commonality acquisition strategy perfect for NASA will never be
realized if it does not comply with government acquisition regulation. Structures which do not
meet commonality best practice, or which fail to meet NASA's mission needs will be equally
useless. We turn first to the acquisition characteristics which NASA's human spaceflight
structures must meet.
2.1 ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT ARCHITECTURES
The 1990 Augustine Report viewed NASA's mission as "a difficult one, probably more difficult
than that of any other organization in the world" (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 18). It is likely the
authors of the report were referring to more than just the technical objectives of the agency, for
the industrial and political environment in which NASA's missions are undertaken make its
achievement all the more impressive. The key technical, industrial and political facts of NASA's
mission, together with their acquisition consequences, are summarized in Table 2. The table also
notes two future possibilities which, if they occur, will change NASA's acquisition task.
The acquisition strategies which are likely to be successful for NASA must first take into account
the unique technical difficulties involved in space hardware development. For example, the
staggering complexity of all space systems precludes high level participation by small
contractors, reducing the competitive pool for NASA's system integration tasks. Acquisition
strategies must also take into account NASA's unique place in the fabric of United States industry
and politics. For example, an acquisition strategy which did not spread contracts reasonably
widely across the country would hamper a space program looking for broad Congressional
support. Strategies which involve too much organizational change, disrupt the balance of
industry, or require political support at Apollo-like levels are simply unrealistic. Therefore this
section develops a set of acquisition "realities" for NASA.
A perfect acquisition strategy would meet all of these realities and still implement commonality
efficiently across the architecture. However, as Chapter 5 shows, a perfect acquisition strategy
has not yet been found, and some of the realities may need to give way to produce a more
affordable and efficient space program.
At the outset, it is important to re-emphasize the types of products this thesis focuses on.
NASA's acquisitions cover a broad range of products from IT services to supersonic aircraft
prototypes to habitats for human spaceflight. In this thesis the focus is on products closest to the
last category: components of the human spaceflight architecture. The realities discussed below
apply only to this subset of NASA's acquisitions because it represents the only unique component
of NASA's acquisition task.
In analyzing NASA through the eyes of its employees, McCurdy shows a changing organization.
Its mission now is different to that which it fulfilled in the 1960s, and to some extent its culture
has changed to reflect that evolution (McCurdy, 1993). It will continue to change, and so this
section does not attempt to pin down exactly those features of the NASA of 2011, but rather to
capture the fundamentals of NASA as written throughout its history. Generally, those
fundamentals are likely to last the duration of the next human spaceflight architecture. However,
two areas of possible future change - increased commercial activity and increased international
cooperation - will significantly impact the exploration architecture if they occur. Therefore the
potential acquisition strategies are also evaluated on their effectiveness should either or both of
these possibilities become reality.
The conclusions in this section are based on histories of NASA and its projects, the opinions of
interviewees (more fully documented in Chapters 3 and 4), and the author's own experience
while preparing this thesis working with NASA and following its fortunes during a particularly
revealing time in US spaceflight policy. Each of the correlations between fact and acquisition
consequence could be examined in more detail to probe the strength of the connection.
Table 2: Summary of acquisition characteristics of any US Human Spaceflight Architectures
Technical Fact Acquisition Consequence
Space systems require research and 1 The acquisition strategy must fund research and
development. development.
Space systems are highly complex. 2 The acquisition structure must be able to
tolerate cost overruns and schedule slips which
exceed initial estimates.
3 The acquisition strategy must ensure its prime
contractors can handle complex hardware-
software systems costing hundreds of millions
in development.
The historical development time for space 4 The acquisition strategy must be effective over
systems is approximately a decade. development times of at least a decade.
5 The acquisition strategy must deliver first flight
within a decade.
NASA has extensive human spaceflight 6 The acquisition strategy must allow NASA to
experience important for the success of impart its human spaceflight experience to the
future exploration missions. contractor.
Complex spacecraft are prone to complex 7 The acquisition strategy must give NASA
failures. NASA is held responsible for confidence in the reliability of its contractors
these failures. design, manufacture and testing process.
Systems engineering and integration is 8 The system integrator(s) must have recent or
performed best by those with experience in ongoing engineering experience on human
building the systems they integrate. space systems.
Operation of space infrastructure is costly 9 The acquisition strategy must achieve balance
and has historically resulted in between up-front and recurring costs.
unsustainable architectures.
Industry Fact
The US Government is the only customer 10 The acquisition strategy must not depend
for NASA's exploration architecture beyond heavily on funding from non-government
LEO. sources.
The production runs of the an exploration 11 The acquisition strategy must allow corporations
architecture are likely to be one or two of to make a profit despite small production rates
each element per year over a period of time and uncertain production volumes.
that cannot be easily predicted.
Political Fact
The ten NASA centers do not function as a 12 The acquisition strategy must overcome inter-
cohesive unit. center parochialism.
Closure of any NASA centers will be 13 The Acquisition Strategy must allocate some
politically difficult. work across all ten NASA centers.
Funding for NASA will vary over time. 14 The acquisition strategy must be robust to year-
by-year changes in funding.
NASA will increase Congressional support if 15 The acquisition strategy must allow work to be
contracts are awarded across diverse divided between the major aerospace
geographical regions and contractors. contractors.
Future possibilities
International cooperation on space 16 The acquisition structure should allow
exploration architectures may increase over international partners to fit into the acquisition
future years. program over time.
Commercial space companies may become 17 Acquisition strategies should utilize commercial
increasingly capable and have customers space companies when the capabilities of those
other than the US government. companies are proven.
Technical features of Human Spaceflight Architectures
The most obvious area in which acquiring space exploration architectures differs is in the
technical characteristics of the acquired systems.
Technical Fact: Space systems require research and development.
The starting point in describing space exploration systems is that they often involve new
technologies to go to new places and therefore their acquisition must fund some research and
development. Space missions push the state-of-the-art and "depend on some of the world's most
advanced technology" (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 5). As one of McCurdy's interviewees pointed
out: "ifyou want to make progress.. you've got to design things that have not been done before"
(p77).
Acquisition Consequence 1: The acquisition strategy must fund research and development.
The need for research and development influences the acquisition strategy, because the necessary
research and development won't be done without funding. Research and development from
exploration architectures can certainly benefit aerospace firms in bidding on additional contracts,
but usually the case for future benefit alone is not strong enough to initiate the new ideas:
"contractors... tend to innovate in response to government requests" (Szajnfarber, 2010).
By its nature, research and development is uncertain in its timeframe and cost. This means that
funding strategies which depend too heavily on fixed-time, fixed-cost contracts will not be as
effective in promoting research and development.
Technical Fact: Space systems are highly complex.
Even without new technology, space systems are very complex. There were "six million
components manufactured by thousands of separate contractors" (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 5) on
the Saturn V launch vehicle, and 2.5 million lines of software code on the Space Shuttle
(Augustine et al, 1990, p. 5)1. Szjanfarber writes that "Spacecraft embody significant "Product
Complexity". Each subsystem is itself a complex system; many disciplines ... are involved... and
multiple different levels of maturity exist simultaneously in any given system" (Szajnfarber,
2010). The complexities of space systems were brought to the fore early in the space program,
when vibration on the early launch vehicles "became one of the first so-called system issues - it
transcended the realm of the structural engineer, the propulsion expert of the electrical engineer
alone " (S. Johnson, 2002, p. 9). Complexity leads to two consequences for acquisition.
Acquisition Consequence 2: The acquisition structure must be able to tolerate cost
overruns and schedule slips which exceed initial estimates.
Both the need for new technology and the complexity of the space systems lead to cost overruns
and schedule slips.
The 1990 Augustine Report pointed out how new technology makes it exceedingly difficult to
propose accurate project costs, as "uncertainties of yet to be demonstrated technologies alone
preclude precision" (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 18).
Complex space systems have "a natural tendency... to grow in scope, complexity and cost"(Augustine et al, 1990, p. 8) as the details of the initially uncertain system become more obvious,
and the engineering detail needed to achieve the mission becomes clear. Additionally, the
(Herbella, 1992) quotes 7 million lines of code which need to be maintained across the entire shuttle program.
compounding effects of new technology, high performance demand, plus inevitable cost pressure
lead to additional complexity as ingenious designers build more into their system: "Ifyou try to
use all of the pig except the squeal" philosophized one of McCurdy's interviewees, "you're
obviously making things work very efficiently. But.. .you end up with a more complicated
system... failure in one thing cascades over into the other" (McCurdy, 1993, p. 159).2
NASA's complex systems also entail complex failure analysis. Augustine points out that "we
should be preparedfor the occasionalfailure " (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 18), for failure is a key
way in which learning progresses, particularly shown in the early years of the space program
when "experimentation more than theory determined the problems and solutions" (S. Johnson,
2002, p. 8). The complex, costly and time consuming failure analysis such as that which
followed the Apollo 1 fire is rarely factored into initial cost estimates, leading to increased
difficulty meeting cost and schedule targets.
Finally, there is a very human reason for programmatic difficulties in NASA programs. NASA
competes with other government programs for funding from Congress, and is at the disadvantage
of not providing an essential service like power, housing, education or healthcare. NASA's
planned work must be spectacular: "unless expectations are sufficiently high, they won't attract
interest and support, especially from governments" (Rechtin, 1999, p. 101). Expectations are
based on perceived value, which is benefit to stakeholders relative to the cost of the program.
Therefore NASA programs are often established with great expectations and "too little margin
for the unexpected" (Augustine et al, 1990).
Acquisition Consequence 3: The acquisition strategy must ensure its prime contractors can
handle complex hardware-software systems costing hundreds of millions in development.
The responsibility for developing or integrating these complex systems often falls outside NASA,
on "prime contractors". There are a limited number of companies with the technical expertise,
management systems and financial capital to perform these projects. An illustration of the
fragility of the top end of the industry is Bromberg's example of a 1997 $6 billion dollar contract
on which "Boeing declined to bid". Boeing's withdrawal meant that Lockheed Martin was the
sole bidder (Bromberg, 1999, p. 177).
Table 3 shows the 2010 revenues of some of the key contractors which might be involved in the
development of an exploration architecture. Importantly, not all of these corporations derive their
revenue extensively from the space sector. The total revenues of each company include revenues
from military sales, commercial sales and space sales. However, all of these corporations are
involved in complex systems engineering and integration and are potential bidders for aspects of
NASA's space exploration infrastructure. The table was derived by cross-referencing the
Aviation Week "Top Performing Companies" rankings of aerospace and defense companies with
total revenues above $1 billion (Aviation Week, 2010) with the top 100 NASA contractors
(Federal Procurement Data System, 2011). Companies which appeared on both lists were
deemed to have an appetite for government space projects and be large enough to handle complex
system engineering. Companies which appeared on both lists but do not do extensive system
engineering (L-3 Communications, Babcock International PLC and Textron) were not included.
2 These heuristic observations have been quantified more precisely in recent work on change propagation. See for
example (Giffin et al., 2009).
Table 3: Aerospace contractors capable of handling large system engineering tasks
Contractor Total Revenues (2009 or 2010)
Boeing $64 billion
United Technologies $54 billion
Lockheed Martin $46 billion
Northrop Grumman $34 billion
Honeywell $33 billion
General Dynamics $32 billion
Raytheon $25 billion
Alliant Techsystems (ATK) $4.0 billion
Teledyne Technologies $1.6 billion
Orbital Sciences $1.3 billion
Even if a handful of additional corporations may be capable of systems engineering and
integration of large NASA systems, the total pool of contractors NASA has to choose from for
complex systems is small compared to terrestrial projects like civil construction. The "oligopoly"
(Szajnfarber & Weigel, 2009) in the space industry affects competition for government contracts
and is an important factor to consider in developing an acquisition structure.
Technical Fact: The historical development time for space systems is approximately a
decade.
An additional effect of complexity is long development times. While from a technical standpoint
increased funding and political support can speed development, history indicates that
development times of approximately a decade from initial funding to initial operations should be
expected. Each of the missions have unique characteristics which make it hard to state the
"decade in development" rule with certainty.
1. Apollo: 1961 to 1969. Apollo had relatively high political support, but the mission it
attempted was also very technologically challenging for the times.
2. Shuttle: 1970 to 1981. The Shuttle program had lower political support than Apollo, but
did not require the coordination of as many separate programs.
3. International Space Station: 1984 (as Space Station Freedom in President Reagan's 1984
State of the Union Address) or 1993 (as the International Space Station under President
Clinton), to 2011 (scheduled) (General Accounting Office, 1994). The Space Station
underwent numerous redesigns, fluctuating political support and had to meet the
challenges of multinational cooperation.
4. Constellation: commenced in 2005, with first missions beyond LEO originally scheduled
for 2017 (NASA, 2005). Constellation was potentially simpler technically than the
earlier programs, but operated under a shrinking budget environment.
From the fact that acquisition structures take a decade to develop, two acquisition consequences
can be distilled.
Acquisition Consequence 4: The acquisition must be effective over development times of at
least a decade.
The acquisition structure must be able to operate over a decade. This is an important
consideration because the corporations which begin work on the systems and products may need
to be incentivized to remain in the aerospace business over that timeframe. Contingencies may be
needed in the acquisition strategy to account for corporations which drop out of the program
midway through.
Acquisition Consequence 5: The acquisition must deliver first flight within a decade.
The acquisition structure must deliver initial successes within a decade. This is an important
consideration because some approaches to commonality would first construct "building blocks"
and later build fully operational projects around these systems. If such an approach takes more
than a decade it will involve a fundamental shift in the way NASA promises and delivers space
hardware to its Congressional funders.
Technical Fact: NASA has extensive human spaceflight experience important for the
success of future exploration missions.
NASA is still the "world's greatest repository of space knowledge and experience" (Augustine et
al, 1990). Human spaceflight is an esoteric discipline carried out in few countries around the
world, and much of the knowledge on successful human spaceflight is gained through experience.
NASA has collected that experience through 50 years of human spaceflight. If the United States
is to capitalize on its current leadership in human spaceflight, future systems should make the
most of NASA's experience.
Acquisition Consequence 6: The acquisition strategy must allow NASA to impart its human
spaceflight experience to the contractor.
The acquisition strategy should include mechanisms which give contractors the benefit of
NASA's human spaceflight experience. Traditionally, this was accomplished through rigid
specifications imposed by NASA for everything from wiring to safety factors to torqueing bolts.
In part it was also driven through the insight process discussed in the next paragraph. These
methods, while proven, are not the only methods for communicating NASA's experience. The
acquisition strategy should achieve the same results but need not use the same techniques.
Technical Fact: Complex spacecraft are prone to complex failures. NASA is held
responsible for these very public failures.
In writing on system architecting, Rechtin points out that "complex systemsfail in complex ways"
(Rechtin, 1999, p. 105). Space systems are not only complex, but they are often only fully tested
for the first time in the totality of their operational environment with humans on board. Physical
assistance from the ground is usually impossible. To minimize the chance of failure, the
spacecraft must be designed, built and tested to be as reliable as possible.
The need for NASA to ensure reliability is compounded because NASA is deemed responsible
for the failures of its contractors. The loss of Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia were
tragically spectacular. The ensuing investigations centered, in the public mind, on how well
NASA performed its job, rather than how well contractors performed.3 NASA, in the eyes of the
media and the public, is responsible for all the systems which it funds.
3 In both cases the causes of the failure were assessed as partly technical and partly organizational. Both NASA and its
contractors shared some responsibility, but the public overwhelmingly perceives failure on NASA missions as a NASA
failure.
Acquisition Consequence 7: The acquisition strategy must give NASA confidence in the
reliability of its contractors' design, manufacture and testing process.
NASA has historically worked closely with its contractors, even after the learning curve of the
Apollo program ended and contractors were more experienced in the design of spacecraft.
NASA's "insistence on looking over all details" and "technical penetration into the industry"
was unchanged. This attitude started during Apollo, "where there was trouble NASA was
inclined to send in its personnel and its techniques, and it had the engineering and manufacturing
expertise to make this sort of laying on of hands possible" (Bromberg, 1999, p. 63). The
insistence of strong oversight stemmed from the early days of the launch vehicle program when
von Braun's engineering and manufacturing teams were organizationally very close. "Rigid
control of manufacturing became utterly critical. The smallest imperfection could and did lead to
catastrophic failure" (Johnson, 2002, p. 8). "Contractors viewed the paperwork as an excessive
burden, but NASA professionals viewed it as contractor penetration - an essential element in their
overall culture" (McCurdy, 1993, p. 117).
An acquisition structure which does not support NASA's cultural insistence on contractor insight
is likely to meet significant resistance when it is implemented.
Technical Fact: Systems engineering and integration is performed best by those with
experience in building the systems they integrate.
System engineering and integration on space programs involves a wide range of disciplines and
skills, from writing technical requirements to managing contracts. Most agree that the quality of
system integration improves if the integrator has had experience with the systems they are
subcontracting for and coordinating. McCurdy states that the hands-on work "sharpened
technical skills and in the process expanded the capability of NASA employees to monitor the
technical work of contractors" (McCurdy, 1993, p. 34).
Augustine made the same point in his 1990 report: "The dilemma is that the best systems
engineers are often those with a great deal of experience...but how can one get scar tissue if one
is confined to studying, analyzing and overseeing the work of others? The answer, by and large,
is that one cannot" (Augustine et al, 1990).
Acquisition Consequence 8: The system integrator(s) must have recent or ongoing
engineering experience on human space systems.
The need for hands-on experience has acquisition consequences. The acquisition structure should
recognize that the best system engineers have had recent hands-on experience. A good
acquisition structure will give the integration role to an organization with that experience, and
find ways of keeping that experience current.
Technical Fact: Operation of space infrastructure is costly and has historically resulted in
unsustainable architectures.
The final twist to NASA's engineering task is the delicate balance between development and
operations. In the early programs such as Mercury or Apollo, operations was a stay of up to week
in space and a logical extension of the engineering development. Each mission achieved very
different objectives and most went to a new location. However, in the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station programs similar missions are performed repeatedly. In those
programs, NASA was faced with difficult but not revolutionary missions. Despite flying the
Shuttle almost 140 times, processing a Shuttle for flight "requires that 1.2 million separate
procedures be accomplished," (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 18) across 87 "critical systems"
(General Accounting Office, 2000) by 12,500 workers and $1.5 billion worth of fixed facilities
(Augustine et al, 2009).
Developing firmer estimates of the relationship between development and operating costs of
human spaceflight programs is difficult. The Mercury and Gemini programs mixed military and
civil funding; the Gemini program was largely operational testing in support of Apollo
development; and the Apollo program did not have continuous operations as its goal. The
International Space Station has had humans aboard for most of its development time, which
makes it difficult to separate development from operating costs. It is also a multi-national
development which mixes in-kind contributions such as Russian Proton launches with more
concrete development costs of US modules.
The Shuttle, although roundly criticized for its high operating costs, remains the one vehicle
where development and operations phases were largely separated and a comparison can be drawn.
Augustine et al (1990) cites the development cost of the Shuttle at $27.8 billion in 1990 dollars,
and Augustine et al (2009) cites the total cost of the Shuttle at $129.5 billion in 2009 dollars. The
1990 Augustine figure is $40 billion in 2009 dollars'yielding an approximate operating cost of
$90 billion over 30 years of operation, or $3 billion per year. The development cost of $40
billion was spread from 1970 (when the RFPs were released (Bromberg, 1999)) to first flight in
1981, making an average cost of approximately $4 billion per year, comparable to the operation
cost.
McCurdy was correct in finding that a "tendency toward routine operations poses a special
challenge for a research and development organization like NASA" (McCurdy, 1993, p. 142).
Acquisition consequence 9: The acquisition strategy must achieve a balance between
development and operation costs.
The balance between operations and development has acquisition consequences. Technical trades
made during development, like those that led to a semi-reusable shuttle, have a lasting impact on
operational costs. Acquisition strategies which encourage contractors to make development-
operation trades in the region NASA would like (wherever that may lie) are preferable. As with
the shuttle, this acceptable region may change during development.
In sum, the unique technical features of human spaceflight give rise to unique acquisition
requirements. However, these technical achievements are reached with the help of industry, and
the nature of the industry-NASA relationship is critical to developing effective acquisition
structures.
Industrial Features of Human Spaceflight Architectures
The nature, number, and motivations of the contractors which serve NASA are of critical
importance in determining acquisition structures for commonality. After all, an acquisition
structure is designed to apportion tasks in the best way between NASA and private industry.
Szajnfarber writes that "the space market structure is relatively unique in that it is effectively a
monopsony (single buyer) oligopoly (few sellers) contract market," (Szajnfarber, 2010) and an
understanding of this unique market underpins the conclusions to this thesis.
Industry Fact: The US Government is the only customer for NASA's Human Spaceflight
Architecture beyond LEO.
Szajnfarber states that for space architectures there is "only a single viable customer in most
cases" (Szajnfarber & Weigel, 2009). This is particularly the case for elements of an exploration
architecture which extend beyond low-earth-orbit (LEO). Elements beyond LEO cannot be
repurposed for commercial uses such as Earth observation and communications or, as yet,
tourism.
Acquisition Consequence 10: The acquisition strategy must not depend heavily on funding
from non-government sources at any point in the product lifecycle.
The acquisition strategy should not try to draw funding by being marketable to private interests.
Space exploration does not yet produce commercially valuable outputs (in the sense that they can
be marketed and sold) at the same order of magnitude as the costs of exploration. The intangibles
of exploration, like national prestige, inspiration, education, curiosity and scientific discovery
(MIT Space Policy and Society Research Group, 2008) are valuable only to governments and do
not yet represent bankable commodities.
There are currently some potential synergies between commercial interests and human space
exploration. For example, commercial interests require launches of up to about 25 metric tons to
LEO and it is possible to spread the costs of launch vehicle development across both commercial
and exploration launches.
It is possible that in the future commercially valuable resources or facilities may exist beyond
Earth. Such a discovery will change the fundamental nature of human activity beyond Earth,
however, it is likely that significant exploration will need to take place before such a discovery is
made. Predictable markets like space tourism are likely to do little for exploration in the medium
term given that they must necessarily operate in reasonably well understood environments like
sub-orbital and LEO. Possible commercial markets opened up by exploration, like on-orbit
refueling, will still be paid for from the government dollar, even if the method of achievement is
left to industry's innovation.
Industry Fact: The production runs of the next human spaceflight architecture are likely to
be one or two of each element per year over a period of time that cannot be easily predicted.
The number of elements produced for human spaceflight architectures are small. For Apollo
elements, "the actual run might amount to one or two dozen items, and even these... would differ
onefrom the other" (Bromberg, 1999, p. 61). The situation was worse with the Shuttle where
only five fully-functional Space Shuttle Orbiters were produced, although the boosters, main
engines and external tanks need replacement on various time intervals.
The quantity of exploration elements required is also uncertain because of uncertainty over the
number of missions to be flown. The final Apollo missions were cancelled. No sustained
program of moon landings followed it. The number of Space Shuttle launches fell many
hundreds short of initial predictions. The Constellation architecture was more open ended and
reflected a drive towards sustainable, ongoing missions, however the program was cancelled after
just a single test flight of the Ares I-X.
Acquisition Consequence 11: The acquisition strategy must allow corporations to make a
profit despite small production rates and uncertain production quantities.
In the long run, NASA contractors must make profit. In the commercial case studies described in
Chapter 4, managers expressed their worry that suppliers under profit pressure would shortcut on
quality. The same applies to NASA's contractors. Additionally, over the decade-long time scales
of exploration developments, contractors who fail to profit from NASA contracts will go out of
business or move to other industries.
The need to make a profit may appear obvious, but aerospace companies do not traditionally
profit on development type contracts. The short production runs on exploration elements
necessitates a different bid strategy by contractors to that which might be used for aircraft or
ships. "Aerospace companies were used to making their money on production runs of
hundreds... it was common practice to buy in by underbidding on the development, with the idea
of making up the losses on subsequent hardware contracts" (Bromberg, 1999).
The need extends below the prime contractor level. The acquisition strategy must keep small
corporations which produce niche pieces of hardware needed only for the exploration program in
business. If these corporations are not maintained, then development of new units and
maintenance of existing units is difficult. "Over the years, the Shuttle Program has experienced
many instances of suppliers dropping off unpredictably, making supply chain management more
difficult and costly...the average mitigation cost is between $200,000 and $700,000"
(Government Accountability Office, 2007a).
The relationship between NASA and industry shapes the types of acquisition structures which are
likely to be effective. Equally relevant are the influences of politics, at both the organizational
level within NASA and at the federal level.
Political Features of Human Spaceflight Architectures
This section examines two types of politics. First is a consideration of the organizational politics
within NASA. Second is a consideration of the consequences of national politics. The
achievement of political goals is NASA's reason for existence. NASA's funding comes from
Congress, and as such an acquisition structure must take into account the political imperatives
which shape NASA.
Political Fact: The ten NASA centers do not function as a cohesive unit.
NASA centers will sometimes place the interests of the center above the interests of NASA as a
whole. This is not intended as a criticism, but rather as a statement of a fact that applies to every
large organization. Centers have traditional areas of expertise which they will promote, market
and protect. Centers will tend to prefer job losses at other centers than their own.
After describing NASA as a "confederation ofsubcultures " (p. 7), McCurdy goes on to highlight
inter-center rivalry at its worst on the Space Station program: "Field officials ... preferred the low
level of supervision created by the lead center approach. [They] wouldn't even give Houston the
courtesy of responding to their communications, much less recognizing them as being in charge"
(McCurdy, 1993, p. 131).
Improved telecommunications now blurs the physical lines between the centers more than
previously. However, the searching budget pressure and lack of clear goals at the present time is
likely to exacerbate a desire to promote the worth of individual centers. It is not possible to say
whether the problem is better or worse than described by McCurdy, but it is certain that it still
exists.
Acquisition Consequence 12: The acquisition strategy must overcome inter-center
parochialism.
The acquisition strategy must acknowledge that information sharing across NASA is not going to
be perfect because of the geographical and cultural separation of the centers. This is important
from an acquisition point of view, because the traditional approach to dealing with this
fragmentation is to exacerbate it by allocating different projects to different centers. The 1990
Augustine Committee were cautious about this approach warning that this was "exactly the
opposite of generally accepted management philosophy that argues for minimizing interfaces, the
'nooks and crannies' where problems seem to breed" (Augustine et al, 1990, p. 128).
Political Fact: Closure of any NASA centers will be politically difficult.
NASA is also strongly supported by local interests within states where NASA is a major
employer. This means that any exploration infrastructure must use a network of NASA centers,
contractors and supply chains which is geographically diverse. Any downsizing or closure of
centers will be fought hard. Szjanfarber observed this on the center level: "NASA has chosen to
prioritize maintaining "10 healthy centers" versus only assigning work to the center where the
historical experience for that work resides" (Szajnfarber et al., 2009) Bromberg saw the same
force at work in the International Space Station work allocation: "Political considerations
dictated that as many centers as possible get a piece of the action." (Bromberg, 1999, p. 180).
Acquisition Consequence 13: The acquisition strategy must allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
An acquisition strategy which utilizes all centers will cause less political difficulty than strategies
which require significant downsizing of particular centers. Inevitably there is some adjustment
with any new dominant program, however strategies like those adopted for Constellation and
International Space Station which put different centers in charge of different aspects of the
exploration infrastructure are more politically palatable than strategies which focus the majority
of work at a single NASA center. This is one of the most obvious areas where the NASA
acquisition realities and the most desirable approach for commonality conflict.
Political Fact: Funding for NASA will vary over time
Even in the best run program, the funding for the development of multi-decade exploration
architectures will vary as priorities within government change. As examples of funding changes
over the life of programs, Bromberg points to the construction of the Shuttle under "tight
financial constraints ...continually under attack from Congress and OMB" (Bromberg, 1999, p.
95). The International Space Station was blown closer to the rocks of cancellation than perhaps
any other completed space architecture, and McCurdy notes that "between 1985 and 1991 they
redesigned space station Freedom no less than five times in their efforts to find a configuration
that the politicians wouldfund". Logsdon argues that Apollo's status in Congress as a fiscally
untouchable memorial to a slain president saved the program from deeper criticism and funding
cuts which may have jeopardized the 1969 moon landing (Logsdon, 2010).
Acquisition Consequence 14: The acquisition strategy must be robust to year-by-year
changes in funding
The acquisition consequence of consistently fluctuating budgets is that such uncertainty should be
planned for. An acquisition strategy which acknowledges that budgets will fluctuate and plans
accordingly in advance will more realistically reflect the nature of NASA's acquisition task.
While there remains "little hope of budget stability" (Augustine et al, 2009, p. 113), a good
acquisition structure (together with strong leadership) can prevent the knock-on effect of a
'frequent need to revamp major programs " (Augustine et al, 1990).
Political Fact: NASA's support in Congress will be enhanced if contracts are awarded
across diverse geographical regions and several different contractors
NASA's Congressional support depends in part on the jobs it creates, though the 2009 Augustine
report warned "it is demeaning to NASA's professionalism to treat the human spaceflight effort
as a 'jobs" program" (Augustine et al, 2009, p. 112). In September 1961 "the lore was that
NASA would not give more than one major contract to any single firm. [Contracting would be
wide] in terms of companies and geographic locations. This would help ensure a cadre of
capable firms for future contracts, and also build political support for its expanding space
efforts." (Bromberg, 1999). Little has changed. Figures showing the diversity of corporations
with responsibility for elements on space programs are shown below for the Apollo program, the
Space Shuttle Orbiter and the main Constellation program elements (Levine, 1982) (NASA,
1976).
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Figure 7: Constellation Program contractors (image: NASA with annotations by the author)
Acquisition Consequence 15: The acquisition strategy must allow work to be divided
between the major aerospace contractors
An acquisition strategy which partitions work so that it can be parceled out to a variety of
contractors is politically preferable to one where a single contractor has the lion's share of the
work. Even on an architecture like the Space Shuttle, where the highly integrated nature of the
design would appear to indicate a single contractor, George Low worked with North American
Aviation / Rockwell which won the prime contract to "ensure that at least some of the money
would be passed through to the losers" (Bromberg, 1999). The diversity of contractors is clear
from Figure 5 and Figure 6.
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Avenues of Change in Future Years
Despite the features discussed above having been more or less constant since the mid 1960s, there
is prospect for change through the next decade.
Possible Change: International cooperation on space exploration architectures may
increase over future years
There appears to be an increasing realization that "Sustainable space exploration is a challenge
that no one nation can do on its own" (International Space Exploration Coordination Group,
2010, p. 2). Nations like Russia, Japan, Europe, China, India and Canada all have significant
space expertise which, if combined, may solve the US difficulty identified in the Augustine report
of the costs of developing and operating space systems (though not without raising difficulties of
its own). Increased international cooperation may be a feature of space programs in the future.4
Acquisition Consequence 16: The acquisition structure should allow international partners
to fit into the acquisition program over time.
Given that international partnerships are likely, the acquisition strategy should not preclude the
possibility of allocating elements of the architecture to other nations. For an analysis of which
elements could be built by which countries, see Szajnfarber et al (2011) . For instance, an
acquisition structure which allocated all exploration elements initially to a particular NASA
center for further contracting would likely preclude international cooperation along the "critical
path" (a desire of many potential partners). It would score poorly against this acquisition
consequence.
Possible change: Commercial space companies may become increasingly capable and have
customers other than the US government
There is increased interest in the products produced by commercial space companies (loosely
defined as those seeking a non-government market or developing for the government market on
private funding). SpaceX is the most prominent, but the inflatable modules developed by
Bigelow Aerospace, the engine technology behind Xcor and the vertical take-off and landing
systems developed by Masten Space Systems would all have places in an exploration
architecture. SpaceX is midway through development of a family of human-rated launch vehicles
where the heaviest of the vehicles (Falcon 9 Heavy) would have a payload of nearly 30 metric
tons to low Earth Orbit, and is developing the Dragon crew capsule (Dreyer, 2009). Commercial
companies are investigating space options for transport and tourism (Chandler, 2007). While
these systems are presently dwarfed by the government investment in space exploration
infrastructure, private development is a fast growing industry. If the high growth trend continues,
the commercial industry may have an effect on NASA's exploration infrastructure. Pelton
overviews some of the more wide-reaching potential contributions by private space companies
(Pelton, 2010).
Scott Pace summarized the uncertain future of commercial spaceflight in a recent interview:
"This generation of companies- SpaceX, Bigelow, Virgin Galactic, and a number of others-is
the strongest and the best that we've seen to date. They have made progress, but if history is a
guide, most will die " (Pace, 2011).
4 For a variety of perspectives on blending domestic US and international space programs, see for example the focused
segment in Volume 27, Issue 1 (2011) of Space Policy
Acquisition Consequence 17: Acquisition strategies should allow the participation of
commercial space companies when the capabilities of those companies are proven.
The acquisition strategies should take the developing commercial sector into account. There
should be scope within the acquisition structure to include commercial developments, once
proven, into the exploration architecture. For instance, an acquisition structure which awarded
most of the contracts at the project outset for long durations would score poorly on its flexibility
to allow commercial space companies to participate.
Summary
NASA's acquisition strategies need to work with the organization and its environment. This
chapter has identified the technical, industrial and political realities of NASA's mission, and how
those realities may change over the next phase of human space exploration. Table 2 summarizes
the key conclusions of this chapter. These acquisition realities will be used in Chapter 5 to assess
the acquisition strategies based on how appropriate those strategies are to NASA's mission.
2.2 COMMONALITY OVERVIEW AND IDENTIFICATION OF BEST PRACTICE
Introduction
The previous section examined the technical, industrial and political environment which
constrains NASA's acquisition strategies. Fitting the NASA environment is not enough for a
successful commonality strategy however, and this section will identify the current best practice
for pursuing commonality. Ultimately, the aim of this thesis is to find a strategy which is close to
best practice for commonality and which fits the NASA environment.
This section will first overview the extensive work on best practice for commonality which has
been summarized and extended by Boas and Rhodes. Then the section will provide additional
high-level observations about commonality developed during this thesis, leaving the detail to the
descriptions of the case studies in chapter 4. The section closes by providing process maps for
commonality. The purpose of the process maps is as checklists of good commonality practice,
and each acquisition strategy will be evaluated on how well it allows each process to be executed.
Overview of existing analysis of commonality
At the outset of this examination of commonality, it must be made clear that commonality is not a
goal in itself. Making two products more or less common does not make either intrinsically
faster, better or cheaper. However, in some commercial industries commonality is an established
way to develop products faster, at lower cost, and with higher reliability. Such achievements
would be attractive to NASA.
Commonality has been defined in a number of different ways. Boas looked at the physical
instances of commonality and defined it as "the reuse and sharing of assets such as components,
processes, technologies, interfaces and/or infrastructure across a productfamily" (Boas, 2008, p.
12).
A product "family" is a set of products which for which the "customer needs" may overlap and
commonality may be possible (Boas, 2008). Hofstetter describes the same in terms of
"engineering needs" and uses the term "portfolio" to describe the set of products finally produced
(Hofstetter, 2009). In this chapter we will use Boas' nomenclature. A "variant" is a particular
type of product in the family. For example, the Delta launch vehicles are a product family, and
the Delta IV Heavy is a variant. Variants have some commonality with other products in the
family.
In these definitions, it is important to draw a distinction between commonality between products
within a family, and commonality between products used elsewhere in industry. The first
commonality philosophy is reuse and platforming within a family (simply referred to as
"platforming"), the second commonality philosophy is the use of "commercial off-the-shelf'
(COTS) parts. This thesis examines "platforming" type commonality rather than COTS
commonality for several reasons. The primary reason is that platforming is more powerful
(assuming it can be well executed, a non-trivial assumption because platforming is generally
more difficult). Platforming in spaceflight applications is more powerful because it deals with
system-level commonality, while COTS deals largely at the component level.
Figure 8 shows the advantages and disadvantages of commonality throughout a simplified
product lifecycle. The figure is a consolidation of information presented by Boas, Hofstetter and
Rhodes and also incorporates comments made by interviewees during this thesis. Table 4 and
Table 5 describe the advantages and disadvantages in more detail.
Three key points can be drawn from Figure 8. First, commonality has multiple effects on all
stages of the product lifecycle beginning with product strategy decisions and carrying through to
operations.
Second, commonality in all stages of the product lifecycle involves a weighting of advantages
and disadvantages. Each lifecycle phase has boxes above the middle black line indicating
advantages and boxes below indicating disadvantages.
Third, commonality involves a multi-objective trade-off. Boxes shaded purple indicate a
performance effect, while boxes left unshaded affect cost and schedule. For example,
commonality improves survivability in the operating phase, but at the expense of an ongoing cost
of managing commonality. Therefore examining whether commonality is beneficial in any
particular instance is not straightforward.
Figure 8 presents the advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of the entire product
family. The perspective of variants within the family may be a subset of this full set of
advantages and disadvantages. This is particularly the case when the developments are offset in
time, which Boas showed occurs in all complex product families.
Figure 9 shows the perspective of the first variant in time when there is offset between the
variants. When the development of variants in the product family is offset in time, the first
variant is likely to perceive commonality as less advantageous than will later variants. For
example, the first variant might be required to design a flight computer which exceeds its own
needs by including additional interface ports. It incurs the additional design cost without any
performance benefit. The first variant will also not obtain any operating benefit until the
subsequent development projects with which it was designed to be common occur. Cancellation
of later projects will reduce the value of the investment of the first product in commonality. The
fact that the first-in-time variant sees significant downside to commonality was highlighted by
Boas, but Figure 8 and Figure 9 taken together powerfully illustrate how strong this phenomenon
could be.
Conversely, the later variants in a product family usually achieve commonality benefits earlier,
for example by taking advantage of earlier designs. In the human spaceflight sector, it is very
unusual for any designs to begin with a purely clean sheet (see for example the launch vehicle
case studies in Chapter 4), and designs usually reuse some previous technologies both for cost
and risk reasons.
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Table 4: Benefits of commonality
Benefit Reason
Cost
reduced development cost Commonality can reduce the number of
separate development projects, or the amount
of effort on development projects after the first
reduced manufacturing cost Economies of scale in component procurement;
reduced variation in the tooling and
manufacturing equipment required for the
product family spreads fixed, non-recurring
capital costs; lower inventory costs for
purchased common parts
reduced operating cost Sharing operating resources like ground
facilities or maintenance plants spreads fixed
recurring costs over more products; variable
recurring costs are reduced through economies
of scale and learning; common products share
common spare parts, reducing spares and
logistics costs
reduced product volume risk Common components can be allocated to any of
the variants, reducing the loss associated with a
single variant performing poorly
Schedule
reduced development time over the In design, reuse of well understood elements
whole product family allows faster design; in production,
manufacturing multiple identical elements
becomes faster due to learning
Cost and schedule
reduced development risk over the Reuse of proven technologies; fewer separate
whole product family development projects
reduced product verification and Reuse of testing infrastructure reduces costs;
validation for later products reuse of results from earlier identical products
reduces schedule
reduced training time Common interfaces or operational procedures
reduce operator training time
Product performance
reduced operational risk Common products can be operated in common
ways, reducing operational complexity and
operator error
increased survivability Commonality improves the chances of success
in using non-intended spares to replace critical
parts in emergency situations
improved interoperability Systems designed on common elements often
have higher inherent interoperability than
uniquely designed systems, though this is not
always the case
Table 5: Drawbacks to commonality
Drawback Reason
Cost
Increased cost and risk for initial Engineering a part to be common across
production multiple products often makes the part more
complex
Increased cost for the initial product if Commonality benefits are often based on
future variants do not appear sharing with future variants; if these future
variants do not appear then the added cost
and complexity of making the parts common
is wasted
Cost and Schedule
Increased cost and time for the design The process of identifying and managing
and manufacture of the first unit commonality increases the cost of producing
the first unit
Increased risk of obsolescence Technology or market changes may make
the common component obsolete,
necessitating an upgrade of the entire
product family
Product performance
Sub-optimal performance Common parts imply either overperformance
in one variant or underperformance in
another variant, because the part is not
optimized for the particular use case
Increased performance risk A single design failure will affect more
products if it occurs in the common part
Increased risk during operation Common parts may be more complex and
therefore more prone to failure
Boas also points out that implementation of retroactive commonality is unusual and expensive.
He traces this to the cost of a simultaneous change to two projects at different stages of the
development cycle, shown in Figure 10. The blue line represents the time variance of the cost of
change for the first project, and the red line for the second project. At the point in time when an
engineering change is contemplated, the cost of making the change is higher for the first project
than for the second project. This means that for a certain range of changes where the cost of not
changing the project (in terms of performance, operating cost or the like) is greater than the cost
of change of the second project but less than that for the first, change will only be implemented
on the second project. The implication of this for commonality implementation is that
commonality must be well planned from the start.
time
Figure 10: Different change costs at different points in development make retrospective commonality difficult to
implement (Boas, 2008)
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Figure 11: Divergence occurs through the product lifecycle (Boas, 2008)
Boas found that the amount of commonality throughout the product lifecycle always decreases
after an initial planning phase, as shown in Figure 11. Boas coined the term "divergence" to
represent the difference between the initial planned commonality of a product family and the
realized commonality. He stated that divergence could occur for both acceptable and
unacceptable reasons, summarized in Table 6. Rhodes showed how active management
throughout the development cycle is an effective tool in the NASA context for managing
divergence, minimizing unacceptable reasons for divergence.
Table 6: Acceptable and unacceptable reasons for divergence (from Rhodes 2010)
Acceptable reasons for divergence
Technology developments mean that a
better solution for the lifecycle of the whole
family has been identified
Market change necessitates a different
second product than first anticipated
Learning through development of the first
product suggests changes for the second
product
Unacceptable reasons for divergence
Divergence to make unnecessary
performance improvements unique to that
variant
Divergence to improve the cost or schedule
of that particular variant, while increasing the
family costs.
In analyzing the management of commonality projects, Rhodes developed
framework based on the time progression of all commonality projects. He
effective commonality plan should consider three phases:
a three-phased
showed that an
* identify commonality opportunities for technical feasibility
evaluate technically feasible opportunities for financial and other net benefit
- implement technically feasible, net beneficial opportunities
Rhodes pointed out that failure in any one of these steps results in less than optimal commonality.
He presented a set of detailed heuristics and tools for managing commonality in each of these
stages.
Boas presented a commonality framework which complements the approach of Rhodes. Instead
of looking at the process steps in developing commonality on a project, Boas divided the
commonality strategies into three types, based on the relationship between the elements in the
family of common products. A stylized representation of the difference between the strategies is
shown in Figure 12. To explain the figure:
- Reactive reuse simply recognizes and implements opportunities to use elements that have
been developed in the past. The development of the first system does not acknowledge the
needs of the second. An example of reactive reuse is the use of the Crawlerway at KSC
for both Saturn V and Shuttle. In the context of developing space infrastructure, the
interviews in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that reactive reuse is generally used where the rate
of improvement in performance from technology is low, where reliability is best proved
through flight heritage and high reliability is required and where manufacturing rates are
low.
- Building block commonality occurs when a small number of particular modules, usually
high-value, are deliberately made common across the variants in the family, but
independent development takes place on all other aspects. An example of building block
commonality is the use of the J-2X upper stage engine across both the Ares I and Ares V.
Building block commonality works well where new systems need to be developed
because of technological progress or performance requirements, but all systems have
similar operational environments.
Widespread forward commonality occurs when modules are made common plus attempts
are often made to identify other opportunities for commonality such as component,
technology or process commonality. Commonality opportunities are implemented on
some systems and divergence occurs on other systems on an ongoing basis to achieve
optimum commonality levels over time. An example of widespread forward commonality
is the Joint Strike Fighter development. Widespread forward commonality is most
appropriate in situations where there is widespread potential component level
commonality across different systems in addition to system-level commonality, and
where there are significant benefits to commonality in later stages of development, for
example manufacture or operations. While divergence is the dominant process, it is
offset to a small degree by the continuous identification and implementation of new
commonality opportunities (referred to as "convergence").
Boas points out that the best strategy is project dependent. For example, one of Boas' concluding
recommendations was "as time offsets between products increase, focus efforts on the intelligent
reuse of existing assets rather than on enabling future commonality." Boas saw all three of these
strategies in organizations where a single corporation was charged with developing a family of
common products.
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Figure 12: Boas' classification of commonality approaches
Before leaving the threefold classification of reactive re-use, common building block and
widespread forward commonality, it is worth illustrating how reactive re-use and common
building block strategies apply to a real NASA example.
Example of reactive re-use and building block commonality within NASA
As a starting point in analyzing NASA commonality, it is important to recognize that NASA
architectures are not based around a single type of commonality. Rhodes, for example, saw
reactive reuse and building block commonality in his three NASA case studies. A second
example was undertaken in preparation for this thesis on the Ares I launch vehicle, and its
commonality forward in time to the Ares V launch vehicle. The example is shown in Figure 13
and illustrates three things.
First, reactive reuse is widespread on the launch vehicles. Each shaded box indicates
commonality with previous launch vehicle systems. The color of the shading shows the source of
the commonality.
Second, most systems have been modified from their original form as they were reused. This
changes the system from being completely common into a "similar" or "cousin" part.
Finally, building block commonality is used at high levels of the project. The aggregations boxed
in red are intended for direct reuse on the Ares V. Systems intended for reuse with modification
are boxed in dashed red.
The example is also a motivation for this thesis. The organizations developing each of the
systems are shown in grey around the system. There is a network of contractors with almost no
commonality between the systems developed by different contractors. The research in this thesis
aims to evaluate the effect of the network of contractors on the commonality that can be
developed.
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Observations on commonality culture and commonality's interplay with other architecting
strategies
Boas wrote that commonality culture is a "culture of designing new by exception rather than
default" (Boas, 2008, p. 214). Boas only observed this culture in an organization practicing
widespread forward commonality. As a result, it is tempting - but incorrect - to consider
commonality culture and widespread forward commonality to be synonymous. In light of the
work undertaken for this thesis, it is more correct to say that a commonality culture can
complement any one of the three family strategies, and it will choose the most appropriate
strategy at any point. For example, the third case study in Chapter 4 demonstrated a commonality
culture predicated largely on reuse.
Commonality is not the only architecting strategy available to design good architectures. Table 7
shows three strategies often considered in the context of architecting space exploration. A
modular architecture, an open architecture and an interoperable architecture are considered. The
modular architecture closely parallels building block commonality by dividing the architecture
into re-usable modules. Its approach is strongly complementary to commonality. An
interoperable architecture is designed to permit predictable interaction between different systems,
usually to form a network. Commonality of interfaces or communication protocols is often used
as a way of obtaining commonality, although commonality is neither necessary nor sufficient for
commonality. In this way, interoperable architectural approaches are complementary to
commonality approaches.
Open architectures, however, are not. Open architectures depend on a proliferation of isolated
but competitive designs with defined interfaces and standards (Silver, 2010). The philosophy of
minimally controlled proliferation of alternative design approaches produces many alternative
designs and commonality benefits. For example, consider a possible section of the human
exploration architecture which is the transfer of propellant from Earth's surface to an on-orbit
propellant depot. An open architecture would encourage many different vehicle designs
competing to transfer propellant to the depot. The benefits would be largely from innovation and
competition as different organizations competed to transfer fuel to the depot. There would be
little commonality benefit. A commonality approach on the other hand would obtain its benefits
from a single vehicle design sent repeatedly to the depot, meaning learning benefits and
economies of scale in manufacturing and operation of the vehicle as well as higher proven
reliability.
This does not mean that open architectures and commonality are an either / or choice for the
whole of the exploration architecture. Rather, the architecture may need to be partitioned and a
commonality approach applied to some sections and an open architecture applied to other
sections. For example, a commonality approach could be used for the deep space infrastructure
such as in-space propulsion and habitation modules, and an open architecture approach used for
fuel, crew and cargo to LEO.
The effect of this observation on this thesis is that the system-level acquisition strategies
evaluated for commonality effect in Chapter 5 may not be the most appropriate for all the systems
in the architecture; rather, a commonality approach should be selected for those acquisitions
where it makes sense.
Table 7: The interplay of commonality and other architecting strategies
Modular Architecture interoperable Architecture Open Architecture
Description A modular architecture
aims to design and build
systems or sub-systems
which can be used
multiple times in the same
or other products.
Interaction Modularity encourages
with reuse by improving the
commonality ability to identify potential
reuse and reducing the
cost of actual reuse.
Modularity is the essence
of building-block
commonality.
Conclusion
Interoperable architectures are
designed to permit predictable
interaction between different
systems. In practice, systems are
usually designed to be
interoperable with multiple other
systems forming a network.
Some commonality between two
systems helps to ensure
interoperability, even though it is a
non-necessary and insufficient
condition for interoperability. In
very general terms two systems
with common interfaces or
common protocols are less likely
to cause interoperation difficulties
than trying to interoperate two
unique systems.
Open architectures define interfaces
and standards in order to allow wide
participation in the achievement of an
architecture (Silver 2010)
Open architectures allow different
organizations to contribute their
products to a system. Usually the
commonality between these products
is limited to that specified in the open
architecture. The benefits of
openness (especially for innovation)
are predicated on organizations taking
different approaches to their products.
This means that it is largely
incompatible with commonality.
Developing Commonality Process Maps
The final part of the overview of commonality theory synthesizes the fieldwork undertaken for
this thesis with that of Boas and Rhodes and the technical analysis by Hofstetter to produce a
series of commonality process maps. The maps are shown in Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16
for reactive reuse, common building block and widespread forward commonality strategies,
respectively. The maps are accompanied by heuristics which capture best practice in gathering
the inputs and performing the processes shown on the maps. The maps will be used in analyzing
the commonality effectiveness of the acquisition. An acquisition strategy which leads to "good"
performance on the process map, as defined by the heuristics, will score well for commonality
effectiveness.
The process and heuristics are similar, but not the same, between the strategies for reactive reuse,
common building block and wide-spread forward commonality. In the figures, the processes or
heuristics which differ from the previous figure are marked in red outlines. Heuristics which
continue through to the next figure substantially unchanged are shaded in light blue, those which
are specific to the strategy being examined have no shading.
The process maps add an "entry gateway" to the identify, evaluate, implement framework of
Rhodes. This is required because the types of projects which are appropriate to each process are
different, and the entry gateway allows this to be specifically considered. It is also necessary
because some heuristics are intended to encourage entry into the commonality process rather than
any particular phase and the idea of an entry gateway permits bookkeeping of these heuristics.
Each commonality project is different but the process maps are intended to be general enough to
capture the flow of almost all types of commonality. The straight arrows show progressions from
step to step, and the circular arrows indicate iterations between processes.
Process Map: Reactive Reuse
Entry Gateway
* WHAT?
Single systems or
components
DRIVER?
Up-front cost / reliability
improvements
FREQUENCY?
Can be isolated incidents
or frequent (culture)
----------------
Requirements of proposed
system / component
Form / function specification
of existing systems
Specs / Requirements from
interconnected systems
Inputs
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Anticipated use case
for new system
Lifecycle cost estimate of I
unique new system
Process: Identify Process: Evaluate
Assess performance Eaut omnlt
diffrence beteen two bEvaluate commonalitydiferecebeteentw benefits and detriments
systems.
Perform Systems Eng to Evaluate whetherinvestigate implications o commonality is beneficialperformance differencenit'isbefca
Assess modifying existing
item to meet performance
specs
Performance cost of reusing
common (or similar) system
Initial Yes / No Commonality
Decision
Outputs
Heuristics: Reactive Reuse
Entry Gateway Process: Identify Process: Evaluate
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1.1 Clearly define requirements and use case of
the potentially common system
1.2 Minimize variation of the requirements and use case of
the potentially common system
1.3 Encourage a thorough planning stage which sifts previous projects for reuse potential
i l d
1.4 Incentivize low development costs or lifecycle affordability
1.10 Create a culture of new
design by exception
1.5 Begin commonality 1.6 Make full costs of commonality
identification early in design available
1.7 Allow trades between multi-objective performance and lifecycle cost
1.11 Make existing designs,
documentation and expertise
available on a wide range of
systems
1.12 Document and validate
projects as if they were going to be
reused
Process: Implement
1.8 Make rights to reproduce /
modify existing designs available
1.9 Apportion responsibility and
liability for reused systems
Figure 14: Process map and heuristics for reactive reuse
Reused System with some
modifications
Description of Reactive Reuse Process Map.
The process map for reactive reuse is shown in the upper half of Figure 14.
The entry gateway shows that reactive reuse processes usually act on single elements considered
in isolation. In other words, a system or project development unilaterally decides to investigate
previous or existing projects to obtain commonality benefits. The driver for this process is
usually up-front benefits from reduced development cost, increased design confidence or
improved reliability. Reactive reuse can be called upon regularly in a project, or infrequently,
depending on the culture in the organization.
The first process is to identify opportunities for commonality. The inputs to this process are
technical: an understanding of the form and function of existing elements which may be reused,
the specifications or requirements of elements interconnected with the proposed elements, and an
understanding of the requirements of the proposed elements.
The process itself is broken down into three steps.
1. The similarity in performance between existing elements and the potentially common
element requirements is first examined. Both of the inputs are needed in making this
comparison.
2. It is unlikely that a reused element will be perfect in terms of form and function,
particularly for systems instead of simpler components. The effect of reusing an existing
system on the proposed development as a whole must be considered. For example, if a
potential reuse of a solar panel would deliver slightly less power than the requirements,
can the power budget for interconnected systems be adjusted downward so that the
performance is acceptable?
3. The final process step in identifying opportunities for reactive reuse is to assess whether
the potentially reused element could be slightly modified to deliver performance closer to
the requirements. For example, the solution might be to upgrade the solar cells from
silicon to gallium arsenide, but retain all mechanical systems of the existing panel
unchanged. It is likely some iteration between steps 2 and 3 will be required to reach an
outcome which satisfies the technical requirements of the element as a whole.
The output of the identification process in reactive reuse is an assessment of the technical
feasibility of reuse which usually identifies the performance cost of such reuse.
The performance cost of reuse is used in the evaluate phase, where the costs and benefits of the
reuse are considered. The inputs to this phase are the use case (how the system is likely to be
utilized in context of the broader architecture) and, as a comparator, the estimated lifecycle cost
of developing the system without commonality.
The evaluate process is broken down into steps:
1. The advantages and disadvantages of the commonality are evaluated. This evaluation
uses the performance cost assessed in the "identify" phase. It also requires the "use case"
or conops for the new system, because factors like the projected number of systems
produced and the production time period will affect the advantages and disadvantages.
2. The net benefit (or detriment) of commonality in the proposed system is compared with
the likely outcome of unique development. In order to make this comparison, the
estimate of the lifecycle cost of the system without reuse is required.
The output from the evaluate process is a decision as to whether it is economically sensible to
proceed with a reuse strategy. Often there is uncertainty around future events which will impact
the decision, so the evaluate process may be probabilistic (Rhodes 2010).
The final step in reactive reuse is to implement the commonality. Implementation is a two step
process.
1. The common element is developed and manufactured, perhaps with some modification
from the reused design. It may be manufactured by the original organization, or from its
designs by a new company. It may even be reverse engineered.
2. Divergence is managed. As the development of the reused element progresses,
management processes to minimize unacceptable divergence must be in place. Those
management processes will need to reflect, and interact with, the development process.
Therefore there is iteration between development and the management of divergence.
There is also iteration between the implementation of commonality and the evaluation process.
As new information comes to hand during implementation, even a reactive reuse strategy should
be continually evaluated in the light of any new information, and divergence allowed to occur if
necessary.
The output of the implementation phase is a reused system, probably with some modifications to
the original if it is a complex system.
Heuristics for best practice on reactive reuse
In addition to identifying the processes which lead to reactive reuse, previous work also identified
heuristics for performing the processes well. The heuristics are summarized in the lower half of
Figure 14. These heuristics are used in Chapter 5 to help assess whether an acquisition structure
will allow the processes to be performed well.
Heuristic 1.1: Clearly define requirements and use case of the potentially common system
The requirements and use case are important inputs into the analysis of reactive reuse potential.
If the requirements or use case are ill defined then there is additional uncertainty in the
commonality analysis and the potential for divergence increases.
Heuristic 1.2: Minimize variation of the requirements and use case of
the potentially common system
Changes in requirements or use case change the assumptions on which the analysis is undertaken.
The changes will necessitate a new analysis if the project is still in the analysis stage. If
development has begun, the element will either undergo divergence or commonality opportunities
that could have been identified will go unimplemented.
Heuristic 1.3: "Encourage a thorough planning stage which sifts previous projects for reuse
potential "
This heuristic is quoted from Boas. The identification and evaluation phases take time to
undertake properly. More time on these phases increases the chance that if a favorable
commonality opportunity exists it will be identified.
Heuristic 1.4: Incentivize low development costs or lifecycle affordability
There must be a reason to undertake the commonality process. In the case of reactive reuse,
incentivizing low development costs is usually sufficient because reactive reuse delivers savings
prior to operations. It is also possible to encourage reactive reuse by incentivizing lifecycle
affordability more generally.
Heuristic 1.5: Begin commonality identification early in design
Rhodes emphasizes that commonality identification should begin early in design. This allows
maximum flexibility in the system engineering aspect of the identification process. Trades can be
made with other systems to increase the possibility of including a reused element in the
architecture even if it does not exactly match the original specification.
Heuristic 1. 6: Make full costs of commonality available
Rhodes found that design teams would better consider commonality if they were exposed to the
full cost implications of commonality over the lifecycle of the product.
Heuristic 1.7: Allow trades between multi-objective performance and lifecycle cost
As shown above, the benefits and detriments of commonality span performance, schedule and
cost. Often, but not always, commonality delivers cost savings at the expense of performance.
Commonality is most likely to be beneficial in systems where performance is not an absolute
requirement, but rather where the concept of value (benefit or performance at cost) is used to
drive system choices.
Heuristic 1.8: Make rights to reproduce / modify existing designs available
The case studies examined by Rhodes and those examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis found that
reactive reuse was stymied in some instances by legal barriers. Reactive reuse requires the right
to reproduce or modify the existing designs identified as potentially common.
Heuristic 1.9: Apportion responsibility and liability for reused systems
The case studies in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the issue of liability for reused elements can
reduce the willingness of organizations to reuse elements. The implementation of reactive reuse
should address liability.
Heuristic 1.10: Create a culture of new design by exception
Boas found that there was a cultural dimension to commonality design. He suggested that
organizations should aim to make commonality culturally embedded into the organization, with
common design the rule, rather than the exception.
Heuristic 1.11: Make existing designs, documentation and expertise available on a wide range of
systems
Reactive reuse depends on historical designs being available. Existing designs should be made as
widely available as possible to increase the chances of an existing design appropriate for reuse
being identified.
Heuristic 1.12: Document and validate projects as if they were going to be reused
Part of creating a culture of common design is creating the expectation that designs will be
reused. Current designs should be packaged in such a way that they can be easily retrieved in
future. Over time, this decreases the effort required to search existing designs and increases the
likelihood and benefit of reactive reuse.
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Figure 15: Process map and heuristics for common building block
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Process map for a common building block strategy
A common building block strategy undergoes a similar process to reactive reuse except that the
entry gateway is different, there are some process changes in the "identify" stage and the required
inputs require more effort to collect. Figure 15 summarizes the process for a common building
block strategy, with the changes from the reactive reuse structure outlined in red.
The building block strategy is the simpler of the strategies which look forward to build a family
of products over time, and the entry gateway reflects this. Usually the products entering this
process are high-value products and have clear commonality potential. The systems are driven to
the process by lifecycle cost savings across the family (rather than the upfront benefit to a single
product of reactive reuse). Relatively few elements per project enter this approach to
commonality because the up-front commonality usually needs to be obvious for the projects to be
singled out early enough for the commonality to be successful.
There are important changes to the identification process. The inputs to the process are now the
requirements across all the variants which may use the building block. This is different to the
reactive reuse approach which considered the requirements of a single product only. For
example, in designing a building block engine for a launch vehicle family the thrust requirements
for all vehicles would be required.
The first step of the identification process now needs to consider the difference in requirements of
all the projects or elements which could use the building block, rather than the difference between
projected requirements of a single element and known performance of an existing element. In
practice, this probably means more iteration between the system engineering of the several
variants to try to achieve a common solution.
The third step of the identification process also becomes less easily defined for the common
building block structure. It is possible to make modifications to the building block to
accommodate variants with unusual performance requirements. This effectively introduces
another degree of freedom which can be adjusted to develop a technically feasible common
solution. However, if too many variants need modification, unique design may be a better option.
Once a technically feasible solution is found, the commonality process moves to evaluate.
Changes from reactive reuse are also made in this process. Under a building block approach, the
use cases of all the potential variants should be considered when assessing the advantages and
disadvantages of commonality. Similarly the lifecycle costs for unique development of all the
potential variants is required to evaluate whether commonality in fact presents a better solution
than independent development.
The implementation process is very similar to reactive reuse. However, when managing
divergence, the effect of divergence on the family as a whole must be considered. Divergence
which benefits an individual variant but which is detrimental to the family as a whole should be
rejected, and such an analysis is only possible with full information (perhaps with uncertainty) on
the entire family. The iterations between evaluation and implementation are just as important in
the building block approach as in the reactive reuse approach.
Additional heuristics for a common building block strategy
Many of the heuristics for common building block design are the same as those for reactive reuse.
Figure 15 shows the new heuristics for building block design in red outline. Heuristics shown in
the figure without red outline are largely unchanged from the guidance for reactive reuse projects
and are not explained again below.
Heuristic 2.13: Encourage a thorough planning stage which looks forward to a range ofpossible
future projects
The thorough planning stage of reactive reuse must go further in the case of building block
commonality. The planning must look forward to a range of possible future projects or elements,
rather than concentrating on looking backward to historic projects. Future projects have
additional uncertainties, making this process more difficult.
Heuristic 2.14: Define building blocks to be investigated (or incentivize the search for
appropriate building blocks)
The search for building blocks has to be incentivized, particularly because the benefit to the first
project to need the building block is likely to be minimal. The simplest, but not necessarily best,
way of doing this is to require the investigation of building blocks on particular architectural
elements like engines or avionics as an early and separate phase of development. An alternative
is to incentivize the investigation of building block opportunities with bonuses or rewards.
Heuristic 2.15: Coordinate development of building block with the unique systems of other
variants
The building block is developed as a new element which must interact with interfacing elements
in several other projects. For example, a new launch vehicle engine must interact with the
avionics and propellant tanks of each vehicle it powers. The development of the building block
must be coordinated with the unique elements being developed for each variant. One way to
ensure this occurs is to develop the building block first, but this may not be the best overall
strategy.
Heuristic 2.16: Establish a single point of responsibility for commonality outcome at a higher
organization level than any individual project
Rhodes emphasized the need for responsibility and accountability for commonality. He
suggested that a single point of commonality responsibility at a level above any variant was the
best way to achieve this.
Heuristic 2.17: Minimize time offset between development of two intended common systems
Boas suggested that as the time offset between common elements increases, the chance of
successful commonality decreases. Therefore a successful building block strategy should not
have a long time offset between two variants.
Heuristic 2.18: Prevent a bias toward any particular variant (especially the first in time variant)
Both Boas and Rhodes found that commonality could be compromised by an emphasis on the
performance of a particular variant, usually the first in time variant. Good commonality practice
avoids biasing the family towards the first in time variant simply because it is better defined and
therefore easier to analyze.
Heuristic 2.19: Plan for change
Boas found that all commonality projects change in ways which are not predictable at the outset.
Therefore a commonality project should have some allowances for changes to ensure that change
does not send the project immediately into an expensive cycle of redesign.
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Process map for a widespread forward commonality strategy
The process for widespread forward commonality is broadly similar to developing common
building blocks. Under widespread forward commonality, however, more elements pass through
the commonality process, and the examination of divergence and commonality is more
continuous. Figure 16 summarizes the widespread forward commonality strategy, with the
changes from building block commonality outlined in red.
The increased number of elements entering the process can be seen in the changes to the entry
gateway. More elements enter the widespread forward commonality assessment process. The
range of elements which enter the process is also larger. Widespread forward commonality is
likely to operate on the highest level of element where some commonality benefits can be gained,
so components are likely to pass through widespread forward commonality in addition to
complete systems. Contrast this with a building block strategy which usually focuses on
complete systems because of their high value.
The initial identification and evaluation processes are very similar to the common building block
processes. However, iteration has been added to the transition between identification and
implementation. This indicates the increased fusion of the processes, so that evaluations
indicating no commonality benefit are reexamined to see if additional benefit can be identified.
The idea of increased interaction is also shown in the additional inputs to the "implement"
process. Ongoing identification and evaluation feed into the process of managing divergence.
The manage divergence process also looks for opportunities to increase commonality over time.
Although Boas showed that the general trend over time was towards divergence, he documented
cases of new commonality opportunities being identified during the course of development.
Constant management of these twin processes of divergence and convergence is a hallmark of
widespread forward commonality.
Additional heuristic for widespread forward commonality
There is one additional heuristic for widespread forward commonality not present in the building
block strategy.
Heuristic 3.20: Incentivize continuous pursuit and optimization of commonality opportunities
Widespread forward commonality requires continuous analysis of commonality. Identify,
evaluate, implement cycles must be undertaken at regular intervals on a wide range of elements.
For widespread forward commonality to occur, this process must be incentivized.
The preceding section has examined the existing literature and mined the case studies for best
practice process and heuristics when developing for commonality. Using the process maps it is
possible to be more precise in predicting which aspects of commonality an acquisition will do
well at, and where it will perform poorly, a task which is undertaken in Chapter 5. Combined
with the evaluation of NASA's acquisition task in section 2.1, there exists a good understanding
of what a commonality acquisition strategy should do. However, understanding what should be
done is not practical without an understanding of what can be done in terms of acquisition
structuring. The following section will examine a range of acquisition strategies and contract
approaches to provide an understanding of the available approaches.
2.3 TOOLS FOR CRAFTING AcQUISITION STRATEGIES
The previous section of this chapter described commonality best practice, however the question
of improving commonality outcomes across multi-organization space architectures has not yet
been answered. One final piece of background information is required before trying to answer
that question. This section will provide it by describing the contractual tools available for
crafting acquisition strategies.
Acquisition strategies can certainly affect the realization of commonality. The previous section
showed how, among other concepts, developing commonality may increase the costs of systems
early in development. The benefits of commonality may only be realized on a long-term view or
from a perspective that encompasses the development efforts of multiple variants. Companies
involved in developing systems for the exploration architecture may not have either of these
perspectives. The acquisition strategy needs to either deliver these perspectives to the company,
or deliver artificial incentives which produce the same results as would be achieved if the
company was able to directly feel the benefits and detriments of commonality. In the absence of
such incentives, companies would make decisions which optimized the variant they were
producing at the expense of the commonality. In other words, in the absence of a considered
acquisition strategy, undesirable divergence would occur.
Introduction and Overview
An acquisition strategy "provides a business and technical management outline for planning,
directing, and managing a project and obtaining products and services via contract" (NASA,
2007a). The FAR encourages the creation of an acquisition strategy as early as possible in
planning major projects: "The program manager... shall develop an acquisition strategy tailored
to the particular major system acquisition program" (FAR section 34.004). In industry,
acquisition strategy is often cast as the "make/buy" decision or subsumed into supply chain
management. In this chapter, we will focus on cases where the government is the customer, and
must work with both other government agencies and private-sector corporations because this
most closely reflects the requirements of NASA. NASA may also be involved in architectures
with foreign participation and it is worth noting that acquisition strategies can include foreign
national governments and foreign-owned corporations.
Although media accounts of government acquisition focus most stridently on concepts like "fixed
price" or "cost plus" payment, an acquisition strategy involves more than just considering how
the contractor should be paid for its work. The acquisition strategy includes analysis of the
broader sequencing and context of contract award in order to deliver a better result. None of the
following examples consider payment structure, but all will affect the schedule, quality and price
of the product:
* Using a series of yearly contracts instead of just a single total quantity contract to
encourage more continuous competition.
- Splitting the technical deliverables into block upgrades to reduce technical risk.
* Awarding contracts to multiple companies to encourage competition.
In its simplest form, an acquisition strategy sets out which organizations build what, when, and
for how much. In complex system development, allowances have to be made for the fact that the
buyer often does not know the detail of what needs to be acquired, or how long it will take, or
how much it should cost (an entirely different question to how much it would like it to cost).
Therefore acquisition strategies must be more flexible than just setting out corporation, schedule
and price. The tools of this flexibility are the subject of this chapter.
The US human exploration architecture - in whatever form it emerges from the post-
Constellation political and technical debate - is a program that requires an acquisition strategy.
In fact, the human exploration architecture is likely to require tiers of acquisition strategies.
Some will dictate the overall approach to acquiring the necessary capability over timeframes of
decades while others will be focused on delivering particular systems in shorter periods.
There is a fundamental difference between the single acquisition structure which is applied across
the top level of the entire human exploration architecture, and the multiple strategies developed to
acquire particular systems. This distinction is illustrated in Figure 17. In this thesis, the two tiers
are called the "Program Acquisition Structure" and "System Acquisition Structures". Program
Acquisition Structures control the program as a whole, and are chiefly concerned with the
integration of projects into an interoperable whole. The Program Acquisition Structure connects
the program to its projects and is shown in red in Figure 17. Only one Program Acquisition
Structure can be used at a time across the human exploration architecture. On the other hand,
there can be a range of System Acquisition Structures, shown in green in Figure 17. For example,
the acquisition structure chosen for the avionics system on the lunar lander need not be the same
as that for the avionics system on the launch vehicle, or that on the ECLS system on the lander.
Note that the System Acquisition Structures need not be confined to the top level of systems in
the acquisition, but can be used for any tier below the project level. Four possibilities for
Program Acquisition Structures will first be examined below. Six possibilities for System
Acquisition Structures will then be examined.
Program-level
Acquisition Structure
System-level
Acquisition Structures System System System
Figure 17: Two Tiers of Acquisition Structures
"Structure" refers to the network of contracts between the organizations developing elements of
the Acquisition structure, regardless of the level at which those organizations operate.
Essentially, the structure dictates "who is working for who". An acquisition strategy is more than
just the contract structure, however. The contracts themselves contain important tools for shaping
contractor behavior. For example, commonality incentives will be affected by the basis on which
contractor payments are calculated. Barriers to later reuse will be lowered if the government
receives the intellectual property developed by the contractor. After the examination of Program
Acquisition Structures and System Acquisition Structures, this section will look at seven
categories of contract terms which affect commonality, specifically:
- Payment structure: examines the payment and risk structure of the contract, including
incentives and award fees.
* Contract deliverables: examines the systems or services which the contractor is required
to deliver under the contract.
* Contract phasing: examines the points at which new contractors are permitted to bid for
the work.
- Contract termination: examines the circumstances under which the contractor can have
its work package terminated.
- Insight and oversight: examines the level of insight that NASA has into the activities of
the contractor.
- Intellectual property: examines the intellectual property provisions of the contract.
- Socio-economic programs: examines the effect of additional FAR requirements dealing
with socio-economic outcomes from government contracting.
Program Acquisition Structures
The analysis begins with the Program Acquisition structures, the highest level of acquisition
structures. Four structures are proposed and discussed:
- Multiple Primes: the traditional approach where a separate prime contractor is
responsible for each project and NASA undertakes system engineering and integration.
e SETA structure: NASA still contracts with a network of prime contractors is used but a
separate organization takes on some of the system engineering and integration (the
acronym for the organization's functions is SETA, standing either for Systems
Engineering and Technical Assistance, or Scientific, Engineering, Technical and
Analytical assistance, depending on the context).
- Alliance structure: NASA works jointly with a commercial organization and forms a
separate board comprised of both NASA and contractor personnel to manage the
acquisition.
* TSPR structure: NASA's responsibilities are reduced to those of a customer, and a
commercial organization, known as a TSPR contractor which stands for Total System
Performance Responsibility, performs all system engineering and integration program-
wide.
The structures form a spectrum based on two variables, as shown in Figure 18. The first variable
is the degree to which NASA is involved in system engineering, which distinguishes all structures
except SETA and Alliance. The distinction between SETA and Alliance is whether the
responsibilities for system engineering and integration are clearly delineated by contract (as they
are in a SETA structure) or whether the responsibilities are shared (as they are in an Alliance
structure).
Shared
Alliance
Responsibilities for
System Engineering
and Integration
Contractually Multiple
Allocated *TSPR * SETA *Primes
Low NASA Involvement in High
System Engineering and
Integration
Figure 18: Spectrum of Program Acquisition Structures
Multiple Primes
The first Program-level structure to be examined is the "Multiple Primes" structure. In this
structure, the government functions as the system integrator and system engineer, and apportions
the development of systems between a number of contractors. The contractor still undertakes
development of individual systems, but the government is more heavily involved in the system
engineering tradeoffs and takes more responsibility for the final product.
An example of this structure at the Program level is the Apollo Program. Each project (for
example the Command and Service Module, the Lunar Module and the launch vehicle stages)
was under contract to a different prime contractor. NASA was responsible for overall system
engineering and integration.
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Figure 19: Multiple Prime Contractor Structure
Multiple Prime Contractor Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
Government has more insight into the project Government requires more in-house
development and can respond more quickly expertise to undertake systems engineering
and intelligently to difficulties and systems integration
Government has more control over which Creative and holistic concept solutions from
contractors build which systems, allowing industry may be more difficult to obtain
policy objectives to be realized and because the scope of the design tasks given
strengthening the long term force that to each contractor are more limited
rewards good performance on NASA
contracts.
SETA
In some cases, the government may require additional system engineering and integration
expertise. The government may use a system engineering integration contractor to work closely
with NASA. Importantly, the government retains all contracts with the prime contractors for the
projects, and the SETA contractor does not take on any development contracts, both of which
distinguish this structure from the TSPR structure. The government may delegate much of its
power under those contracts to the system integrator if the system integrator is to handle the day-
to-day project management, but the system prime contractors remain contracted to the
government.
NASA realized the need for system integration expertise on the Apollo program, although the
system integration contract was not sufficiently widespread to be described as a program-wide
SETA contract. After the Apollo 1 fire "Webb arranged a contract under which Boeing would
provide NASA with advice on integrating the spacecraft and the rocket" (Bromberg, 1999, p. 7 1).
Under that contract, Boeing assisted in analyzing the "pogo" oscillations in the Saturn V and also
performed "sneak circuit analyses [which] it was felt all along...should be made, but personnel
had not been available to do so." (Bob Gilruth, quoted in Levine at p. 91)
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Figure 20: Commercial System Integrator
Commercial System Integrator Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
Government can draw on the expertise of The system integrator adds an additional
the system integrator to complement its layer of management to the project. This
understanding of the system. increases the risk of duplication or omission
of activities, and adds cost.
Conflict of interest issues may arise which
prohibit the system integrator from
participating in any subcontracts. In
complex system cases there may be a
limited number of competent contractors and
removing the system integrator from the
competitive pool may be undesirable.
Alliance structure
Alliancing arrangements can be best thought of as a "joint venture" between the customer and the
contractor. During the late 1990s and early 2000s they came into vogue for civil construction
contracts, where they were seen as a new way of reducing risk in a litigious sector of engineering.
Interestingly the contracts in many ways mimic strategies which have existed since the 1950s in
government aerospace projects. For example, a cornerstone of alliancing contracts is the sharing
in cost overruns and underruns which was a key incentive used in the early aerospace projects.
The advantage to re-examining alliancing contracts in light of their recent use on oil and gas
projects and high visibility public sector projects is that there is now a broader base of experience
to draw on when formulating the contract and a broader range of success stories for project
participants to draw comfort from.
Each alliancing contract is adapted to its own environment, but there are some usual features:
* both contractor and customer share in project successes and failures. This is achieved by
cost underrun and overrun and by monetizing performance parameters.
- the contractor is not liable for any poor or defective performance on the contract,
including negligence, unless it reaches the standard of "wilful default" which essentially
involves the contractor refusing to work or deliberately sabotaging the project
- project decisions are made by an alliance board comprised of contractor and customer
representatives rather than by the customer
Alliances underpin the "Public Private, Partnerships" (PPPs) for building government
infrastructure which have enjoyed both positive and negative press over recent years. Initially
seen as a panacea for over-budget, under-performing government programs, serious doubts were
cast over their effectiveness, before the view moderated to one that acknowledged PPPs as
effective in the right circumstances (International Association of Dredging Companies, 2008).
Fully-fledged PPPs have been used twice in the space sector, for the acquisition of satellite
communications for the British Ministry of Defense and for the acquisition of the Galileo satellite
(Bertran & Vidal, 2005). PPPs also appear to have been used on some Japanese space projects
(Hashimoto, 2009). Other projects have been transitioned to PPPs at some stage in their
development, for example, the outsourcing of the Space Shuttle operations to United Space
Alliance, or the outsourcing of the operation and maintenance of the US evolved expendable
launch vehicle (EELV) fleet to United Launch Alliance.
Still, although the PPP model has proved successful in civil projects in the United States, it does
not seem to have transitioned well to military and aerospace projects. Rendon and Snider include
no acknowledgement of PPPs in their 2008 book on Defense Acquisition projects, and the DAU
Acquipedia focuses on PPPs only in the context of depot maintenance: "Toward this end, DoD,
with support from Congress, has emphasized the use of Public/Private Partnerships
(PPP). Although partnering can be implemented in many areas and functions, the primary focus
has been on depot activities... " (Defense Acquisition University, 2011 b).
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Figure 21: Alliancing structure
TSPR Contract
TSPR stands for "Total System Performance Responsibility." Under this structure, shown in
Figure 22, NASA acts as a pure customer, and requests a particular product from a contractor.
The government contracts only with that contractor, which then subcontracts as appropriate. The
TSPR contractor takes full responsibility for delivering the project. The terminology for this
structure varies: TSPR is an Air Force acquisition term, while the Army describes the same
structure as "Lead Systems Integrator."
The US contribution to the International Space Station closely resembled this structure, after the
management approach was overhauled in the mid-1990s. The NASA budget request for 1996
summarized the new TSPR structure: "an entirely new management approach has been
implemented, in which a single contractor (Boeing) has been given total prime and integration
Alliancing Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
Better communication between customer and Additional effort must go into building the team
contractor at the outset of the program.
Less contractor "capability, intellect, attention Govemment and contractor are left without the
and energy" (IADC, 2008) directed to exploiting "protections" of normal contractual
the contract, or protecting itself under the arrangement, leaving each exposed if there is
contract, and more to delivering performance. a breakdown in trust.
The structure is more flexible to design Does not work well with more than two parties
changes which still achieve the initial goals. in the alliance because the alliancing board is
too fragmented.
Customer and contractor both focused on
longer term project success than with more
traditional structures.
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responsibilities, with the previous prime contractors (McDonnell Douglas, Rocketdyne, and
Boeing Huntsville) serving as first-tier subcontractors to Boeing" (NASA, 1995).
A second example of this structure from DOD acquisition is the Future Combat System. Under
this contract, the Army contracts only with Boeing, as the lead system integrator (LSI). The GAO
described it as follows: "The working relationship between the LSI and the Army is complex. The
LSI is a traditional contractor in terms of developing a product for its customer, the Army, but
also serves like a partner to the Army in management of the FCS program" (Government
Accountability Office, 2007b, p. 2). In the case of the FCS, the system integrator also helped the
government define requirements and concept definition (Yakovac, 2008). Boeing's system
integration team was prohibited from taking on subcontract work in that program (Government
Accountability Office, 2007b, p. 33), and in that respect, the LSI contract in this instance takes
one step closer to a SETA structure than a pure TSPR structure.
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Figure 22: Prime contractor structure
The idea of a "prime" contractor who had responsibility for the system engineering and
integration functions was developed in response to the difficult systems engineering tasks faced
in ballistic missile production. Bromberg writes that in 1952 the Air Force introduced their
"weapons system" contract where "a prime contractor would be chosen and given wide
responsibility for each system, including design, development, procurement of subsystems, and
integrating systems into the final missile or plane" (Bromberg, 1999, p. 25).
Generally, the contractor supply chains below the prime contractor are considered "opaque" to
government, in that the government merely contracts with the prime which then subcontracts as it
sees fit. The FAR controls the circumstances in which the prime contractor must obtain
government consent to subcontract (FAR subpart 44.2). For NASA contracts, assuming the
prime contractor has an "approved purchasing system," approval is only required to subcontracts
specifically listed in the contract. It is likely that the prime contractor will have an approved
purchasing system, as this is one of the barriers to entry that distinguish the large government
prime contractors from similar organizations which operate only in the private sphere.
TSPR Program Acquisition Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
Single point of contact for the government Prime contractor may keep work for itself
simplifies contract management inefficiently instead of subcontracting (conflict
of interest)
Theoretically, government only needs to know In practice, government may not achieve good
its needs, and does not require expertise in the value for money if it does not understand the
project to be developed cost, schedule and performance interactions
between its requirements
High cost to switch prime contractor
System Acquisition Structures
System Acquisition Structures differ from Program Acquisition structures in that multiple System
Acquisition Structures can be used across the architecture, in contrast with the single Program
Acquisition Structure which must be used. Six System Acquisition Structures are considered:
- Fully competitive: The system is acquired by publishing the function-based system
requirements and allowing all qualified bidders to submit proposals. The best bidder is
chosen.
" Joint venture: A joint venture between two organizations is formed to build two or
more systems, when, in the absence of the joint venture, the organizations would have
built at least one each.
- Directed contractor: A contractor who has previously built a similar system within the
architecture is selected without a competitive process.
e Long-term supplier: A contractor is chosen competitively at the outset of the
acquisition of the exploration architecture as the sole supplier of a particular system
element across the entire architecture.
- Build-to-print: A system is designed by the government,5 and contractors are required
to build that exact system from the detailed specifications provided. Also known as GFD
("Government Furnished Design").
- GFE: A particular system is supplied directly to a contractor by the government 6
completely developed and requiring only integration. This is known as Government
Furnished Equipment.
The System Acquisition Structures form a logical progression of government involvement, shown
graphically in Figure 23. Government involvement increases to the right.
Full Joint Directed Long-Term Build-To-
Competition Venture Contractor Supplier Print GFE
No Involvement Government Direction To Government Government
Use A Specific Contractor Designs Entire Develops Entire
System System
Figure 23: System Acquisition Structures lie along a spectrum of increasing Government involvement
Fully Competitive
Under the "Fully Competitive" System Acquisition Structure, the prime contractor for a particular
project advertises its requirements for a particular system. It then receives a series of bids to
build the system from different companies, and selects what it considers the "best" bid.
The chief advantage of this structure is that competitive forces between the bidders encourage
each bidder to submit a bid which they believe has the best chance of winning.
5 In the case of both Build-to-Print and GFE, the most common circumstance in acquisition generally is that the design
or system is supplied by the government. However, the design or system may be supplied by a contractor to a
subcontractor lower in the acquisition hierarchy. The principles behind the acquisition strategy remain the same.
6 See above note.
The structure is less effective when there is an oversupply of work in the market relative to the
number of bidders because it reduces the incentive on each bidder to submit a bid which delivers
the best value. The structure also works poorly at the opposite extreme, where bidders are
desperate to obtain the work. In this case the practice of "buying-in" (submitting a low bid to
obtain the work and making profit on later change requests) tends to lead to overly optimistic
initial estimates and expensive or poor quality final systems.
The effort in preparing the proposal by the unsuccessful bidders also has a cost, which is
effectively recouped through the unsuccessful bidders' profit or overhead rates on the projects
which the bidder does win. On aerospace contracts the cost of proposal preparation is not
insubstantial.7
Finally, the structure has been criticized for prioritizing the bidder with the lowest price over the
bidder which offers the best value. Quality may suffer. Augustine cites the example of "a
military aviator [who] added to the "caution and warning" stickers that traditionally abound in
the cockpits of modern rotary-wing aircraft, the following hand-lettered admonition: "Caution.
This helicopter built by the lowest bidder. "" (Augustine, 1983, p. 222)
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Figure 24: Fully Competitive System Acquisition Structure
A multiple-bidder structure has specific implications for commonality. The most important is the
tendency for the system to be built by someone other than the incumbent (here, the organization
which has most recently built a similar system for the government). New entrants win work
under this structure due to their inexperience, which leads to overly optimistic cost estimates.
Augustine's Law 33 neatly summarizes this point: "Fools rush in where incumbentsfear to bid. "
When the government is the customer, this tendency has been exacerbated by the Truth in
Negotiation Act (TINA), which requires in part that bidders disclose all they know about the
system for which they are bidding (Rascusin, 1968). Given that experience usually teaches
lessons about cost increases rather than decreases, an experienced bidder complying with TINA is
likely to have a more costly bid than an inexperienced one. Therefore there is some incentive for
the winner under this competitive bidding system to flip from one to the other. Such a transition
between contractors makes it difficult to maintain commonality across systems.
7 Estimated in Augustine's Law Number 36: "The thickness of the proposal required to win a multimillion dollar
contract is about one millimeter per million dollars..." (Augustine, 1983)
Fully Competitive Program Acquisition Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
General
Fully competitive structure poses no regulatory Inefficiency of preparing unsuccessful bids.
difficulties.
If there are many participants in the market, If number of bidders is small relative to the
there will be a downward pressure on prices amount of work then competitive forces are
and upward pressure on quality fed by a desire unlikely to be strong.
to win the contract.
Tendency for inexperienced bidders to win
contracts because of their inexperience.
Commonality-specific
Emphasis on low-cost bidding disincentivizes
lifecycle focus and commonality planning.
Re-bidding each time a system is available for
development does not encourage planning for
future systems by early contractors, or
continuity of knowledge from the previous
system development.
Joint Ventures (and Mergers, Consortia and Collaborations)
Joint ventures are a device for fusing together the resources of two companies to exploit an
opportunity which neither would be willing or able to tackle on its own, or to jointly serve a
market that is too small for all competitors independently. Ingrao notes the increase in joint
ventures in government contracting, attributing it to the fact that "many larger government
programs require expertise in so many different disciplines that very few defense contractors can
meet all of these requirements... the use ofjoint ventures under some procurements has become a
necessity" (Ingrao, 1990, p. 399).
An example of the joint venture combining skills is the combination of expertise from Boeing and
Bell on aircraft and rotorcraft expertise to develop the tilt-rotor V22 Osprey, defeating a
consortium led by Sikorsky. Another example is GE and Rolls Royce working together on the
alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. An example of a joint venture created in response to
shrinking markets occurred when Boeing and Lockheed joined their launch services divisions to
create United Launch Alliance.
To show how joint ventures can contribute to commonality, consider Figure 25 and Figure 26.
Figure 25 shows a Fully Competitive structure where System Contractor A and System
Contractor B compete to win work on two different projects. System Contractor A wins on one
project and System Contractor B wins on the second project. If instead a joint venture were
formed which wins both contracts as shown in Figure 26, there is likely to be significantly greater
visibility between the teams working on the system for Project 1 and the system for Project 2, and
hence commonality will be easier to implement.
A similar scenario arises where the joint venture is formed to merge skills rather than to jointly
capture the market. The resulting joint venture will have an advantage over lone companies in
the market due to its depth or breadth of skills, and is more likely to win the contracts for both
Project 1 and Project 2 than any single company would be. Once again, commonality will be
easier to implement.
There are many shades of joint venture. On one end, the joint venture resembles a merger of two
corporations into a single entity, as with ULA. On the other end, the joint venture can be merely
a temporary cessation of hostilities brought about by a common enemy in the "dog-eat-dog"
(Bromberg, 1999) world of the aerospace industry, such as the GE-Rolls Royce joint venture.
Legally, a joint venture may be either an "incorporated" joint ventures where a new company is
formed, the shares in which are held only by the two joint venturers, or an "unincorporated" joint
venture, which more closely resembles a partnership where both companies maintain their
separate legal identity.
For the purposes of this structure, mergers (more permanent), consortia (less permanent) and
collaborations (less permanent and more informal) are also considered as types of "joint venture".
While this coarse clumping will cause lawyers to cringe, each effectively allows the two
organizations to act in a manner closer to a single company than they could previously, though
the degree to which this occurs depends heavily on the actual agreement between the two
companies and the permanence of the arrangements. Specifically, these amalgamations:
* allow two organizations to draw on a common pool of skills
e increase visibility between the two organizations
* increase the interdependence of the organizations, so that if the joint venture, consortia or
collaboration succeeds so do each of the organizations comprising it.
e present a fagade of unity to an external customer, allowing that customer to reward,
incentivize and instruct the company as a single entity
There are significant drawbacks to a joint venture from a contractor's viewpoint. The most
significant are that liability for the actions of the other contractor is likely, and the joint venture
may be subject to antitrust investigations (Ingrao, 1990).
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Figure 25: Fully Competitive Structure Prior To Joint Venture
Figure 26: Joint Venture
Joint Venture System Acquisition Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
General
In theory the customer does not have to Joint ventures formed without substantial
concern itself with coordination of engineering planning may increase the internal
designs, and knowledge transfer between the management overhead of an organization.
joint venturers
The joint venturers have a financial incentive to Organizational culture differences may interfere
meet the requirements of the customer as with the free transfer of information between
efficiently as possible, using the expanded, the contractors
shared resources at their disposal.
Administrative and legal burden of establishing
and maintaining a joint venture can be
significant.
Commonality-specific
Improved visibility between activities of two
contractors lowers barriers to commonality
identification.
Directed Contractor
In some circumstances the government may select particular contractors to the project prime
contractor. Although practitioners cautioned against this approach (see Chapter 3), it is
historically a widespread practice in complex system engineering.
There are essentially two forms of directed contract, both shown in Figure 27. In one, the
government contracts directly with the contractor, and in the other it is a requirement of the prime
contract that a particular contractor is selected. The advantage of the first is that it is easier for
the government to tender for that subcontract under the general FAR principles of
"competition ...fairness and openness ", however the disadvantage is that government takes on the
burden of managing the contract. The advantage of the second is that it more accurately reflects
the role which the contractor should play, on the other hand the prime contractor may find it
difficult to exert strong control over the contractor because the contractor is in a protected
position by being specifically nominated.
Relevantly, the directed contractor structure is often used to improve commonality across
systems. An historical example is the use of subcontractors on the Apollo Lunar Module:
"NASA also disagreed with our choice of subcontractors for the environmental
control system and the fuel cells. Our competitive selections had been very close,
but in both cases we had selected another company over the existing supplier for
the command and service modules. (We chose Pratt and Whitney for ECS and
Hamilton Standard for fuel cells, the reverse of the CSM lineup.) NASA asked us
to update the competition for the two top ranking companies, adding a
requirement to maximize commonality with CSM equipment... we obtained
revised bids from the subcontractors involved and changed our selections to the
CSM suppliers of these systems. " (Kelly, 2001, pp. 43 - 44)
A similar approach was used more recently on the Army's future combat system:
"the noncompetitive selection of General Dynamics and United Defense as the
manned ground vehicle integrating team ... as these corporations were the
providers of all the Army's current inventory of manned combat platforms,
government management made the decision to maintain that portion of the
[industrial] base. " (Yakovac, 2008)
NASA has also used the directed contractor approach to spread contracts around the industrial
base. This improves public and congressional support for NASA and may also contribute to a
more diverse supplier base, both of which are important longer term goals for NASA. The
political reality of this approach was obvious early. In September 1961 "the lore was that NASA
would not give more than one major contract to any single firm. ... This would help ensure a
cadre of capable firms for future contracts, and also build political support for its expanding
space efforts" (Bromberg, 1999).
On the shuttle program for example, George Low insisted on North American Rockwell (which
won the orbiter) subcontracting "to ensure that at least some of the money would be passed
through to the losers" . He wrote "our procurement regulations permit this kind of sole source
subcontracting" (Bromberg, 1999). Eventually, Grumman won the wing, General Dynamics-
Convair the fuselage, McDonnell Douglas the Orbital Maneuvering system, Fairchild the vertical
tail fin, Martin Marietta the external tank and Thiokol the SRBs. Northrop and Boeing were the
only two large aerospace firms to miss significant initial contracts on the Shuttle.
Note that NASA has a right to require it give consent to any subcontracts (clause 44.2 of the
FAR), which it could use to narrow the field of potential subcontractors and approach a directed
contractor relationship without necessarily specifying a particular contractor.
Figure 27: Directed sub-contractor structure
Directed Subcontractor Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
General
Allows the agency to disperse subcontractor There is an unclear division of responsibility for
tasks to best meet non-engineering goals of and management of the directed
the agency such as ensuring wide subcontractor's work, which may lead to project
Congressional support. management difficulties.
Allows the agency to mandate particular pieces In some cases directing particular
of work as subcontracted in circumstances subcontractors in the prime contract may
where it is obvious that the prime contractor is appear contrary to the spirit if not the letter of
not best suited to carry out this work, but may the FAR and attract negative press coverage.
nevertheless be tempted to do so to maximize
revenue.
The prime contractor may have a better
working relationship with other subcontractors
in the same area, and so learning to work with
the directed subcontractor introduces
inefficiencies.
Using an existing contractor may reduce the
chance of finding innovative system designs
compared with a fully competitive structure.
Commonality-specific
Choosing the same contractor is a simple way
to give the contractor insight into previous
designs.
Reduces intellectual property and liability
concerns associated with reuse (discussed
further in Chapters 3 and 4).
Long-term Supplier
The long-term supplier structure for system acquisition competitively selects a particular
contractor as the supplier of a certain system across the entire architecture. Figure 28 shows this
structure underpinning a Multiple Prime Program Acquisition Structure, but it could be equally
used with other Program Acquisition Structures. Under this structure, it is mandatory for each of
the prime contractors to use the long term supplier for a particular system.
The closest example to this type of system appears to be specialization among the member states
of the European Space Agency (ESA). For example, ESA's pressurized modules are almost all
built by Italian firm Thales-Alenia, and interviewees mentioned several other areas of
specialization. However, this specialization appears to be more a matter of practice than an
official policy of ESA. The official policy is still to create and increased specialization is
mentioned as a possible area of future improvement: "[there is currently] limited specialisation
among suppliers ofsubsystems " (European Space Agency, 2007).
The point which distinguishes a long-term supplier from a directed subcontractor is that the long-
term supplier is a forward looking arrangement which extends across the entire architecture even
if the more distant projects have not yet been awarded a prime contractor. The directed
subcontractor in contrast is an arrangement which occurs project-by-project, and there is no
assurance from the contractor's point of view that they will be chosen for subsequent projects.
A long-term supplier arrangement places the supplier into a strong monopoly position so the
contract will require some mechanisms for removing the supplier, for example if cost growth is
too rapid or if quality slips. Removing the supplier, though, undermines the whole principle of
supplier continuity across the architecture and approaches a simple directed contractor structure.
Therefore the strength of contractor tenure needs to be carefully considered.
Figure 28: Long-Term Supplier System Acquisition Structure
Build-to-Print
A Build-to-Print system acquisition structure, shown in Figure 29, occurs when all of the design
is undertaken at a higher level in the acquisition structure, and the contractor responsible for the
system need only build the system to the specifications provided. This approach uses
specifications of form, rather than the more common practice of specifications of function.
Some of the benefits of commonality are lost, because two separate contractors (labeled C and D)
need to integrate and manufacture the common systems (labeled 1A and IB). Economies of scale
and learning benefits are not realized to their fullest extent with this method. However, the
philosophy is that the government customer will receive two identical systems at the conclusion
of the acquisition and can realize recurring engineering savings during the operations phase,
without asking contractors to work together with their competitors on design.
The feasibility of this approach depends heavily on how well finalized the technical details of the
potentially common system are. If there is any development work required on the common
system, divergence is certain to occur, and very likely this will occur in different ways under the
two contractors. The final products will not be common and some of the benefits of commonality
will be lost. To develop common products under this structure requires either:
Long-Term Supplier System Acquisition Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
General
Choosing the same contractor is an important There is an unclear division of responsibility for
step towards enabling commonality with and management of the supplier's work, which
previous systems, and allowing the contractor may lead to project management difficulties.
to plan commonality with future systems.
Allows the agency to mandate particular pieces Sole-sourcing a particular system over a time
of work as subcontracted in circumstances period of a decade or more presents significant
where it is obvious that the prime contractor is regulatory challenges. It also presents price
not best suited to carry out this work, but may challenges if the supplier exploits its monopoly
nevertheless be tempted to do so to maximize position
revenue.
The prime contractors may have a better
working relationship with other subcontractors
in the same area, and so learning to work with
the supplier introduces inefficiencies. Equally,
the supplier may work better with some prime
contractors than others.
The use of a single supplier reduces the
industrial base making the provision of spare
parts difficult if the original supplier should
cease production.
The use of a single supplier reduces the
national dispersion of contracts, hampering
efforts to gather broad Congressional support.
Commonality-specific
Contractor can invest in commonality for future
systems which it knows it is likely to develop.
1. Preventing divergence occurring, meaning minimal development work and short
manufacturing timeframes; or
2. Managing the divergence so that the end products from each corporation remain
common, meaning extensive change control and close co-operation through development.
Further casting doubt on the workability of fully specifying form to obtain commonality across
two contractors, it is questionable if the form of the design could be fully specified in advance for
most space systems. The most egregious example of this difficulty was the lunar lander contract.
Tom Kelly describes the lunar module selection process:
"NASA considered both the mission planning and technical requirements too uncertain to buy a
proposed design... the RFP was more like a graduate examination in an aerospace engineering
course than a typical government procurement specification...
1. Discuss the flight mechanics and other considerations of near-Moon trajectories
2. Describe your approach to the design of the following LM systems...
3. To what extent do you consider backup methods of control and guidance necessary?..."
(Kelly, 2001, p. 28)
It is unlikely that NASA will be on a learning curve as steep as that in the early years of the 1960s
again, but Kelly's "graduate exam" clearly shows that it is not always possible to specify the form
of space systems exactly at the time contracts are opened for tender.
However, specifying function in the same situation would probably be even worse from the
perspective of commonality. The benefits of commonality stem from common form, and
specifying common functionality is unlikely to result in common form.
Common systems built by two
different contractors
Figure 29: Build-To-Print System Acquisition Structure
Government Furnished Equipment
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) takes the idea of specification of form one step further.
In a GFE System Acquisition Structure, the developed system itself is supplied at the program
level to all projects which require it. The GFE structure is shown in Figure 30.
The contractor need only interface with the GFE, and is not involved with its development at all.
The GFE may be developed in-house by the government or supplied to the government by a
separate contractor. This is still a requirement of form on the systems which must use it.
However, the full form of the GFE system need not be known at the time the contracts for the
variants are written, only the relevant interfaces and an envelope in terms of key design
parameters like mass, volume and power draw. Further, the organization developing the GFE can
have the requirements of the GFE specified in functional, rather than formal, terms. This avoids
the rigidity of specifications of form and increases the design space which can be considered.
The common system will be developed by a single organization, which increases the
commonality benefits during the design and development phase, and removes the need for rigid
change control between the two contractors to maintain commonality. One drawback is that the
GFE contractor is unlikely to have full insight into the final requirements of both systems, and
therefore the GFE may not be as well suited to the particular application.
However, NASA's previous experience, as embodied in the NASA supplement to the Federal
Acquisition Regulations, appears to take a negative view of GFE:
"1845.102-70 NASA policy.
Government property shall not be provided to contractors unless all
other alternatives are not feasible. The decision to provide Government property
to contractors (whether Government-furnished or contractor-acquired) shall be
made only after careful consideration of all relevant factors. Among these
factors are the following:
(a) Providing Government property to contractors increases the
Government's administrative burden and requires recordkeeping and personnel.
(b) Providing property may dilute the contractor's overall
responsibility and weaken guarantees, end-item delivery requirements, and other
contract terms.
Built-to-Print System Acquisition Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
General
No regulatory obstacles. System design must be finalized before
contractor begins work.
Lower risk for contractors, hence lower margins Government must understand the system and
and / or increased willingness to accept fixed its requirements well enough to design it.
price contract structures.
I Changes are expensive and difficult.
Commonality-specific
Develops system-level commonality without Copes poorly with any divergence.
requiring competitors to share information.
Commonality benefits are only in the operating
phase.
(c) Providing property may make NASA responsible for delays in
that the Agency assumes responsibility for scheduling delivery of the property."
Supplying GFE is also, effectively, a specification of form on the organizations which will
integrate the GFE and therefore limits the design freedom from the perspective of the final
product. For this reason specifications of function are preferred. The FAR recognizes this when,
in its regulations on the acquisition of major systems, it states: "Agencies acquiring major
systems shall: (1) Express... agency needs and major system acquisition program objectives in
terms of the agency's mission and not in terms of specified systems to satisfy needs." (FAR
section 34.002) Often the contract goes further and requires that the contract not limit the ability
of the contractor to propose new ways of achieving the goals, as when the RFP should "clearly
state that each offeror is free to propose its own technical approach, main design features,
subsystems, and alternatives to schedule, cost, and capability goals." (FAR section 34.005-
2(b)(5))
An additional drawback of GFE is that the only way to change the commonality solution is to
change the requirements themselves. Although frequently done, requirements change once the
contract has been signed is damaging to project costs and schedules. Therefore this method of
specifying commonality does not allow for flexible modification of the common systems which is
often helpful in managing divergence. If the solution specified in the requirements is shown to be
unworkable for one system, the two open options are less than satisfactory: to allow the systems
to diverge, or to modify the contract of the still-compliant system to bring it into line with any
design changes.
Figure 30: GFE as a System Acquisition Structure
GFE System Acquisition Structure
Advantages Disadvantages
General
Reduces duplication of effort in developing GFE imposes oversight responsibilities on
systems compared to fully competing the government, which it has not traditionally
system each time. performed well and is reluctant to assume.
Requires coordination in interfaces and in
system engineering to ensure GFE will
integrate successfully and perform properly.
Commonality-specific
Captures most of the lifecycle advantages as Requires strong high-level commonality
there is a single designer, manufacturer and management to prevent projects requesting
operator (but not a single integrator, perhaps excessive variation in their items of GEE.
leading to some loss of benefit in testing and
commissioning compared to the case where a
single entity controls the entire development
cycle).
Cumbersome to manage divergence across
organizational boundaries.
Contract Terms
Having considered the acquisition structure at both the program and project levels, the next
consideration is the terms contained in each of the contracts. Seven categories are considered.
e Payment: examines the payment and risk structure of the contract, including incentives
and award fees.
- Contract deliverables: examines the systems or services which the contractor is required
to deliver under the contract.
e Contract phasing: examines the points at which new contractors are permitted to bid for
the work.
e Contract termination: examines the circumstances under which the contractor can have
its work package terminated.
- Insight and oversight: examines the level of insight that NASA has into the activities of
the contractor.
- Intellectual property: examines the intellectual property provisions of the contract.
e Socio-economic programs: examines the effect of additional FAR requirements dealing
with socio-economic outcomes from government contracting.
Payment
The first category of contract terms concerns the way in which payment to the contractor is tied to
the contractor's performance under the contract. This is perhaps the most important tool, because
the payment to the contractor is a powerful behavioral incentive.
Payment is so intrinsic to the contract that the "type" of contract has become synonymous with
the way the contract pays the contractor for their services and to the risk the contractor assumes in
providing those services: "the contract type defines the expectations, obligations, incentives, and
rewards for both Government and contractor during an acquisition" ("Contract Type" in
(Defense Acquisition University, 2011b)). Part 16.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations
describes the sweep of contract types:
"The specific contract types range from firm-fixed-price, in which the contractor
has full responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit (or loss), to
cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has minimal responsibility for the
performance costs and the negotiated fee (profit) is fixed. In between are the
various incentive contracts, in which the contractor's responsibility for the
performance costs and the profit or fee incentives offered are tailored to the
uncertainties involved in contract performance."
This section will consider each of the contract types in detail. There is much scope for tailoring
acquisition strategies using these techniques. However, the point to be borne in mind at the outset
is that no finessing of the contract type is effective without a good understanding of the costs and
risks involved with the project; that is, without an informed customer who understands the system
trades likely to be made in development. The general rule is that the simpler the contract, the
better, and more complicated payment structures should only be added when there is a clear
contractor behavior which the payment aims to incentivize or disincentivize.
Table 8 sets out the contract types which will be considered in this section. The cost basis of the
contract must be either cost-plus or fixed price. Then any or all of cost sharing, incentives,
indexing or price redetermination can be layered on top of the cost basis to arrive at a mutually
acceptable contract.
The overriding principle behind the range of types of development contracts is that development
carries uncertainty, which translates to risk. Corporations taking higher risks require higher
possible rewards in order to undertake those risks. The contract types should be viewed as tools
for balancing the risk and reward between the government and the contractor. If the government
wishes development projects with significant uncertainty to be developed, it must either shoulder
some of the risk itself or be prepared to pay high profits to the corporation which takes those
risks.
It should be noted that the presentation of the contract types in Table 8 is simplified. There are
several types of price redetermination presented in the FAR, as well as constraints on which types
of incentives are allowable. Additionally, there are a number of contract types not presented in
Table 8 which are allowable under the FAR. Generally these would be used to fund research
activities for small total cost. These contract types are minor contributors to the overall cost of
NASA's exploration architecture and are thus ignored for simplicity. The subtleties of
architecting an acquisition strategy which fits the letter of the FAR are not trivial, however this
appears to be a matter of finessing the form of the contract, rather than its substance, and
therefore Table 8 is an adequate summary of the tools available. Chapters 3 and 4 expand on how
these contract types work in practice through interviews with practitioners.
The phase of development also has an effect on the likely contract type. As contracts move
forward in the development cycle from the design phase to the manufacturing phase, there is less
technical uncertainty implicit in the contract requirements. Accordingly, in the manufacturing
phase contractors are more willing to accept development risk and contracts are more likely to be
for fixed price. Fixed price manufacturing contracts are also likely to contain price-volume
curves to account for the different costs of different levels of government demand and remove
what could be broadly termed "market risk".
It appears to be possible for one contract to contain multiple contract types. For example, Firm
Fixed Price could be used for some well defined elements, while cost plus contracts could be used
for other elements in a single piece of equipment. Although an explicit formulation of this rule
was not found, it is clearly implied in a 2009 GAO report: "Contracts containing more than one
contract type will be coded as the contract type representing the preponderance of obligations"
(Government Accountability Office, 2009).
Table 8: The financial features of a development contract
Cotatfatr0umr
I Base price: fixed price I
(FAR 16.202)
The contractor agrees to complete the development for a fixed cost.
The contractor's profit margin will be increased if the development
costs less than the bid price, and decreased if the development costs
more. The fixed price is limited to the development work specified in
the contract, and changes to the scope of work usually incur
additional cost.
or
Base price: cost plus The contractor agrees to take as profit an amount equal to a
fixed fee percentage fee of the estimated costs of performing the work. If the
actual costs are more or less the contractor's profits do not increase(FAR 16.306) or decrease. The contractor's rate of profit does however change,
because the base costs change.
and any or all or none of the following
Over-run and under-run Over-run and under-run cost sharing can be used to blur the
cost sharing boundaries in risk/reward between cost-plus and fixed contracts.
Under sharing arrangements, government and contractor agree to(FAR 16.405-1 usually) share in the costs if they overrun or underrun the targets. Sharing
arrangements make fixed price contracts less risky for the contractor
and cost-plus contracts more risky. The rate of return under these
contracts is adjusted to reflect the risk adjustment of sharing.
Targeted incentive Incentive awards offer additional payments to the contractor, in theory
awards for delivering additional value to the customer. The awards are
usually linked to time, cost or performance metrics, but may also be(FAR 16.4) awarded for programmatic achievements like working well with other
contractors.
Price indexing Price adjustment removes limited risks from the contractor, usually
which are outside the contractor's control. It is only required by the(FAR 16.203) contractor as protection on contracts where the contractor is not fully
reimbursed for costs. The adjustment is specified in advance and
usually linked to changes in published indexes like the price of
aluminium, price of labor, or general inflation.
Redetermination of price Redetermination of the price of a contract is used for contracts with
basis significant design uncertainty. The contract contains a fixed price for
a fixed period, followed by a ceiling price for subsequent periods.(FAR 16.205) The initial fixed period is intended to resolve some of the uncertainties
which affect price, allowing a more realistic price to be calculated for
the subsequent periods.
Fixed price contract
A fixed amount of base payment occurs when a contractor promises to develop a system for a
fixed price at the outset. The summary in section 16.202 of the FAR is succinct:
"[there is no] adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in
performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum
risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides
maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively
and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties."
These advantages come at a price. The contractor is likely to include contingency amounts in the
contract to provide for the uncertainties in development. There is no guarantee that a fixed price
contract will be cheaper for the government than a cost-plus contract, even though the contractor
has maximum incentive under the fixed price contract to minimize costs. The danger of the
contractor overbidding is particularly high if either the customer does not well understand the
costs of the system it is requesting, impairing the customer's ability to negotiate the cost
downward, or if there is limited competition, which removes the incentive on the contractor to
submit a competitive bid.
However, it is not clear that government contracting practice acknowledges this distinction. The
Defense Acquisition University's ACQuipedia states:
"The most advantageous contract type from the Government's perspective is
firm-fixed price, as the contractor has full responsibility for the performance
costs and resulting profit (or loss). The most advantageous contract type from
the contractor's perspective is cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has
minimal responsibility for the performance costs and the negotiated fee (profit) is
fixed."
For this reason, when fixed price contracts are suggested in circumstances of low competition, a
competent and dedicated system engineering team is required. A low competition environment
arises by design in most of the System Acquisition Structures considered earlier in this section.
When there is no adjustment to the fixed price for incentives it is referred to as a firm fixed price
contract.
Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract
A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract pays the contractor a fixed amount of profit. It achieves this by
reimbursing the contractor for costs incurred in performing the work and also paying an
additional fee. The fee is usually expressed as a percentage of the total estimated cost of the
project. For example, a contractor undertaking a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract on a $1 million
contract with a fixed fee of $60,000 would usually be described as having a "cost-plus contract
with a 6% profit".
It is critical to note that the fee portion of the contract ($60,000 in the example above) is fixed at
the start and is not adjusted based on the costs in performing the contract. The amount of cost
reimbursement is adjusted to reflect the actual costs in performing the contract. Paying the
contractor a percentage of actual costs has been illegal since the Second World War. This type of
contract is prohibited in section 16.102(c) of the FAR, due to the financial advantage to the
contractor of cost overruns, and corresponding misalignment of incentives between the contractor
and customer wishes. The prohibition extends to all subcontracts let by prime contractors except
for firm fixed price prime contracts.
Under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract the contractor is still incentivized to deliver the project at or
below the target cost, because, if the cost of the project is assumed proportional to "contractor
effort," the profit per effort decreases as costs increase, although the profit remains the same. In
practice, however, this provides a weaker incentive than the fixed price contract, where cost
overruns are completely absorbed by the contractor.
Cost reimbursement is a key feature of government contracting. Its use is very limited in
commercial circumstances, but used in government when "the cost of the work to be done cannot
be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract" (Government
Accountability Office, 2009). In practice, this is not a narrow gateway: $136 billion of cost
reimbursement contracts were used in FY2008, in proportions between 33% and 100% of
contracts awarded by randomly selected agencies. (Government Accountability Office, 2009).
Cost-reimbursement contracts have limits on "allowable costs", the types of expenditure which
may be recovered. Vacketta states "cost principles preclude or severely limit the recovery of
certain ordinary business expenses which a company might typically allocate to commercial
operations" (Vacketta, 1999). However Scherer's study, although old, found that "in 1960 non-
allowable costs comprised 1.0%... Interest charges made up the largest single share of this
figure" (Scherer, 1964).The discrepancy in emphasis between the two appears to be that the
administrative burden of tracking, categorizing and reporting costs included in a cost-
reimbursement contract is unusual for commercially oriented firms, however the dollar amount of
non-allowable costs is relatively small.
The administrative burden reduces the number of firms willing to contract with the government
on large cost reimbursement contracts. When the work exceeds $500,000: "requirements
necessitate the development of relatively complex, government contract-unique accounting."
(Vacketta, 1999). The requirements are pared down for contracts under $25 million, however
corporations with cost-reimbursement contracts in excess of this amount must fully comply with
the Cost Accounting Standards. In examining cost-plus contracts in the space sector, it will be
assumed the value exceeds $25 million and the full accounting rules are required.
One further consideration weighs in favor of the cost-plus-fixed fee contract. The government
does not want to appear to be delivering windfall profits to defense contractors. In the absence of
competition or sound understanding by the government's contracting officers, it is possible that
defense contractors could make profits at rates that would be branded scandalous in the media.
While the total cost to government under the fixed price contract may in fact have been less than
the cost to government of same contractor operating under a cost-plus contract with a 6% profit
margin, such a rational analysis is unlikely to grab headlines. This chain of reasoning led Scherer
to conclude:
"It so happens... that minimizing the risk of loss is often just what the contractor
prefers while minimizing the risk of windfall profit is what the government
desires, and so the CPFF [cost plus fixed fee] contract provides a mutually
satisfactory relationship." (p133)
Overrun and Underrun Cost Sharing
It is possible to blur the boundaries between the fixed price contract and the cost plus fixed fee
contract. Under the fixed price contract, the contractor is wholly responsible for cost overruns,
and receives all the benefit of cost underruns. Under the cost plus fixed fee contract the
government is wholly responsible for cost overruns, and receives all the benefit of cost underruns.
Overrun and underrun cost sharing allows the contractor and the government to take percentage
shares in the "pain and gain" involved in the contract.
For example, a contract could be structured such that:
- any overrun or underrun up to 10% of the target price is completely absorbed by the
contractor;
- any overrun or underrun up to 20% of the target price is jointly shared 50 / 50 between
the contractor and the government;
- any overrun or underrun greater than 20% of the target price is completely absorbed by
the government.
This contract regime may deliver preferable affordability results because often the part of the
development which poses the greatest risk for the contractor is the low-probability, high-
consequence tail of cost overruns greater than 20%. If the contractor bears this risk it must
significantly increase its fees to maintain a risk-reward profile acceptable to shareholders. The
total responsibility for costs close to the target provides a strong incentive to deliver close to the
target costs.
A drawback with this type of contract is that the incentives close to the target price only function
when there is a chance of the target being achieved. For example, if halfway through
development it is clear that overruns of 200% are likely, with 150% as an absolute minimum, the
incentive ceases to function because there is no longer a correlation between contractor actions
and the incentive returns.
This problem is compounded when the government is unable to estimate the target costs with
certainty. This led the GAO to recommend that these should only be used where "the
government has a sound basis to estimate contract costs, but where uncertainties exist that make
a fixed-price contract impractical" (General Accounting Office, 1987, p. 1). In an attempt to
improve, among other things, this situation, the Truth in Negotiations Act was introduced which
requires contractors to give honest assessments of their view of contract cost to the government.
"Value Engineering", a watered-down version of overrun and underrun cost sharing, is included
in section 48 of the FAR. Value Engineering means the contractor can propose better ways of
performing the contract which save the government money. The contractor shares in the savings.
The contractor is permitted to receive between 25% and 50% of the savings on a fixed price
contract, and between 15% and 25% on a cost-plus contract. Section 48.105 of the FAR contains
a provision which prevents value engineering payments from being double counted under other
incentives.
Value Engineering is less powerful than general overrun or underrun cost sharing because it
operates only at the instigation of the contractor (or, in some cases, if the government directs the
contractor to examine a particular piece of the acquisition for value engineering). The
government also has discretion as to whether or not to accept a Value Engineering Change
Proposal, introducing a risk for a contractor that it will invest effort in a value engineering
proposal that the government rejects as not worthwhile.
In another way Value Engineering is more powerful than overrun and underrun cost sharing
because it can apply to phases of the acquisition beyond those the contractor is responsible for,
for example operations under a design and manufacture contract.
The GAO has been critical of value engineering: "the VE program has made a minimal
contribution to cost reduction in DOD" (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). It
attributed the failure of value engineering to starting value engineering too late, its limited use
throughout the services, and the "cumbersome processes required to implement the program "
(Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). Although the GAO does not mention it, it is
likely there are practical difficulties in implementing value engineering as well, since operations
cost savings can only be estimated during the manufacture period.
Sensibly, the NASA FAR Supplement states that Value Engineering shall not be included in any
R&D contracts which are simply restatements of the contractor's proposal, on the other hand it
encourages them where NASA specifications are written. The principle is that contractors should
not benefit from their own ill-thought proposal, but should be rewarded if they improve a poor
NASA concept.
The concept behind value engineering, incentivizing contractors to find cost savings that benefit
the government rather than themselves, is an important one for improving contractors' incentive
to identify and implement commonality during the design phase. It appears the value engineering
approach as it currently exists does not achieve this, however.
Incentive contracts
Overrun and underrun cost sharing is one method of delivering an incentive to contracts.
However, contracts do not have to offer incentives based on cost considerations alone. Incentives
can be allocated based on almost any other parameter, including schedule and technical
performance. The contractor is paid the appropriate fixed price or fixed fee for simply meeting
the requirements. The contractor is paid additional fees for delivering at a higher level than the
requirements dictate. The idea of using incentives in aerospace contracts is almost as old as
flying itself, with the contracts won by the Wright brothers for the Army's first heavier than air
machine stipulating incentives for flights faster than 40 miles per hour (Sokolow & Green, 1999).
Equally, incentives on NASA contracts are by no means new. A 1962 article documented the
increasing reliance by NASA on incentive contracts (H. Taylor, 1962). Tom Kelly notes the
same: "In March 1965 Joe Shea kicked off a major exercise aimed at renegotiating Grumman
into an incentive contract" (Kelly, 2001, p. 146). Figure 31 is reproduced from Levine and
shows a swift growth in incentive contracts through the Apollo program, as well as an increasing
variety of incentive combinations.
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Figure 31: Growth in NASA incentive contracts (Levine p108)
Incentives can either be tied to fixed metrics, or considered subjectively by the customer at the
conclusion of the contract performance. In the latter case the incentive is referred to in the FAR
as an "award fee" and is "an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the
Government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance" (FAR
section 16.305). The FAR recognizes the government costs associated with subjective
evaluations of contractors and requires that award fee incentives are not used unless the
"administrative costs... are not expected to exceed the expected benefits" (FAR section
16.404(b)(1)). Award fees have been criticized for being too routinely awarded, for example
awarded in cases where performance was simply satisfactory and not excellent (Government
Accountability Office, 2007c). This requires fortitude, competence and independence on the part
of the government evaluation committee. Details of the incentive structures of current programs
are difficult to come by because of confidentiality. Belden however gives the following
incentives from a 1960s era satellite development contract. Cost was an 80/20 share ratio,
schedule was approximately a $5,000 penalty per week late for the first month, and $20,000 per
week after that to a maximum of $66,000 and performance was based on the ratio of commands
given to commands executed, with a zero-incentive for 80% performance sliding up to a bonus of
$132,000 for 100% performance and down to a penalty of $132,000 for 60% performance
(Belden, 1969).
Incentive contracts are frequently used by customers in complex engineering situations where
trade-offs between cost, schedule or technical performance will need to be made during
development. The inchoate system development does not permit the customer to fully specify the
trades to be made at the outset, and meeting each time a trade is contemplated to re-write and
perhaps adjust the price of the contract would be inefficient. Most of the development time
would be taken up with meetings. Instead, "the incentive structure should compel decisions as
between cost, time and performance that are in consonance with the overall procurement
objectives of the government. " (US Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide, p3 8,
quoted in Scherer, p173).
Although incentive structures in contracts are powerful motivators to contract performance, they
must be used carefully. The government should not rely on incentive targets being met, or even
attempted to be met. Performance at the level specified in the requirements must be acceptable.
The incentives must represent value for the government, in that the government must consider the
improved performance to be worth the additional payment to the contractor. Poorly crafted
incentives offer an opportunity for contractors to reap additional profit while making trades that
are not necessarily in the best interest of the government: "Because outstanding results may not
be attainable for each of the incentive areas, all multiple- incentive contracts must include a cost
incentive (or constraint) that operates to preclude rewarding a contractor for superior technical
performance or delivery results when the cost of those results outweighs their value to the
Government" (FAR section 16.402-4).
A carefully written incentive contract where legal and technical teams work closely together can
overcome the difficulties cited in the previous paragraph. A more fundamental difficulty with
incentive contracts is whether they have a strong effect on the contractor teams which make
contractor decisions. Scherer's study of a wide range of defense acquisitions in the early 1960s
led him to conclude that incentive contracts were in reality not especially powerful for motivating
contractors: "Just as engineers become fascinated with the products they design to the point of
seeking undue perfection, contracting personnel may well overestimate the effects of the
instruments they design and administer."
However, the defense industry of the 1960s is separated in both time and purpose from the space
industry of the 2010s and Scherer's conclusions may no longer be relevant. In drawing his
conclusions on the inefficacy of multidimensional incentive contracts, Scherer uses two findings.
First, market forces tended to encourage contractors to sacrifice profit margin or schedule for
quality: "Strongly motivated technical personnel at the operating levels are typically more
concerned with perfecting the things on which they work than with profit maximization."
Second, incentives did not translate to the people who did the work:
" our case study research in companies with profit sharing plans suggested that
the plans failed to alter employee behavior. The common problem was that
engineers and project managers were unable to perceive any correlation between
their individual performance in such activities as tradeoff decisions and the size
of the bonuses they received. .... "bonuses are nice to get, but you can't interpret
them back as an incentive to make our plane fly higher, faster and so forth, at
less cost.""
Scherer notes that the effectiveness of incentives increases for small production runs and
contracts with little follow-on work: "development contracts with no follow on potential are
clearly the exception in weapons acquisition although they may become more common in the field
of space exploration ". In these cases "automatic multidimensional contract incentives may have
more than a small marginal effect on contractor behavior " (Scherer, 1964, p. 170). This is
consistent with Kelly's recollection that, after NASA and Grumman Aircraft Corporation
negotiated an incentive contract for the Apollo Lunar Module, "Gavin and Mullaney held internal
meetings to publicize the incentive provisions of the contract so that everyone working on LM
would know what the specific short term goals and priorities were." (Kelly, 2001, p. 147)
The issue of the effectiveness of incentive contracts in the 2010s is investigated further in the
scoping interviews and case studies.
On balance, incentives appear to be a powerful motivator of contractor behavior, but the effect of
incentives on commonality is not straightforward. Incentives can be used to strike the right
balance between cost and performance trades, which helps incentivize commonality. However,
incentivizing commonality directly is very difficult. First, as commonality is not a goal in itself,
maximizing the commonality to maximize the profit on the commonality incentive may not be the
most desirable outcome for the government. Second, predicting the right commonality level in
advance is impossible in all realistic cases because the amount of beneficial divergence or
unanticipated reuse cannot be predicted in advance.
Incentivizing minimum lifecycle costs is an alternative, but also faces difficulties. First,
calculating lifecycle costs depends heavily on data, and often the contractor is the best source of
this data. Having the contractor calculate lifecycle costs on which its incentives will be based is
unlikely to produce the best results. Rewarding a contractor at the end of development based on
estimates of future lifecycle costs is troublesome because there will be considerable uncertainties
around what the future lifecycle costs will be, making it unlikely the incentive will directly
represent outcomes. Payment for yet-to-be-realized savings could be politically explosive if the
savings fail to materialize and yet the contractor received a large incentive payment. The
alternative, waiting until the lifecycle costs are incurred is also problematic, because few
contractors will be willing to wait decades to receive incentive payments, the actual lifecycle
costs will be influenced by factors outside the contractor's control like operating procedures, and
finally the baseline operating costs in the absence of commonality will themselves be uncertain,
making it impossible to calculate savings.
Price Indexing
Some contracts provide for contractor fees (or incentive targets) to be adjusted by reference to
prices actually experienced by the contractor. These may be published indices or actual costs.
For example, published indices reflect the cost of raw materials in particular sectors or the cost of
labor. The changes in these indices from their values at the time of contract negotiation can be
used to change fees or targets (FAR section 16.203-1).
The effect of these arrangements is to move the risk of input cost spikes from the contractor to the
government. Such a clause may be beneficial for the government because the removal of external
risks to the contractor like labor price increases should lower the contractor's bid price.
It is not likely that price indexing will have a significant effect on commonality, but it is included
here for completeness.
Price Redetermination
Section 16.205 of the FAR provides for prospective price re-determination in connection with
fixed price contracts. Essentially, a firm price is agreed for a fixed period and a ceiling price is
agreed for subsequent periods. Renegotiation occurs after the initial fixed period for subsequent
periods. The advantage of this approach is that much of the uncertainty is driven out of the
design in the initial period and the associated risk need not be priced into subsequent periods.
However, the contractor has little incentive to lower prices below the ceiling price unless there is
competition at that stage of the contract.
Price redetermination may affect the price of commonality because commonality strategies
increase the risk in the early phases of the contract. Acquisition strategies with renegotiation
permit the government to renegotiate once the costs of commonality are better known. On the
other hand, competition, which incentivizes realistic renegotiation tends to be suppressed under
commonality strategies which may make renegotiation difficult.
Market forces
A discussion of contract incentives would be incomplete if it neglected the powerful forces acting
on contractors which are not written into the contract. In practice, there are a range of market
forces which incentivize contractors to think about more than just short term profit maximization
when performing a contract. These have implications for designing an acquisition strategy
because they affect contractor behavior but are harder to identify because they are not incentives
printed on the contract. Four appear particularly prevalent:
- A bias towards quality to ensure future work is not compromised.
- A bias towards underbids on initial contracts with profits to be later recovered.
e A bias against subcontracting when the market offers few opportunities for new work.
- A bias towards lower profit rates on high-technology cost-plus contracts to improve
corporate skills.
Most obvious is the incentive for corporate quality. Making poor products threatens the ability of
the corporation to obtain subsequent products. This impacts the long-run survival of the
corporation and therefore the corporation may act to improve the quality of the product even
when this causes a reduction in short term profitability. One quote in Scherer's qualitative
analysis summarizes this attitude: "this isn't for any monetary considerations, but for our
corporate reputation. There's nothing that will sour your customer like selling him something
that doesn't work... if we're going to stay in business a thing's got to be good" (Scherer, 1964, p.
162).
A second incentive is the idea that corporations will sacrifice short term profits on a contract in
order to secure later profits. In the aerospace and military industries, corporations often look to
production contracts, rather than development contracts, to make profit. In extreme cases, the
development contract may be a loss-leader to obtain the development contract. "Contractors
have generally been willing to sacrifice initial development contract profits for the chance of
earning substantial production follow-on contract profits once they are locked together with the
government in a relationship analogous to a bilateral monopoly" (Scherer, 1964, p. 156).
Corporations also have a long-run investment in staff. In a market with low opportunities for
other types of work, contractors are incentivized to keep their staff busy on existing (cost-plus)
contracts, rather than complete the work quickly and have idle staff. This extends to
subcontracting. A firm is likely to minimize subcontracting in a low opportunity environment
even when such subcontracting is an efficient strategy and the contractor could reap incentive
profits from the lower development cost. The longer term forces acting on the corporation trump
short term forces. It is not possible to definitively state how this will affect the project. It may
improve the project if the subcontractors were equal or lower quality than the prime by keeping
the design team better coordinated. In contrast, if the contractor normally subcontracts because
the subcontractor has better expertise, then quality will suffer if the contractor keeps work in-
house.
The investment in staff is closely tied to an investment in knowledge. High-risk, cutting edge
projects offer the chance to obtain corporate skills that can be later applied to profit making
projects. The canonical example is DuPont's assistance on the Manhattan Project for a cost-plus-
$1 fee. DuPont was sensitive to allegations of profiteering leveled at it in the First World War,
but also emerged from the Manhattan Project in a leading position to build the United States' civil
nuclear power plants (DuPont, 2011). Government aerospace projects offer similar opportunities
to companies willing to invest in learning while being paid by the government.
These ideas are important to commonality. Market forces lead corporations to minimize short
term profits to make long term profits, the same constraint that operates when an initial
investment is made to develop a platform. Corporations are willing to sacrifice short term profits
to achieve a "bilateral monopoly ", and commonality across the exploration architecture increases
the potential for monopoly situations to arise.
In concluding this analysis of extra-contractual incentives it is worth noting that Scherer lays a
heavy emphasis on their effectiveness after his extensive case work: "iffirms tend to maximize
any kind ofprofits at all, it is the long run variety " (p32 1). Scherer's work was conducted in the
Cold-War defense contracting environment and this sentiment seems to be in contrast with the
popular view of modem space contracting, but is worth noting.
Summary: Effect of Contract Payment Provisions on Commonality
In summary, contract type has a strong effect on commonality:
- Fixed price contracts encourage minimum up-front expenditure by contractors, which
usually hampers commonality identification, while cost-plus contracts may incentivize
an over-emphasis on performance at the expense of value. Degrees between the fixed
price and cost plus extremes can be achieved through overrun and underrun sharing.
e Incentives other than price can be used to better align government and contractor goals,
however it is difficult to achieve an incentive which operates directly on commonality.
Award fee structures may be better suited to assessing commonality, but rely on a
competent customer system engineering team such that the contractor has confidence it
will be fairly assessed.
- Price redetermination may be a strategy which could be used to encourage the
exploration of commonality ideas early in the contract at low risk to the contractor.
- Contractors are also affected by longer term profit motives shaped by market forces
outside the contract, which must be considered when designing incentives.
Contract Deliverables
Closely linked with how the contractor is paid is what the contractor must do. Thus far it has
been implicitly assumed that the contractor performs design, development and perhaps some
commissioning as well (Figure 32). That is not the only way to achieve an acquisition goal. Two
other methods are considered below. One is to simply acquire a service rather than paying for
development (Figure 33). The second is to pay for development but extend the contracting
relationship to cover operation also (Figure 34). The latter two methods connect the development
contractor financially to the operating stage of the project - often the phase which benefits most
from commonality - and are therefore more likely to encourage commonality in the development
phase.
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The service contract is unusual in space acquisition and deserves further explanation. In this type
of contract, the customer does not pay for a physical item, but rather for a service to be provided.
For example, the US government is not paying directly for the entire development of commercial
crew launch vehicles, but will pay for services on a per-launch basis. Similarly, Hamilton
Sundstrand is being paid per liter for water produced from its Sabatier reactor on board the
International Space Station, rather than as a lump sum development fee.8 Other government
branches have used contracts for services because it allows funds for operations and maintenance
rather than procurement to be used for the contract (Government Accountability Office, 2006).
The effects of this contract type are that the service provider is not paid if the service is not
provided, which incentivizes quality, and the service provider is responsible for the ongoing
maintenance of the product in order to continue to provide the service. Of course, contracts for
service only work well if there is price competition, otherwise any inefficiencies in design or
operation are simply passed through to the customer as higher rates for the services.
The third type of contract shown above is one where the contract itself requires the contractor to
operate the infrastructure in some form. This structure is most often seen where civil
infrastructure is "project financed". The up-front funding for the project is raised from debt
lenders (banks) and equity participants (shareholders), and the funding is paid off over time from
profit in operating the project. Examples of output include oil from an oil rig, water from a
desalination plant or coal from a mine. These "bankable" products do not yet exist for human
spaceflight, making a project finance revenue stream only possible by a government guarantee,
for example a payment of $1 billion for each successful landing on the moon. Such a guarantee
would tie future Congresses and Administrations to the policy goals of this one, and would
therefore be difficult to implement.
As a secondary consideration, the rates at which debt is lent to projects depends largely on the
resale value of the assets which that debt purchases. Mining trucks and oil rigs have reasonable
resale value; pieces of launch vehicles do not (particularly in the most likely default circumstance
where the United States has abandoned its space program). Project financing is not suitable for
the space sector.
Optimists may point out that SpaceX received significant funding from Draper Fisher Jurvetson
(Needleman, 2009), however that funding is tied to the satellite launch market, which does have a
bankable product and for which there would be buyers of, in particular, SpaceX's intellectual
property in the event of an insolvency.
8 A more detailed discussion of contracts for service is summarized in the scoping interviews.
Summary: Contract Deliverables
The Contract Deliverables have a significant effect on implementing commonality.
- Contracts for service or contracts for development and operation of infrastructure connect
the development contractor with the lifecycle costs of the product and are more likely to
incentivize examination of commonality.
e Contracts for service are more appropriate for a human exploration architecture than
project finance approaches.
Contract Phasing
The contract deliverables considered above extended the usual concept of a development contract
into the future, allowing the system developer to operate the developed product. This section will
examine the effect of shortening the usual concept of a development contract and breaking it into
separate concept, design and manufacture phases, illustrated in Figure 35. Corporations which
win early design contracts and perform well have an advantage going into future phases of the
design.
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Figure 35: Contracts phased over time
There are several reasons why requiring companies to bid on shorter contracts is a good idea.
Contracts for concept designs are cheaper than full development contracts. This means that
several concept designs can be let and the best ideas captured. Bergstrom points out how this
approach evolved between the Apollo and Shuttle programs. NASA teams made many of the
critical design decisions for the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo spacecraft, but by the time of the
shuttle "the contractors were strengthening headquarters' ability to effect the design it
wanted... the profusion of ideas, and the engineering studies of them, were giving NASA the data
it needed to make the optimal trade-offs among configurations" (Bromberg, 1999, p. 89).
This approach carried to its extreme results in "fly-off' acquisition, where contractors build a
fully working version of their proposed design and compete with one or more other contractors
for the final production order.
Two main reasons make the fly-off unsuitable for NASA acquisitions. First, the high proportion
of total system cost which is spent on design means that the advantages of the fly-off come at a
higher cost. Government must pay for the extra design effort either by contemporaneously
subsidizing it or by offering sufficiently lucrative contract prices and volumes that the risk of not
winning the fly-off is outweighed by the upside. Note that Figure 36 is based on DoD space
activities, which do not have the ongoing operating expenses of human spaceflight. Satellite
operation is largely a matter of following the manual and crossing one's fingers. Human
spaceflight involves ongoing interaction between crew and ground, and an operating phases that
includes repeated launches of hardware. This may make the fly-off more attractive for human
spaceflight programs than for satellite programs.
Second, there are significant interrelations in the human space architecture as a system-of-
systems. For example, during design of the lunar module in Project Apollo, there was a delicate
interrelationship between the reduction of performance margins on the Saturn V and the weight
envelope on the lunar module. In a fly-off, the product evaluation must be taken out of its context
with other design elements and evaluated on its own parameters. This means that flexibility to
move envelopes between systems during design is lost.
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Figure 36: Contrast between terrestrial and space acquisition cost profiles (Brown, 2008)
Having discarded a full fly-off approach in the NASA context, the question arises of whether
phasing of design or development contracts might be appropriate. Funding multiple design
studies in the early stages of a project has become routine now as an increasing amount of space
expertise resides outside NASA. A more controversial approach extends simultaneous
competition to the manufacturing phase, with independent designs. A recent example of this
approach is the dual-sourcing of engines for the joint strike fighter. The debate in Congress
summarizes the pros and cons of this approach neatly. On the one hand, the fixed capital costs of
design and manufacturing lines must be paid for twice by the government. On the other,
continuous competition delivers lower prices to the government throughout the lifecycle of the
aircraft.
The Federal Acquisition Regulations recognize the benefit of extending competition, but also
accept that it is impossible to precisely legislate for the right duration of competition government
wide. Subpart 34.002 requires that "Agencies acquiring major systems shall... (b) sustain
effective competition between alternate systems and sources for as long as is beneficial."
Occasionally, this can be a difficulty in the aerospace industry. In one instance in 1997, Boeing
"declined to bid on a six billion dollar contract, leaving Lockheed Martin the sole bidder"
(Bromberg, 1999, p. 177).
An application of contract phasing related directly to commonality includes an additional phase in
the contract for the identification of commonality opportunities. During this pre-design phase,
the contractor prepares a report on possible commonality options and the estimated return from
taking those commonality options. This focuses attention directly on possible commonality
opportunities and avoids the possibility that commonality is overlooked altogether. However, the
contractor may not yet have the experience with the system necessary to make informed decisions
at this point. If the commonality investigator is not the same contractor which develops the
system there is a risk the system developer will ignore the commonality exercise.
Leader / follower contracts are a halfway point between the monopolistic position that
manufacturers of complex systems find themselves in, and the inefficiencies associated with
paying two corporations to design a complex system. In leader / follower contracts, one
corporation is primarily responsible for development, while the other corporation offers an
alternative at a lower switching cost than restarting the project, but at a higher cost than running
two simultaneous development projects.
There are two broad types of leader / follower contracts which achieve competition without
excessive development costs. In the first type, a corporation agrees to train a second corporation
as a potential competitor in the manufacture of its goods. The government sets such a condition
early in the contracting process, and presumably the original corporation requires an uplift in fee
to undertake such an obviously adverse move as training the competitor. Once trained, the
competitor sells to the government and keeps the prices of the manufactured hardware lower. In
the second type, a corporation is kept in a position to potentially take over the manufacture of the
goods, but the government does not require the second corporation to manufacture goods unless
the government so requests. The threat of competition, rather than competition itself, is deemed
enough to keep the original corporation's prices reasonable, while the government does not have
to indirectly pay for the establishment of two separate manufacturing lines with its associated
costs and inefficiencies.
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Scherer's analysis of competition in the defense industry concluded "it is frequently possible to
create competitive incentives for production efficiency through competitive breakout and second
sourcing. Nevertheless, there are usually costs and problems associated with securing price
competition on the production of technically advanced and complex items. A high order of
judgment is required to determine in any particular case whether the prospective benefits ofprice
competition outweigh the costs" (Scherer, 1964, p. 128).
Summary: Contract Phasing
Contract phasing has some effect on commonality:
- Switching between contractors more frequently through the design process discourages
rational investment in future commonality.
- Including a separate commonality identification phase can improve commonality
outcomes.
- Shadow contracting can provide downward price pressure on a directed or long-term
contractor, mitigating one of the major disadvantages of these structures. However, the
shadow contractor comes at a cost, and there is a high switching cost associated with
moving to the shadow contractor.
Contract Termination
Under some circumstances the government can terminate the contract with the contractor. The
contractor has a powerful incentive to avoid those situations. Usual circumstances relate to cost,
time or performance. For example, the contract may be terminated if the total cost expended
crosses a certain ceiling, or if the contractor fails to pass a critical design review by a particular
point in time. A contract may also be terminated without express contract provisions in
circumstances where the contractor has not or is anticipated to not fulfill its contract obligations.
Practically, making a judgment as to actual or anticipatory breach of the contract is a risky
exercise which is why specific circumstances giving rise to a right to terminate the contract are
often specified. Scherer notes the "leniency manifested towards the large corporate contractor"
which the government showed in terminating 221 contracts worth a total of $8 million in 1957,
and comments that termination for default on large contracts was virtually non-existent at the
time (Scherer, 1964, p. 307).
These circumstances are generally less powerful incentives in government contracts than in
commercial contracts, because all government contracts are also terminable "for the convenience
of the government." This allows the government to terminate the contract without a breach of
contract by the contractor when it is "in the government's interest " (FAR section 2.101). At this
point, the payments to the contractor become as much a matter of policy and government
reputation as law. The FAR requires that termination "should compensate the contractor fairly
for the work done and the preparations made for the terminated portions of the contract,
including a reasonable allowance for profit" (FAR section 49-2). Termination for convenience
is used when policy directions dictate the cancellation of programs, or when the outlook for
programs looks bleak despite the contractor having committed no breach so far.
The government must generally be cautious about exercising its rights to convenient termination
too liberally. While such rights may be helpful in a current tight situation, overuse leads to
contractor distrust of the government and eventually to a reluctance to bid on contracts. It is
effectively an expression of "sovereign risk" more closely associated with nationalization of
utilities or resources in the third world, and, like sovereign risk is likely to drive up prices in the
industry generally.
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Summary: Contract Termination
Contract termination in itself does not appear to have a direct effect on commonality. However,
the historical reluctance by the Department of Defense or NASA to terminate projects until
compelled to do so by Congress does have an effect. Properly implemented commonality
encourages affordable projects and requires constant consideration of benefit-cost trades. A
reluctance to terminate contracts which do not meet these criteria decreases the incentive for
companies to implement commonality.
Insight and Oversight
A further category of contract provisions do not instruct the contractor on what to build, but
rather mandate part of the organizational structure that oversees the development. In this respect
these provisions are more concerned with the process of development than with what is actually
developed. NASA contractors are often required to allow a NASA team to inspect progress on
the development, often on a daily basis. NASA representatives work full time at the contractor
facilities. This has five advantages:
1. NASA representatives supervise methods and processes to ensure they are being carried
out correctly
2. Formal approvals and inspections which are required before work can proceed can take
place more quickly with permanent NASA representation at the facility
3. NASA representatives are part of a continuous reporting chain back to senior NASA
managers, which incentivizes ongoing efficient performance by the contractor and
identifies potential programmatic problems early
4. NASA representatives serve as a conduit into NASA's extensive human spaceflight
knowledge base and can share that knowledge with the contractor to improve the product
5. Continuous oversight allows cost structures like "cost plus" contracts to be used with
greater confidence in the contractors' estimates of costs.
A more formal expression of the oversight function used across government is the Earned Value
Management System (EVMS). The FAR requires that the EVMS is used for all major projects.
EVMS establishes a baseline of work packages to be undertaken and then assesses contractor
performance against the time taken for completed work packages and the cost taken for
completed work packages (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 231). EVMS focuses only on the
development aspects of a system, rather than the performance of the system during operations. In
effect, EVMS is a system of metrics intended to be as precise as possible in measuring the
development performance of a contractor against the target development performance.
Aiming for such development certainty does not complement commonality attempts. If
commonality is already planned in the requirements given to the contractor, the EVMS is unlikely
to account for divergence. Accordingly commonality will appear to the contractor as a difficult
process to implement, as divergence drives actual cost and schedule away from predicted cost and
schedule. Another drawback is that EVMS focuses solely on development. In the event that the
contractor is required to identify commonality opportunities, such a focus is unlikely to
incentivize the contractor to consider full lifecycle costs in their design and development,
reducing the likelihood that commonality that delivers operating phase benefits will be identified.
Finally, the EVMS puts cost and schedule pressure on the contractor which makes it unrealistic
for the contractor to consider undertaking additional work to improve commonality with variants
built by other contractors.
Summary: Insight / Oversight
The supervision culture that is already a part of NASA has implications for commonality.
Contractors remain in close contact with NASA, making communication of small commonality
changes easier and faster. If the NASA overseers have a good understanding of the project
outside the particular piece they are asked to supervise then they can also contribute by helping to
generate the visibility to identify new commonality opportunities, and also by identifying the
causes of divergence early so that the divergence can be managed.
Using the EVMS does not normally account for the "overhead" of commonality implementation
both from the perspective of the initial investment in commonality and the subsequent cost of
managing divergence. This would be likely to discourage commonality attempts.
Intellectual Property
The intellectual property terms of a contract are an important facet of cross-contractor
commonality. The essence of cross-contractor commonality is reuse of other contractors'
designs. Such reuse is illegal without first securing intellectual property rights to the design. The
provisions of the contract dictate the rights that customer, prime contractor, and system contractor
have in intellectual property developed during the course of the program.
Intellectual property includes patents, trademarks, copyright, rights in data and moral rights, and
engineering designs are likely to fall under either "patents", "rights in data" or "copyright".
The most straightforward case is the transfer of intellectual property rights from the company
which developed the design ("originator") to the company which is receiving the rights
("recipient"). At one end of the spectrum of transfers which might take place is the complete
transfer of intellectual property from the originator to the recipient. If this occurs, the recipient
has full rights over the design, almost9 as if they had designed it themselves. More moderately,
the originator may give the recipient a license to undertake activities with the intellectual property
but without ceding full rights. For example, the recipient could be given the rights to
manufacture a particular design for five years only. Licenses can be exclusive, where the right to
manufacture may not be given to anyone else. In practice, the terms of a license can be modified
to suit the particular commercial needs of both parties. The parties will decide between
themselves the value of the intellectual property.
When two companies work together to develop a product, for example as customer and supplier,
the terms of the development agreement will determine whether intellectual property developed
by the supplier belongs to the customer or supplier. If the development agreement is silent on
intellectual property, then arguments are likely if any valuable intellectual property is developed.
The transfer of intellectual property from a government contractor to the government is more
complicated. Part 27 of the FAR governs the intellectual property provisions of acquisition
contracts. Examining the FAR, the NASA FAR supplement section 1827, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Act 1958 indicates that the Government has very strong theoretical rights
in intellectual property developed by its contractors. However, two factors mitigate government
rights in practice. First, the government appears to have, on a policy basis, decided not to press
its intellectual property rights as strongly as it could. Second, the provisions depend on a clear
delineation between intellectual property developed with government funding and that developed
with private funding, which breaks down in complex projects which combine both private and
public funding intertwined over time.
9 In some cases, especially where the design approaches a work of art, the originator may retain "moral rights" in the
design, essentially the right to be identified as the creator perhaps with some control over modification. This situation
is unlikely in the engineering context of this thesis.
There is no doubt that the government has strong theoretical rights in inventions generated under
government contracts. Section 20135(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act states that if
an invention is generated by any person involved with a NASA-issued contract, whether they are
at NASA or a contractor or elsewhere, then that invention becomes "the exclusive property" of
the United States. To enforce this, no aerospace related patent may be issued anywhere in the
United States unless the applicant for the patent proves that the invention was not made under a
NASA contract (Section 20135 (d)). If the invention is made under a NASA contract, the
Administrator may waive NASA's rights to the invention, however the United States at all times
retains "an irrevocable, nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free license for the practice of
such invention" (Section 20135(g)). A similar right is given under the FAR where "any
invention of the contractor made in the performance of work under a Government contract"
automatically gives the United States a non-exclusive license in the invention (section 27.302(c))
and "march-in" rights to force grant of a license to third parties (section 27.302(f)). The same
rights of the United States apply to the intellectual property of any subcontractor to the contractor
at any tier (27.304-3(a)). There are some exceptions for small businesses.
The government also has strong rights in technical data and copyrights under sub-part 27.4 of the
FAR. The Government receives "unlimited rights" in data which does not include trade secrets
'first produced in the performance of a contract" (27.404-1). The government also has a right to
data ("limited rights data") which contains trade secrets or confidential information, but must not
disclose the data outside the government or use the data for manufacture (27.404-2(c)(1)).
The armed services have an additional category of data rights which operate halfway between
limited rights data and unlimited rights data. "Government purpose rights" apply to data which is
developed partially from private funds and partially from government funds. Government
purpose rights allow the government to disclose 'for competitive procurement but notfor private
manufacturing" (Duberstein, 1988, p. 26).
Despite these broad rights, intellectual property in contracts was cited as a key obstacle in the
scoping interviews and case studies such as Rhodes' examination of the Constellation Space Suit
System and the JTRS. Unfortunately, no specialist government intellectual property lawyers
responded to requests for interviews for this thesis, and consequently the analysis below may not
capture all the practical obstacles to giving the United States rights in intellectual property.
Despite the author's lack of a guide in navigating the complex intellectual property provisions in
the FAR, two principles are clear. First, there are clear policy statements that reflect a
government duty to strike a balance between contractor and government rights. "Agencies shall
balance the Government's needs and the contractor's legitimate proprietary interests"
(27.402(b)). The NASA FAR supplement states "it is the policy ofNASA to waive the rights (to
acquire title) of the United States (with the reservation of a Government license... and march-in
rights... if the Administrator determines that the interests of the United States will be served)"
(1827.302(b)(ii)). The supplement also states that "the contractor is normally granted... a
revocable, non-exclusive, royalty-free license in each patent application" (1827.302(i)), which
goes beyond the strict FAR requirements. Finally, the supplement acknowledges that its
technical data rights in commercial items should be "kept to the absolute minimum consistent
with the purpose for which they are being procured" (1827.406). The FAR itself states that "the
government recognizes rights in data developed at private expense and limits its demands for
delivery of that data... [to] only those rights essential to its needs" (27.102). The patent rights
are designed to "encourage maximum participation of industry in federally supported research
and development efforts " (27.302), which necessitates restrictions on the government's rights to
appropriate industry's research.
109
Second, the provisions of the FAR contain significant grey areas when applied to complex
development projects which intermingle hardware and software. The provisions depend on a
clear delineation between intellectual property developed with government funding, and that
which depends in some way on achievements made with private funding. For completely new
research contracts such a division may be possible, but in the development of hardware projects
the contributions of government and contractor are likely to have intertwined to an intractable
Gordian knot. Some components are likely to be developed privately, perhaps at the
subcontractor level, and others may have been developed under previous government projects.
There is also a question over how much change separates a minor modification from a project that
is so extensively modified that it is deemed to be a new development. Finally, the division
between a patentable invention and the generation of technical data is difficult to make in the case
of hardware-firmware-software interactions.
An attempt to strike a halfway point between the needs of the government and the needs of the
contractor is the concept of "form, fit and function data", defined in section 27.401 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulations. Governments (or their system integrator delegates) require this data to
successfully integrate complex systems, and contractors are more willing to make mere interface
data available than the entirety of the design.
The importance of intellectual property to commonality is high. Without the intellectual property
rights to projects which have been developed it is exceedingly difficult for the government to
allow multiple corporations to build the same common system. Without intellectual property the
government is beholden to a single supplier, leading to a choice between the price rises often
associated with a monopoly or new developments which abandon commonality. Proper
management of intellectual property will be a critical determinant in the success of any
acquisition program.
Summary: Intellectual Property
Intellectual property has a very strong effect on commonality:
- NASA has very strong intellectual property rights in the designs of its contractors which
it could use as part of a more extensive commonality strategy. It chooses not to for
policy reasons.
- Successful intellectual property for re-use in space systems will need to consider
hardware, software and any intermediates.
- Rights to intellectual property should be agreed at the outset, before it is clear which
organizations will benefit from particular provisions.
Socio-Economic Programs
It is worth noting that government acquisition requires that a wide range of socio-economic
programs are considered, from the Buy American Act to the Small Business Act to the Javits-
Wagner O'Day Act (support for people with disabilities). Most of these acts are concerned with
furthering social goals through government acquisition. As many commentators have noted, such
a multiplicity of goals from government acquisition necessarily means a dilution of efficiency
when measured against any one goal (such as development cost). Two socio-economic programs
have more direct impacts on the acquisition of architectures with commonality.
First, the Small Business Act encourages the use of small businesses in government acquisitions.
Using small businesses means that more corporations will be involved in the supply chain at any
one time, and also that more corporations will be involved over time because the duration of
existence of small businesses is generally lower than the duration of existence of larger
companies. Further, small businesses are likely to simply go out of business at the end of their
lifecycle, whereas larger companies are often absorbed into others, often maintaining their
experience within the aerospace sector albeit under a different name.
Second, the Buy American Act which limits the purchase of foreign goods in government
acquisitions. Section 25 of the FAR simply requires that "A foreign endproduct may [only] be
purchased if the contracting officer determines that the price of the lowest domestic offer is
unreasonable or if another exception applies. " In practice, the impact of the Buy American Act
on space hardware is supplemented by the need for wide Congressional support and by the close
nexus between space hardware and national security manifested in the International Trafficking
In Arms Regulations (ITAR), both of which make it politically infeasible to send aerospace work
(and jobs) outside the United States. On the one hand, the limitation of the pool of contractors to
those with significant presence in the United States tends to decrease barriers to commonality by
increasing the likelihood that the same contractors will be involved in projects with commonality
potential. On the other hand, if the space exploration infrastructure is multi-national then the Buy
American Act and its policy undercurrents will hamper commonality. On a macro scale,
European contractors may have to duplicate the work of US Contractors, and on a micro scale the
acquisition of common components or subsystems in a GFE-type arrangement will be more
difficult.
An analysis of the balance which should be achieved between commonality and these socio-
economic objectives is left to others. It suffices to note here that it is not at all clear the balance
should be struck in favor of commonality. For example, the inclusion of more small businesses in
acquisition may increase the availability of innovative solutions with far more positive effects on
acquisition than those associated with an increase in commonality.
Summary: Socio-Economic Programs
Socio-economic programs have some effect on commonality:
e An emphasis on small business in acquisition increases the variety of organizations
involved in acquisition and in theory makes commonality more difficult to implement.
* An emphasis on United States products in acquisition decreases opportunities for
international commonality in space exploration architectures.
Conclusion
This section has examined the possible contract structuring and contract terms which could be
blended to create an acquisition strategy. Combined with sections 2.1, which addressed the
nature of NASA's acquisition task, and section 2.2, which addressed commonality best practice,
the necessary background to the investigation of NASA commonality acquisition has been set
out. The following chapters will summarize the results of discussions with practitioners which
are used to more fully grasp the advantages and disadvantages of different commonality
acquisition strategies.
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS OF SCOPING INTERVIEWS
The previous chapter relied heavily on formal, published works in assessing NASA's acquisition
constraints, best practice from commonality, and the range of available acquisition strategies. In
using such sources, there is a danger that practical constraints on acquisition will not be
unearthed, or the most recent developments will not be captured. To address this limitation, a
series of semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a range of NASA, DOD, industry and
academic personnel. The aim of the interviews was primarily to identify any methods in use to
improve commonality in complex aerospace architectures, particularly between multiple
contractors. In doing so, interviewees normally gave examples of successful commonality
projects from their past experience.
Interviews were conducted between October 2009 and March 2011 with people in the positions
listed in Appendix A. During this time period, presentations on commonality were made to the
CAEG team (involving consultants, civil servants and contractors working on costing at NASA
Langley Research Center), JPL's office of the Chief Engineer, the NASA Human Exploration
Architecture Team, the NASA Cost Estimation Group, and a group of interested analysts at
RAND Corp. The discussion after these presentations contributed to this scoping exercise.
The results of the semi-structured interviews answer six major questions:
1. Have any acquisition strategies been used by NASA or DOD which focus on
commonality?
2. Which acquisition strategies - actual or potential - could affect the amount of realized
commonality?
3. To what extent do US Federal Government acquisition regulation and practices limit the
acquisition strategies available for commonality?
4. What types of NASA projects would most benefit from an acquisition strategy focused
on commonality?
5. What factors drive commonality success?
6. What are the obstacles to successful implementation of inter-contractor commonality?
The short interviews were supplemented by analysis of available academic literature and
government publications. Table 9 summarizes the answers to these questions, as they were at the
end of the scoping phase of the thesis. The answers go some way to analyzing the acquisition of
commonality, and are then further developed in the detailed case study phases of this thesis in
Chapter 4.
Table 9: Summary of scoping interviews
Question Answer
Have any acquisition strategies Both NASA and DOD plan for commonality when
been used by NASA or DOD writing project requirements during the architecting
which focus on commonality? phase. Neither organization has widely used
acquisition strategies to encourage commonality in
later design phases.
Which acquisition strategies - The scoping discussions revealed a range of
actual or potential - could affect acquisition approaches which drive commonality. None
the amount of realized of these are at the level of a comprehensive acquisition
commonality? strategy, however many of them represent the state of
the practice in NASA and DOD and are worth noting.
To what extent do US Federal NASA acquisitions are governed by both the formal
Government acquisition regulation requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulations
and practices limit the acquisition (FAR) and general acquisition practice. The FAR is
strategies available for theoretically open to the adoption of innovative
commonality? acquisition strategies, but the practical realities of fixed
yearly budgets and an inability to commit to purchases
in future years or across centers eliminate some
commercially used commonality strategies.
What types of NASA projects High value projects in the early stages of development
would most benefit from an and facilities and ground support equipment are likely
acquisition strategy focused on the best targets for commonality focused acquisitions,
commonality? but there were a wide variety of opinions.
What factors drive commonality Strong management leading to commonality success
success? was a constant theme through interviews with project
participants. Interviewees also pointed to the need for
mandated commonality, clear examples of commonality
benefit and firm requirements.
What are the obstacles to All interviewees expressed concerns about the difficulty
successful implementation of of implementing extensive inter-contractor
inter-contractor commonality? commonality. An overriding theme was the lack of
positive incentive for companies to work together,
coupled with significant downsides for companies
which cooperated like loss of intellectual property or
market leadership.
Question One: Have any acquisition strategies been used by NASA or DOD which focus on
commonality?
Both NASA and DOD plan for commonality when writing project requirements during the
architecting phase. Neither organization has widely used acquisition strategies to encourage
commonality in later design phases. The planned common projects or systems in the architecture
are usually awarded to a single contractor.
NASA plans for commonality during program architecting, making tradeoffs between the
perceived costs and benefits of commonality. A good example pointed out by several
interviewees is the architectural commonality in the Ares launch vehicles proposed for the
Constellation Program. Features of the Ares I / Ares V commonality were examined Figure 13.
The interviewees pointed out in particular:
- NASA re-used aspects of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motors (SRM) between the
Shuttle and Ares launch vehicles.
e NASA designed the SRMs to be shared between Ares I and Ares V with minimal
changes.
- NASA designed the J-2X engine to be used in the upper stage of both the Ares I and Ares
V launch vehicles.
e NASA reused aspects of the Apollo-era J-2 design and technology in the J-2X.
This commonality was established with a small level of contractor involvement. Contractors
were awarded design studies and contractor staff with special expertise are often seconded to
some NASA teams. However, the design process which resulted in the Constellation Program
was essentially an in-house development exercise by system architects within the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate within NASA HQ.
Once the architecture is decided, requirements are written for each of the elements which reflect
that architectural vision. For example, the J-2X requirements are written in such a way that they
represent the upper bound of both the Ares I and Ares V upper stage requirements. The
contractor then designs and manufactures to those requirements, and the final product reflects the
planned commonality. Several interviewees viewed this method of high-level architectural
commonality development as the way to drive commonality into exploration architectures.
The DOD follows a similar pathway of early commonality intention. The DOD is exposed to
more obvious architectural opportunities for commonality than NASA because it is responsible
for distinct services, the needs of which often overlap. During the early phases of many defense
projects, system architects examine opportunities for developing projects jointly with other
services (McChrystal, 2009). Examples of jointly developed projects include aircraft, ranging
from the TFX project to develop an aircraft for the Navy and Air Force in the 1960s to the
recently developed Joint Strike Fighter used by the Navy, Air Force and Marines. The joint
development of inter-operable radios in the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) project is a non-
aerospace example of commonality more fully examined in Chapter 4.
Interviewees often pointed to these joint DOD programs as good examples of commonality in
systems-of-systems. The aggregation of demand from multiple services improves unit cost by
spreading fixed costs over more units. Joint development breaks down when the cost savings of
pooled development are outweighed by the performance compromises inherent in a joint project.
Joint projects are most often executed by a single prime contractor as system integrator. Most
interviewees considered this approach to be the most sensible one to realizing commonality. For
example, Lockheed Martin was the prime contractor for the Joint Strike Fighter. Lockheed
Martin was then responsible for cost and schedule performance of the final product. Although
there were requirements to develop a common aircraft, no specific financial incentives for
commonality were included in the contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. Boas observed that this
impacted the commonality actually realized: the "contract incentive structure and budget
constraints focus Lockheed Martin's development decisions on the minimization of development
and Unit Recurring Flyaway costs" (Boas, 2008).
Figure 39 and Figure 40 contrast the conceptual difference between the DOD approach, to drive
commonality from the project requirements level, and the NASA approach, to drive commonality
from the system function level. As the diagram shows, this is an obvious outcome when DOD's
internal divisions have similar needs at the project level, and NASA's internal divisions have
similar needs at the system level. Possible areas within NASA where the DOD structure would
work are communications architectures like the Deep Space Network or Mars Orbiting Satellites
which could be used by both human and robotic exploration.
Department / Agency
Acquisition Customer ir Force Navy Marnes Amy
Project Level Tank cle
System Level Engine Avionics Structures Engine Avionics Structums
DOD Approach: Allocate similar projects based on close requirements between
acquisition customers to a single contractor to drive commonality
Figure 39: DOD commonality approach
Department /Agency
Acquisition Customer sM
Project Level
System Level
NASA Approach: Allocate similar systems to a single contractor at the
system level where aspects of function and form are defined
Figure 40: NASA commonality approach
Question Two: Which acquisition strategies - actual or potential - could affect the amount
of realized commonality?
The scoping discussions revealed a range of acquisition approaches which drive commonality.
None of these are at the level of a comprehensive acquisition strategy, however many of them
represent the state of the practice in NASA and DOD and are worth noting.
The approaches raised during the discussions have been divided into three major categories.
"Acquisition culture changes" describe ways that government organizations could change their
approaches to acquisitions in general. "Industry-wide strategies" describe structural changes in
the aerospace industry that could improve commonality. "Contracting strategies" describe
approaches that could be used on particular acquisitions to improve commonality outcomes.
1. Acquisition culture changes
o Formalized re-use
o "Commercial off-the-shelf' acquisition
o "Smart Buyer" strategies
2. Industry-wide strategies
o Centralized technology development
o Neutral organization as knowledge repository
3. Contracting strategies
o Single corporation as system integrator
o Joint ventures
o Directed subcontracts
o Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)
o Commonality contract incentives
o Contracts for services
o Develop and buy-in
Acquisition Culture Changes
Formalized reuse
Reuse is the most basic form of Boas' three models of commonality development (Boas, 2008).
However, it is straightforward to implement and several NASA centers have had success with
formal re-use programs paid for as an overhead resource available to the center.
One example is JPL's Flight Hardware Logistics Program (FHLP). It creates a JPL-wide
inventory of hardware which was ordered for a project but was not used during development. For
example, flight spares or test articles are often ordered in anticipation of possible failures, and are
unused if those failures do not eventuate. Under the FHLP, subsequent projects can reuse those
pieces of hardware, which saves up to 1.5% to 2.0% percent on the total mission cost.
The initial driver for the FHLP was to address schedule inefficiency caused by the long lead time
in certain space-qualified computer processors. The secondary driver was the cost reduction due
to commonality. The program has a number of features to reduce the up-front barriers to reuse
for program managers, such as web-searchable on-line inventories and shopping lists.
One drawback of programs like FHLP is that they do not incentivize the choice of easily reused
hardware, for example by giving the original program some "sale proceeds" from the reuse. Such
a market mechanism is unworkable under the accounting methods currently used at JPL. Inter-
project transfers of completed systems either occur at the full cost of the system if the system is
unused, or at zero cost if the system is used. There is no middle ground for a second project to
help subsidize the development expenses of the first system.
Formalized re-use appeared most capable at the expensive component level rather than the system
level. For example, the FHLP has had most success with items like flight computer chips, sun
sensors and deep-space transponders, rather than more high-level systems. Clark & van
Amrindge (2002) note common system development as a future goal of the FHLP. Analysis by
the Constellation commonality team focusing mainly on cost savings showed that the benefits
that can be expected from component level commonality are small compared to the benefits of
commonality at the architecture or system level. The Constellation analysis is examined in more
detail in the answer to Question 4 below.
COTS Acquisition
A strategy suggested by several interviewees as a way to increase commonality is to acquire
"commercial off-the-shelf' parts ("COTS"). By buying commercial parts without alteration, the
likelihood of commonality across projects or systems is increased.
This approach gives the government benefits of manufacturing economies of scale without the
government having to consolidate bulk buys. It also gives some of the reliability benefits of and
often access to large sample sizes for reliability analysis. Further, COTS parts can be very simply
acquired under the FAR.
The most obvious disadvantage of COTS acquisition is that a commercial provider may not make
a product that meets all of the requirements. This is a particular concern for space projects which
often have unusual requirements, for example radiation hard circuitry, performance in a zero
gravity environment or demonstrated ultra-high reliability. Additionally, there are often multiple
commercial providers whose products are not common, and there is no guarantee in these
circumstances that COTS acquisition will yield the operations phase benefits of commonality that
come from standardized parts and processes. COTS acquisition may in fact decrease the
commonality when compared to a NASA acquisition of a bespoke part from a dedicated
production line.
Like formalized reuse, COTS acquisition focuses mainly on components and small assemblies,
rather than architectural or system level commonality where the bulk of the commonality benefit
is likely to occur.
Smart Buyer Strategies
The "smart buyer" approach involves government system engineers heavily in scoping and
tradeoff exercises early in system development. This has three major effects:
- Government understands the costs of requirements better, and so can write a contract
which includes only the requirements perceived as value for money.
e Government understands the level of technical risk, and so can choose a contract reward
structure which apportions risk and reward between contractor and government
appropriately.
- Government can participate more intelligently in the system tradeoffs that occur during
development as cost, schedule and performance become more clearly defined.
One example given by an interviewee to illustrate the value of a smart buyer was the difference
between commercial and military aircraft acquisition. The acquisition could proceed based on
delivering a fixed level of performance for an negotiated price, as with most military contracts, or
delivering negotiated performance for a fixed price, as with some commercial aircraft. A smart
buyer will be able to pick the best of these strategies based on the best solution for its needs.
The "smart buyer" strategy was evident in the now cancelled Jupiter Icy Moons Observer (JIMO)
program. The mission had high technical risk due to the use of nuclear thermal propulsion, so an
innovative organizational structure was formed which combined government and contractor
teams in a collaborative fashion termed "co-design". The structure also made the government
nuclear expertise available to industry by allowing half of the government laboratories to join the
contractor bid teams, while the other half were reserved to work for the government buyer teams.
The niche expertise required to design around the nuclear power source meant that commercial
companies designing alone would have had to spend significant time learning how to work with
the source. By pairing government and industry, the learning time was reduced and the quality of
tenders prepared increased (R. Taylor, 2006).
While it did not promote commonality as such, the JIMO mission illustrates that unique project
structures are possible under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). No FAR waivers were
necessary for this structure (R. Taylor, 2006).
Industry-wide strategies
Centralized Technology Development
An approach which was identified as leading to commonality in the defense sector is the use of
centralized research and development. As an example, the Air Force Research Laboratories
(AFRL) receive technology requests from Air Force personnel across the United States. As a
central point, the AFRL is in a position to aggregate similar requests and develop technology
which meets the needs of several groups within the Air Force. This leads to greater technology
commonality than if the groups had requested technology development to meet their needs
through separate requests to defense contractors.
Neutral Organization as Knowledge Repository
One avenue used by NASA and the DOD to improve commonality without compromising the
intellectual property of contractors was the establishment of the Aerospace Corporation. One of
its founding purposes was to serve as a repository on reliability data for satellite and launch
vehicle components and systems. Aerospace Corporation would then apply this information to
future government projects in a way that largely satisfied the contractors, but also preserved the
knowledge of the US aerospace industry in general. Contractors have been willing to share
information with the Aerospace Corporation because of its unique position as a not-for-profit,
FFRDC organization with a charter that prohibits it from competing with contractors.
Contracting Strategies
Single Corporation as System Integrator
A conceptually simple way of increasing the chance of commonality being realized is to use a
single contractor for two systems with significant commonality potential, and incentivize the
contractor to seek out commonality.
In cases where commonality decreases up-front costs as well as long-term costs, a fixed cost
contract can be sufficient incentive to realize commonality. One example is the NASA Fluids
and Combustion Facility currently on the International Space Station. Through concept studies in
the 1990s, independent contractors were responsible for two separate projects, the Fluids Facility
and the Combustion Facility. At project inception in 1999, NASA combined the two into a single
project office, and a contract was issued to a single contractor for both facilities under a fixed
price contract. The commonality opportunities in the design and manufacture phases were so
obvious to the customer that the corporation was sufficient to encourage some examination of
commonality.
The Joint Strike Fighter discussed in detail by Boas is also an example of a single corporation
acting as the system integrator. It is obvious from Boas' identification of the integrated
management structure as a key factor in managing divergence that the level of commonality
achieved by Lockheed Martin would have been very difficult to realize if each variant was
designed by separate corporations.
One disadvantage of this structure is that it places large demands on the system integrator for
large, complex systems. The system integrator must have a very detailed knowledge of the
systems, attendant cost-performance trades, and stakeholder requirements. The system integrator
must also have experience of the engineering difficulties associated with each of the systems.
These resource demands are one reason why extrapolating this approach to a single system
integrator for the entire Human Spaceflight Architecture is not straightforward. Further
difficulties with this approach are discussed in Chapter 5.
Joint Ventures
Interviewees also commented on joint ventures as potential avenues to drive commonality into
designs.
The prevailing opinion was that joint ventures are created due to skill asymmetry, rather than to
drive commonality. For example, the Boeing-Bell joint venture created to beat Sikorsky for the
technically demanding V-22 tilt rotor aircraft, or the joint venture between GE and Rolls Royce
on the F 136 engine, were both project joint ventures where the partners brought different skills to
the table. GE and Rolls Royce had expertise in different but complementary areas and co-
operating on this project was seen to be useful.
Interviewees were cautious about driving companies into joint ventures because it suited the
perceived needs of the customer; rather they suggested allowing the market to develop suitable
joint ventures based on carefully written requirements. However one exception to this strategy
was found. On a project for the acquisition of night vision goggles, the Army considered four
manufacturers (ITT, Litton, Varian and Vero Vellini) to be too many, and requested that two joint
ventures were formed. Originally the commonality between the manufacturers was limited to the
standard external interfaces specified by the Army. The joint ventures drove commonality
internal to the goggles within the ITT-Vero team and within the Litton-Varian team.
One interviewee expressed the view that there are "soft" factors like cultural mismatches which
can also cause joint ventures to fail. He pointed to the NPOESS shared weather satellites,
essentially a joint venture between two government organizations, and suggested the project
failed because the DOD and NASA cultures were simply too different.
In line with the general view held by interviewees that joint ventures were delicate arrangements
that depended on many more factors than just customer convenience, Park & Russo (1996) cite a
variety of sources which give joint venture failure rates of between 50% and 70%.
Directed Subcontracts
Using a common subcontractor to design a system to meet the same function across two projects
will improve the potential for commonality. For example, a company contracted to produce the
ECLS system for both an in-space habitat and a planetary lander is likely to look for design
commonality between the two systems to reduce risk even if it is on a cost-plus contract.
Interviewees considered it possible, but dangerous, to try to specify particular subcontractors in a
proposal. The government's control over the subcontractor is limited, because there is no privity
of contract between the government and the subcontractor.10 Ordinarily the prime contractor has
the right to choose and control its subcontractors, and in the most general terms any removal of
rights from a prime contractor will come at a contract price increase to the government.
Additionally, there is no assurance that a common subcontractor will lead to common subsystem
design. First, the subcontractor operates at the direction of the prime contractor. The prime
contractors, as system integrators, may choose to trade the resource envelope allotted to the
common subcontractor in different ways on the two different projects and direct the subcontractor
accordingly. Second, the performance requirements or resource constraints may actually be
different between the two projects, and the subcontractor will optimize the system accordingly.
Without any incentive for commonality in the prime contracts, the prime contractors are likely to
require the common subcontractor to optimize in each instance to help meet the prime's design
targets.
An often-cited example of a commonality failure is the "square peg in a round hole"
uncommonality dramatically highlighted on the Apollo 13 mission. The film of the same name
may have overdramatized the dialogue, but it neatly summarizes the popular incredulity at the
lack of commonality: "They take square cartridges. And the ones on the LM are round. Tell me
this isn't a government operation. " (Broyles & Reinert, 1995).
In fact, the Command and Service Module (CSM) and the Lunar Module (LM) had a common
subcontractor for the ECLS system, but the different requirements for the two vehicles drove an
uncommon design.
The Command and Service Module (CSM) was developed by North American Aviation (now
Boeing) and the Lunar Module (LM) was developed by a competitor Northrop Grumman.
Hamilton Standard (as it then was) was the Environmental Conditioning and Life Support
Systems (ECLSS) contractor for both the CSM and the LM. Apollo 13 infamously demonstrated
that the lithium hydroxide canisters used to remove carbon dioxide were cylindrical in the LM
and cubic in the CSM. The cubic design minimized the storage volume of the canisters, while the
circular cross-section of the LM canisters minimized the pumping power required to drive carbon
dioxide removal. The CSM, designed to support more people for longer, needed more canisters
and therefore storage volume was the constraining resource. The paramount consideration for the
LM design was weight, and the batteries which provided power were heavy. Presumably in an
attempt to minimize power, and therefore weight, the cylindrical canisters were considered the
1 In some cases the government may enter into a side deed with particular subcontractors to establish the necessary
privity of contract. However these are usually intended to give the government certain rights if the project fails, and are
not usually appropriate for day-to-day management of the subcontractor.
preferred design. In this case the use of a common subcontractor did not lead to complete system
commonality. However, a common technology and similar design was used. This enabled the
unintended sparing, although in a more rudimentary way than might have been hoped for. It is
possible therefore that despite the apparent lack of commonality the use of the common ECLSS
subcontractor was one of several factors that saved the crew of Apollo 13.
Common subcontractors may also result without any stipulation because there are only a small
number of subcontractors able to carry out the tasks. This is common on government aerospace
projects. The subcontractor pool is first reduced because the administrative requirements on
government contractors discourage some technically capable contractors from participating in
government work (Scherer, 1964). Secondly, in some technically esoteric branches of the
aerospace market, for example microgravity life-support or high-reliability, radiation-hardened
computer chips, often there are few technically capable contractors to begin with and therefore
the likelihood of a common subcontractor is high.
One interviewee provided a counterpoint to the idea of common subcontractors, suggesting that
dialogue among the NASA community was a sufficient information sharing pathway when the
number of technically competent experts is small. They gave the example of the Constellation
ECLS system development across Orion, Altair and the Lunar Surface Systems. In this instance
the small number of technical experts in the area meant there were strong personal relationships
which led to strong communications channels. In the opinion of the interviewee, these channels
were more important in driving technological commonality than having a common contractor.
Such a method is likely to be less successful in driving design commonality because of the
additional complexity in moving from technology demonstration to detailed design. A further
possible reason why the channels on the NASA community side were effective here was that the
development process in this instance was incremental, in that a technology demonstration
contract would be let, and subsequently NASA would perform testing, then an additional contract
for further development would be let. This kept the NASA workforce actively in the loop on the
development process.
Government Furnished Equipment
An obvious pathway to transfer common systems is to supply them as "Government Furnished
Equipment" (GFE) which was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.3. Under these arrangements, a
contractor is not responsible for a portion of the final system because it will be supplied by the
government. In some cases the government builds the GFE, in other cases a second contractor
supplies the GFE to the government.
Interviewees were generally comfortable with the idea of GFE as a commonality mechanism.
They commented that the approach requires a good initial understanding of the common system
so that interfaces can be defined, resource envelopes allocated and simultaneous development
made possible. Most often the contractor is not liable in any way for failures associated with the
GFE which means that test planning needs to be carefully coordinated between the government
and the contractor to ensure that the system as a whole is fully tested.
Pyrotechnic devices as GFE
The Constellation team looked at the possibility of using common pyrotechnic devices across the
Constellation elements. The drivers which led to the pyrotechnic devices being identified were
cost and reliability benefits from commonality and low performance sub-optimality from
commonality because of low variations in the required performance between elements. The
model for the acquisition of common pyrotechnic devices was to have NASA contract separately
for the pyrotechnics and supply those to the contractor as GFE.
The downside to GFE was that the project office would be responsible for the logistics and
integration of the pyrotechnic devices. This was not a responsibility that the project office
wanted, and they would prefer for Orion and Altair to arrive fully prepared, with each prime
contractor subcontracting separately for pyrotechnics. The cost savings associated with
commonality were also small because of the low production volume. Therefore there was not a
compelling, provable case for significant commonality benefit, and the GFE approach was not
used.
Avionics
A GFE approach was also examined for common avionics between the Orion and Ares vehicles."
This had the potential for significant cost savings, as the most expensive line item in the Orion
acquisition was software. A common avionics strategy was not pursued for several reasons.
First, by the time the potential commonality was identified and investigated it was too late to
capture all of the benefit of establishing a common avionics project. The Orion and Ares projects
had been established prior to the overarching Constellation groups such as the commonality
group. The project momentum was too great to cease work on the separate development projects
and begin a common architecting approach. (Ironically, the lessons learned from the common
architecting exercise may have been more valuable to any post-Constellation architecture and
may have in fact resulted in less work being "lost".)
The team that worked the common avionics study believed that a separate project office was
necessary for the workable acquisition of a common system. There would be "immense
difficulty" in the contractor on one development project (eg Orion) trying to anticipate, negotiate
and fairly evaluate the requirements of a second contractor's system (eg Ares).
The NASA commonality team also pointed out that the avionics industry was a higher clockspeed
industry than the pyrotechnics industry. The offset between Orion and Ares development and
Altair development meant that common avionics would be obsolete before they were acquired for
all systems.
Contract Incentives
Many of the interviewees expressed the view that contract incentives were a necessary but
insufficient condition for commonality development. One went as far as to say that it is not
possible to use contract incentives to close a business case that is not otherwise compelling to a
corporation. Most were reluctant to place significant contract incentive on a fixed level of
commonality given the uncertainties around the optimum level of commonality.
One interviewee felt that commonality was such a nebulous concept that any contract incentive
payment related to commonality would be "gamed" by a contractor and was essentially wasted
incentive. Some support for this view came through examples of defense contracts given in the
interviews where contractors were given incentive payments for "playing nice together":
attending interface co-ordination meetings, raising interface issues promptly and similar tasks.
The interviewee involved with the contracts stated that the contractor always did enough to get
the maximum score (and therefore maximum revenue), but no more.
The interviewees noted that the additional revenue earned by developing a second independent
project almost always outweighs the additional profit made by meeting incentives for fully
developing commonality on the original project. Whether businesses maximize profit or revenue
from a contract depends on market conditions as discussed above in Chapter 2.3. Therefore the
" The Constellation commonality working group carried out a significant study on the potential for avionics
commonality. The study was marked sensitive but unclassified, and was therefore unavailable to the author during the
writing of this thesis. Those with access to the document may wish to read this case in more detail.
incentives for commonality need to be extremely strong to overcome the corporate predilection
towards multiple development projects.
Contracts for services
Contracts for services are increasingly being used in place of the acquisition of hardware.
Essentially, the contractor operates a product for the benefit of the customer rather than supplying
a physical product for the customer to operate.
One example is the provision of aircraft engines under a system where the aircraft operator pays
the engine maker per hour of engine operation, rather than purchasing the engine outright, an
arrangement offered for many commercial aircraft and recently for the military tilt rotor the V22
Osprey. These "power by the hour" arrangements transfer responsibility for lifecycle costs to the
engine manufacturer rather than the engine operator.
The contract for service strategy has been used in aerospace also. Hamilton Sundstrand built a
Sabatier reactor to supply water on the International Space Station and are paid by the liter. The
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Operations remarked "[tihis is a fundamental shift in
the way we do business... the contractor is responsible for all system development and
performance. The only requirements we have imposed are those associated with safety and
interfaces. " (Curie, 2008) The same economic effect can be seen in the United States' purchase
of transportation services on the Soyuz launch vehicle instead of paying contractors to construct a
launch vehicle which NASA would operate.12
These arrangements force the product manufacturer to make decisions based on the operating
costs of the product as well as the up-front costs. This makes the contract for service particularly
well suited to products with significant commonality potential because the commonality benefit is
often most pronounced in the operating phase. One disadvantage of the strategy is that it requires
competition (or some other price discovery method) to incentivize contractors to search for life-
cycle cost savings and pass the savings through to the customer. The recent rise in Soyuz seat
prices" is evidence that a contract for service is not guaranteed to reflect the true costs of
operating the system without competition.
Develop and buy-in
A develop and buy-in strategy occurs when an initial project develops a potentially common
system, and is then rewarded financially when future systems choose to use it. This is an extreme
commonality strategy which tries to create a microcosm of a market economy within a NASA
center. It goes further than the Goddard Common Flight Software case examined by Rhodes
(2010), where projects paid a "tax" to use the common software which went to software
maintenance. Under develop and buy-in, the original project is attempting to provide a more
attractive option for the second project than independent development.
One interviewee with particular expertise on acquisition structures was asked about the viability
of this type of strategy. That interviewee felt that it would be very challenging to implement and
no other interviewee raised develop and buy-in as a potential mechanism for improving
commonality.
1 More factors than simply acquisition strategy influence this choice. However the economic effect is that the Soyuz
operators pay for the lifecycle cost of the vehicle.
13 The price of Soyuz seats was $47 million per seat in 2008 ($141 million for 3 seats; NASA Contract Release C08-
068) and rose to $63 million per seat in 2011 ($753 million for 12 seats; NASA Contract Release C 11-013). The
"space tourist" rate in 2007 was reportedly between $20 and $35 million per seat (Conlin, 2007).
Question Three: To what extent do Federal Government regulations and practices limit the
acquisition strategies available for commonality?
NASA acquisitions are governed by both the formal requirements of the FAR and general
acquisition practice. The FAR is theoretically open to the adoption of innovative acquisition
strategies, but the practical realities of fixed yearly budgets and an inability to commit to
purchases in future years or across centers eliminate some commercially viable commonality
strategies.
Federal Acquisition Regulations
The interviews indicated that the FAR are moderately flexible and can accommodate a range of
acquisition strategies other than the 'full and open competition " which is the strategy required by
default for acquisitions under the FAR (FAR section 6.101).
Sole sourcing can be justified if there was demonstrable advantage to selecting a particular
contractor. One interviewee said that at a certain point in the acquisition process "you need to
stop changing horses " and pursue a sole sourcing strategy. In a competitive award it is possible
to take into account the effect on commonality when deciding to award a contract, even if this
clearly favors a particular contractor (FAR section 6.302(1)). The test is whether the expected
cost of switching to a different contractor outweighs the benefit expected from the competition.
Going further, some interviewees stated that waivers to aspects of the FAR were possible. While
such waivers do exist, the waivers chiefly concern social policies implemented through the FAR,
such as small business support. More extensive waivers in specific cases are possible by an Act
of Congress but in practical terms such waivers amount to a change in law. The practical view of
one interviewee was that the process of obtaining any waiver to the FAR was to be avoided
because it was complex, time consuming and difficult. The interviewee felt that there was
sufficient potential for innovation available within the FAR itself.
One interviewee indicated that the most important areas in managing commonality between
contractors are not in the FAR; instead they are writing clear requirements and specifications,
dealing with budgetary issues year by year and managing divergence.
Restrictions of the FAR in practice
The general support for the flexibility of the FAR contrasts with a perception that there are other
constraints on government acquisition. Four hard constraints were repeatedly voiced by NASA
project managers and acquisition officials.
First, spending above budget in a given year is not permitted even if it will decrease life cycle
costs significantly, under the Antideficiency Act (Rendon & Snider, 2008). A NASA project
manager must always fall within their allotted yearly budget, regardless of the impact in future
years of under spending or investment in the current year. This means that commonality
opportunities cannot be solely justified based on a "return on investment" mentality as in the
private sector. A specific example was given of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, where a $1
million over-budget spend request was denied although it was shown to offer savings of $8
million in the following year.
An alternative expression of this idea was put forward by an interviewee responsible for seeking
out commonality opportunities in the Constellation program. The major question to ask in
assessing commonality is: "will common development give a lower total headcount for my
project than independent development?" If the answer is no, then obtaining approval for common
development will be difficult. This approach means that many of the commonality benefits and
detriments shown in Figure 8 are discounted.
Second, most government projects cannot use future years' funding to commit to current
purchases, again as a result of the Antideficiency Act. This means that the economic benefits of
promising larger production runs to suppliers due to commonality are largely lost, as the
production runs cannot be firm until the year in which they are required to be ordered. Purchases
for future year items can be made, and frequently are for long lead time items, however the
current year budget must include the full cost of those items. This factor combines with the
yearly budget cap noted in the previous paragraph to make multi-year bulk purchasing
impractical.
Note that some projects are "fully funded", meaning their entire predicted cost is obligated in the
first financial year of development, even though the project will not require the funds until future
years. This ensures that the funds to develop a full end item will be available, and the project can
be appropriately planned. "Fully funded" projects only run into budgetary trouble if their
procurement extends longer than five years or exceeds the original budget.
Other projects are also approved by Congress as "Multiyear Procurement" projects, which means
that funds are committed for future years' spending. This occurs most often when "production
risk is minimal and opportunities exist for economies of scale with a contract for a large
quantity" (Scherer, 1964). The requirement to obtain Congressional approval for multiyear
procurement is a significant obstacle.
Third, there is often little incentive on behalf of the government project offices to spend less
money, provided they remain within budget. Most often, funds cannot be carried over from year
to year, with the unsurprising result that most government agencies spend all their budget, every
year. To compound this difficulty, surplus funds in a given year may not be used to purchase
items needed in future years (often referred to as the "bona fide needs" rule) (Rendon & Snider,
2008, p. 203). In a letter to acquisition professionals in the Department of Defense, Dr Ashton
Carter stated as a ground for reform that services would be allowed to retain amounts they saved,
implying that saving funds currently is not permitted (Carter, 2010, p. 3).
Finally, different NASA centers are not permitted to aggregate purchase orders made at the center
level to increase purchase quantities. This eliminates up-front cost savings due to economies of
scale and therefore reduces the immediate incentive to implement a common solution across
centers.
One interviewee pointed out that these limitations become less severe if the acquisition can be
thoroughly planned in advance. This requires steady requirements and budgets, as well as margin
for schedule and budget slip.
Technical involvement in acquisition decision making at NASA
Within NASA, acquisition strategies are developed at the mission directorate level, and then
passed to the procurement officials at NASA Headquarters for approval. The level at which the
acquisition strategy is crafted is important because it affects the understanding that the acquisition
planners have of the particular project requirements. For example, the acquisition structure for
the JIMO project hinged on the technical risk issues associated with nuclear electric propulsion
(NEP). An acquisition structure which failed to take this into account would have resulted in a
much higher cost acquisition as contract teams priced in the risk of developing the NEP system.
Several interviewees highlighted the need for adequate technical input into acquisition strategies
at the outset and in making determinations of contractor progress during the project.
Effect of layers of oversight on acquisition decision making
The number of layers of oversight increases as the value of an acquisition increases. For
example, at a certain level of spending, the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will involve
itself in briefings and decisions on projects. This oversight process may make it more difficult to
obtain approval for innovative processes on very large projects, as it is more difficult to object to
a by-the-book strategy than an untried one.
Commonality approaches in the Department of Defense
DOD 5000.2 is the DOD's equivalent of the FAR. Although DOD 5000.2 specifies the
acquisition process in greater detail than the FAR, efficient acquisition is an increasing concern of
the DOD and therefore defense contracting on major projects offers a source of ideas with which
NASA can improve its acquisition structure.
Three current trends in DOD acquisition which may impact commonality were described by
interviewees. There is increased emphasis on open architectures, more incentives to buy
"commercial off-the-shelf" products and more specialization from contractors.
DOD increasingly requires open architectures, described as a "shiftfrom proprietary to public
architectures " (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 59). By definition an open architecture requires some
commonality, either by defining common interfaces (closer to building block commonality), or by
making open source designs widely available for adaptation by others (closer to reactive reuse).
Traditionally, DOD has promoted open competition as the best route to cost efficiency. One
interviewee suggested that DOD's view may be changing. The growing alternative view is that
unbridled competition in fact increases inefficiency and increased government direction in the
specialization of preferred firms into particular development areas may reduce costs.
The third trend is increased use of commercially produced products. The DOD is increasingly
open to buying them with a renewed emphasis on COTS parts over perfect performance. "The
Department recently prefers the use of more commercial, off-the shelf systems that provide more
timely deliveries" (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 185). One NASA example is the development of
standard bus architectures from commercial suppliers for satellite projects by NASA's Rapid
Spacecraft Development Office at Goddard Space Flight Center.
The selection of specialized companies, together with increased commonality from the
manufacturer side, is likely to lead to more commonality in defense space projects. Commonality
of course is not a goal in itself, so it is unfortunately too early to see whether these trends result in
a more cost-effective strategy.
The DOD appears to place greater value on having fully funded acquisition programs than
NASA. "It has been a long-standing DOD policy to seek full funding of acquisition programs...
Experience has shown that full funding is a necessary condition for program stability" (Defense
Acquisition University, 201 la, section 3.2.3). In contrast, the 2008 NASA procurement tenets do
not mention the funding structure of acquisitions (Dale, 2008). This may be a result of the
brevity of the 7 pages of NASA tenets compared with the voluminous Defense Acquisition
Guidebook, however no interviewee from NASA or DOD mentioned obtaining full funding as an
important way to manage the acquisition of a project.
Question Four: What types of NASA projects would benefit from an acquisition strategy
focused on commonality?
High value projects in the early stages of development and facilities and ground support
equipment are likely the best targets for commonality-focused acquisitions, but there were a wide
variety of dissenting opinions.
Several interviewees expressed doubt that complex space architectures could benefit significantly
from commonality. One interviewee opined that space projects exist to "push the envelope ", and
that if there is substantial commonality "we are doing something wrong ". This view was
prevalent among the project managers of smaller projects.
Constellation architectural commonality
The perspective of the Constellation commonality analysis teams was that the benefits of
architectural commonality were significant, while the benefits of component level commonality
were relatively minor. The cost savings associated with common components are limited by the
small buy quantities in space projects. The Constellation commonality team estimated that the
maximum cost savings that might be realized from common components was in the single digit
millions. Generally this meant that the cost savings associated with the commonality were
comparable to the costs of doing a study to determine whether the case was a suitable one for
commonality, making it insufficient.
Facilities and Ground Support Equipment
Common facilities were identified by interviewees as a productive area for space project
commonality. Examples include the common use of the Deep Space Network for spacecraft
communication, or the creation of shared test-beds like the GRIP. Unfortunately, none of the
examples examined had an interesting acquisition structure. A "complex algorithm" is used to
share the operating cost of the DSN between the organizations which use it, however individual
projects which propose to use the DSN treat it as an available no-cost resource. Their use of the
DSN is a factor in evaluating their proposal. GRIP is a common testbed built as a separate
project because it appeared that several projects would required a gravity testbed. GRIP is funded
separately from the projects which use it.
Note that there is little flexibility in purchasing common ground equipment. An accounting
perspective of cost sharing at one NASA facility identified only two approaches for the
procurement of common ground support equipment. If the equipment was demonstrated to meet
an anticipated common need then it could be purchased in advance with institutional (centralized)
funds. On the other hand, equipment purchased for a single project would need to be paid for out
of project funds, despite opportunities for other projects to utilize the equipment.
Question Five: Which factors drive commonality success?
Strong management leading to commonality success was a constant theme through interviews
with project participants. Interviewees also pointed to the need for mandated commonality, clear
examples of commonality benefit and the need for firm requirements.
A number of interviewees felt that commonality success was driven by the enthusiasm and
personality of the person responsible for ensuring commonality. The first observation was that
there should be a single person responsible for commonality. The second was that there will be
resistance to the implementation of commonality at the individual project level and the
commonality manager will need a strong and determined personality to override project-level
resistance. The commonality manager also needs visibility across all current and potential
variants and authority to force variants into a common approach, while avoiding the perception
that the manager is biased toward a particular design.
A strategy which has worked in the past in driving projects to agree on common requirements is
to mandate that the project must use the common developed solution. Faced with a choice
between accepting a common solution into which they have no input, and one which they have
some input, most projects will choose the second approach. Again, this requires strong
leadership, and constant reevaluation, to avoid a situation like NPOESS (discussed above), where
two organizations with very different cultures were forced into a commonality approach which
did not work.
Several interviewees also pointed to a "tipping point" in commonality development. Often there
was a clear example of where commonality was an obvious solution, delivering cost and schedule
benefits. For example, on the Combustion and Fluids Facility the tipping point was the
acquisition of common radiation hardened processors to achieve economies of scale and cost
savings. This led to investigations of other areas where commonality could deliver savings.
Firm requirements were identified by several people as a key contributor to successful
commonality. If items are contracted out under a fixed price contract, the requirements must be
fully determined. Any requirements undefined at this stage will be priced into the contract at zero
cost, and their cost recovered via a change order in future when the requirement is known.
Effectively, according to one interviewee, the undefined requirement will be ignored by the
contractor until it becomes more certain, because the full cost of the consequences of that
uncertainty can be recovered.
An interesting footnote to the need for firm requirements was the insistence of one interviewee on
function-based requirements as an important precursor to commonality. Function based
requirements are appropriate for the situation where a single contractor is to maximize the
commonality of their system, for example by designing a system for dual use. On the other hand,
form-based requirements help to improve commonality across multiple contractors because two
contractors will build to the same specification.
Question Six: What are the obstacles to inter-contractor commonality?
All interviewees expressed concerns about the difficulty of implementing extensive inter-
contractor commonality. An overriding theme was the lack of positive incentive for companies to
work together, coupled with significant downsides for companies which cooperated like loss of
intellectual property or market leadership. Other obstacles were also identified, including
disruption to supply chains, impacts on industry competitiveness, lack of incentive for design
teams, late identification of commonality opportunities and aversion to sub-optimal performance.
One interviewee felt that commonality may disrupt existing supply chains or strategic alliances.
He emphasized how in the aerospace industry, prime contractors and sub-contractors work
together on multiple projects over years. Many project failures or cost over-runs are caused by
cost breakdowns at the interfaces between the work packages of different organizations.
Inefficiencies in interfaces contribute to cost overruns because system integration can account for
up to 40% of total costs (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 55). Allowing prime contractors to choose
their teams and take responsibility for system integration provides a market force for developing
good work processes between sub-contractors and contractors. Specifying particular GFE
systems or mandating sub-contractors may dilute the market incentive on contractors and
subcontractors to work most efficiently together. Component-level commonality through
mandated suppliers also perturbs established supply chains, which may increase cost.
Many interviewees were cautious about commonality because it ran counter to the established
method of competition for ensuring efficient pricing. Government acquisition officials want to
ensure at least two healthy and competitive potential contractors for any contract, and
commonality may threaten that corporate ecosystem by preferring one contractor over the other
for all acquisitions. Acquisition strategies which carry two manufacturers throughout the
acquisition in order to preserve competition deliberately sacrifice commonality and increase
lifecycle logistics costs to decrease the unit cost. Examples of this strategy include the JTRS
radios and the recently overturned approach of having two engines for the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter. Therefore the minimization of long term costs may require a lack of commonality.
Several interviewees pointed to a managerial or contractual disconnect in passing the system-of-
system benefits of commonality through to the design team level. The design teams need to take
certain actions at the sub-system level to ensure that commonality occurs at the system-of-system
level, for example, accepting performance sub-optimality for the sake of commonality. However,
often the design teams do not have visibility into the cost structure at the system-of-system level
and therefore cannot see the system-of-system benefits, only the local detriment to their sub-
system. This encourages divergence.
An example occurred with the development of the Constellation commonality plan.
Commonality plans are an established way to develop and enforce architecture level commonality
(Rhodes, 2010). The Constellation commonality plan was developed over a 12 month period
between 2006 and 2007. The plan was seen by the Constellation project offices as an imposition
of an additional reporting requirement, which resulted in a cost and schedule burden. This meant
that the commonality plan was watered down each time it went to the project offices for review.
There was little acceptance of the utility of the commonality plan, which became a self-fulfilling
outcome. The plan was developed by a team of between three and five people, with additional
technical experts participating on an as-needed basis.
14 One example discussed during the scoping interviews was Boeing's production of the 787, where many of the
performance and schedule difficulties arose from interface issues between the contractors who made up the global
supply chain.
Less rational objections to commonality were also identified during the interviews. People take
"ownership" of designs which they have developed, and will often defend these designs
passionately even within a company. Commonality implementation often involves choosing
between two or more competing alternatives each of which people are invested in. This is
particularly the case when commonality is woven into a system after some development has taken
place. It is likely that the defense of variants from two different companies would be even more
hostile. On the NASA Combustion and Fluids Facility installed on the International Space
Station, the ownership sentiment was very strong at the outset of the commonality exercise. It
was overcome using rational demonstrations of commonality benefit based on agreed metrics like
cost and reliability, and strong leadership.
A clear obstacle to commonality for one interviewee was the lack of leadership support for up-
front identification of commonality opportunities. The avionics and pyrotechnics commonality
studies for Constellation would have been more favorable towards commonality if the design
process had been less advanced at the time of the commonality study.
Interviewees were curiously divided on whether the negative performance impact of commonality
was a significant obstacle. To some, the cultural shift in NASA required to design for sub-
optimal performance was a key reason for the uninspiring results from commonality to date.
DOD perspectives held that many of the joint projects that failed did so because the organizations
sponsoring the different variants could not agree on a compromise between their sets of
requirements. In contrast, some interviewees felt that the performance-cost trade was simply a
part of engineering design, and with an engaged customer and properly written requirements,
contractors could deliver solutions at any point along the performance-cost spectrum.
Summary
The results of the scoping interviews discussed in this chapter are summarized in Table 9.
Another key outcome of the scoping interviews was shaping the detailed case studies examined in
this thesis. The detailed cases on the JTRS radio development and two commercial launch
providers will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4: DETAILED CASE STUDIES
The scoping interviews described in the previous chapter provided a broad introduction to the
issues that affect commonality in government acquisitions. The following case studies of military
radios and launch vehicles delve into particular commonality projects in more detail. Each is
intended to provide deeper insight into the problem of government acquisition of common
systems than could be achieved from the short scoping discussions.
4.1 JTRS COMMON SOFTWARE CASE STUDY
Introduction
This section 4.1 will discuss the first of the detailed case studies, the Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) developed by the Department of Defense (DOD). In aiming for an affordable and
interoperable system of radios, the DOD tried to share common software between different radios
with mixed success. This case study is important for two reasons. It captures acquisition
behavior from the government perspective, unlike the two commercial organizations examined in
the subsequent case studies, and it offers insight into software commonality, which is valuable
given the climbing contribution of software to project costs.
Although there were several aspects to the acquisition strategies used in JTRS, this case study
will focus on the attempt to make the JTRS software common across radios. The case study will
briefly outline the objectives of JTRS and provide a technical overview. Then the benefits and
drawbacks of commonality as seen by DOD will be examined. Against this background, the
commonality strategy, management structure, funding structure and acquisition strategy will be
discussed.
JTRS Objective
The objective of JTRS is to develop communications systems that are interoperable between
friendly warfighters, whether pilots, ground troops, armored vehicles or navy ships. The
communications systems are intended to provide data and video as well as voice communication.
The network over which the communication takes place is intended to be open to any friendly
forces in need of information, allowing warfighters to join a network and share information as
needed. At the same time, the information must be secure, meaning it is accessible only to those
with permission to do so.
The sheer number of radios required for the JTRS project means it will be gradually phased into
service. Therefore JTRS must also be able to communicate with US and allied forces using pre-
JTRS radios, referred to as "legacy" radios. As an example some JTRS radios include "Link 16",
the current NATO standard for inter-operable air communications, in their communications suite.
A completely common radio was not a feasible solution because it could not cope with the
different environments, constraints and missions required across the DOD. The 1997 Mission
Needs Statement requires that "to respond to variations in operating ranges and conditions, the
system will need to operate over multiple frequency bands and with a variety of waveforms."
However, the need for interoperability plus the perceived similarity in the needs of the different
services led to the formation of a joint project to "bring together separate service-led programs
into a joint software-defined radio development effort" (General Accounting Office, 2003).
Technical description of JTRS
In a software defined radio (SDR), simple radio hardware is controlled by complex software.
Changing the software causes the hardware to perform differently. Several sets of software can
be pre-loaded onto the SDR and it is the type of software selected, rather than the hardware,
which controls the output of the radio.
There are two major advantages to an SDR over a conventional radio where fixed hardware
provides fixed performance.
First, a single set of hardware can be used to communicate with a range of other friendly units,
each of which may be using a different radio. Without an SDR, achieving this level of
communication between units would require carrying multiple sets of radio hardware. A single
set of hardware leads to weight and volume savings. It may also lead to affordability savings due
to the lower number of units purchased, provided the unit price of the software defined radio was
still relatively low. As an example, US infantry may be using SINGCARS radios, NATO armor
may be using LINK 16 and recently upgraded special forces may be using the Soldier Radio
Waveform (SRW). A US aircraft would ideally be able to communicate with any of these units.
A pure hardware solution would require the aircraft to carry three different radios to communicate
with the three different forces. A software defined solution in contrast would only require the
aircraft to carry a single piece of radio hardware running three different software packages.
As a second advantage, an SDR can be upgraded more quickly and easily to reflect changes in
operations. The design of any radio is a trade-off between factors which often compete, such as
signal strength, cryptographic strength, throughput and range. An SDR can load new software on
existing hardware to change the trade-off if the operational environment changes. For example, if
the aircraft above was deployed to an environment with heavy jamming, the waveform could be
modified to make it less susceptible to jamming.
Despite this flexibility, there are still limitations imposed by the hardware. For example, the
upper limit on the frequency of transmission by a JTR Set is 2GHz. Software patches cannot
change this. This limitation is becoming restrictive as feeds above 2GHz are required for video
communication with UAVs (Button, 2010).
In order to understand the difficulties DOD encountered when attempting to implement
commonality of software across the JTRS family of radios, it is necessary to understand the
architecture of the JTRS in more detail.
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Figure 41: Idealized and Actual JTRS Architectures
There are five elements to the JTRS architecture, shown in Figure 41:
1. A set of "platform services". A platform' 5 is the warfighting element the radio will be
integrated with. The platform could be an infantry commander's laptop, or the electronic
systems of an airplane or navy ship. The platform provides the interfaces with the human
operating the system and must be able to communicate with the JTRS software. The
platform hardware must be physically interfaced with the JTRS hardware layer.
2. A hardware layer ("JTR Set"). The JTRS hardware layer includes RF components like
antennas, transmitters and receivers, associated circuitry and processors to provide low
level control of the RF circuits. Critically, some of the RF hardware is software-tunable.
This hardware box is referred to as the "JTR set" for consistency with the DOD
terminology. The physical configuration of the radio in terms of size and weight is
referred to as the "form factor". Table 10 shows how the JTR sets were grouped into
"clusters" based on their intended platform. The clusters formed the basis for acquisition
partitioning.
3. A software interface layer ("SCA"). The "Software Communications Architecture"
(SCA) layer is meant as a "core framework for software applications to operate on
different JTRS platforms" (GAO 2003).
4. Standard software programs ("APIs"). "Application Program Interfaces" (APIs), are
small programs that control various aspects of the hardware, and which may be used by
the waveform layer in implementing a waveform.
5. The radio waveform layer ("Waveform"). The waveform is pure software. It controls
how the JTR set packages data, which modulation format is used, how data is encrypted
and the frequency and bandwidth at which the data should be transmitted. Ideally, the
radio waveform only interfaces with the APIs and the SCA.
15 The term "platform" comes from the Department of Defense lexicon and means a warfighting element such as an
airplane or tank. It does not overlap with the way "platform" and "platforming" were defined in the commonality
context in Chapter 2.3.
Table 10: JTRS Hardware Types (adapted from Feickert (2005) )
Summary of JTRS Hardware Types
JTR Set GMR CISHR - AMF (Airborne, Maritime, HMS MIDS -
(Ground JEM Fixed) (Handheld, JTRS
Mobile Manpack,
Radios) Small Form
Factor)
Cluster One Two Three Four Five Not
applicable
Description Ground, Hand-Held Fixed High Handheld, Aircraft
Vehicle Radios Site and Performance Dismounted replacement
and Maritime Aircraft and Small for MIDS -
Helicopter Radios Radios Form Factor LVT
Radios Radios
Original Army Special Navy Air Force Army Air Force
Service Operations
Lead Command
New Dev't Complete New JTRS Developments Upgrade of
or MIDS to
Upgrade? JTRS
The form factor of the hardware layer was determined by the physical platform on which it would
be used. Different platforms have varied sensitivity to the size, weight and power-draw of the
JTR Set.
The form of the software (SCA, APIs and Waveform) was intended to be independent of the
physical platform. Each of the JTR Sets would in theory run the same hardware-independent
waveform. This decoupling would have reduced the complexity in the system, and allowed
common waveforms to be used across all the systems.
However there was in fact coupling between waveforms, JTR Sets and platforms. First, the more
waveforms, and the more complex the waveforms, intended to run on a particular hardware set,
the more power the set consumed during operation. Greater power consumption required a larger
volume and mass for adequate heat dissipation. This meant that small JTR Sets such as those
attached to remote ordinance or carried by infantry could not run a large number of different
waveforms, and required more efficient operation from those waveforms that were run.
The properties of the physical platform also affected the types of waveforms which were
appropriate to run on the platform. Specialist waveforms had to be developed for specialist
applications. For example, fast moving aircraft which used the AMF JTR Sets and the MIDS-
JTRS JTR Sets are more likely to lose parts of the signal, and therefore require more repetition of
information to transmit a message. This led to the development a specialized waveform for
aircraft.
Commonality strategy
The JTRS commonality strategy was closely connected to the way in which the architecture was
defined. The waveforms, APIs and SCA were intended to be common. The JTR Sets and
platform integration were not.
Software, the focus of this chapter, was intended to be common across the different JTR Sets. As
waveforms were developed, they were intended to be effortlessly portable to all JTR Sets. The
2003 GAO presentation on JTRS summarized the early thinking on software commonality,
presciently placing it under the heading "technical challenges": "Portability: Ensuring
waveform and other software capabilities are available to all JTR sets in "plug and play"
format. " The SCA was intended to be common across all architectures regardless of platform or
waveform. The SCA was the keystone into which both hardware and software integrated, and
any changes to the SCA would have far reaching impacts.
Initial hardware commonality strategies (Army Supportability Assessment 2003) were quickly
abandoned. There was no program-wide intention or strategy for common components or
hardware. Each hardware manufacturer would develop hardware based on the unique form
requirements of the particular platform.
The vision of absolute software commonality, however did not emerge. A 2008 paper (Stephens
et al) wrote:
"...the end product of JTRS waveform development is not a binary software
application. Instead, the end product is a set of source files that, with minimal
changes, can be compiled and linked into a waveform capable of being hosted on
a number of different platforms, along with the supporting documentation
necessary to enable a third-party to port and optimize the waveform for a
specified platform."
In other words, divergence occurred. The goal was no longer common software (a common
building block strategy) but portable software (closer to a reuse strategy). The causes of
divergence will be examined later in this chapter, but first an examination of the benefits and
drawbacks expected from the JTRS software commonality will be undertaken.
Perceived benefits of JTRS software commonality
The common software architecture was one of the key planks of the JTRS affordability strategy.
In 2009, the JTRS "Waveform Portability Guidelines" stated:
"The portability of the waveform software across multiple JTR platforms is
necessary for the JTRS Program to achieve the following goals:
" Reduced cost through maximized reuse of waveform software across
multiple platforms
* Faster insertion of new technologies
* Interoperability of radio systems between services
* Reduced training requirements due to commonality of platforms"
The key benefits sought from JTRS commonality were affordability throughout the lifecycle and
interoperability.
Perceived drawbacks of JTRS software commonality
The public announcements emphasizing the benefits of JTRS commonality unsurprisingly did not
mention the drawbacks to the commonality. Some of these drawbacks were identified by
interviewees with hindsight, however the impression given by the interviewees was that there was
an emphasis on commonality benefit early and a late realization of the drawbacks of
commonality.
The most commonly noted drawback of JTRS commonality by interviewees was that technology
developments in communications occur so swiftly that common architectures which take some
time to implement are outdated before they reach full service. For example, the use of full video
from UAVs has increased dramatically since the late 1990s when the JTRS architecture was first
developed. This has led to alternative communication approaches which can accommodate
frequencies above 2 GHz being used for UAV communication (Button, 2010). This drawback
was noted only in interviews and GAO oversight reports and was not found in any of the
discussions from the early 2000s on the benefits of JTRS.
The second drawback of commonality is the performance compromise entailed by software.
Again, this drawback does not appear to have been widely recognized early in development. To
preserve commonality, additional layers of software need to be added between the hardware and
the waveform software. These additional layers slow the performance of the radio. Stephens et
al comment: "Strategies such as hardware abstraction layers can reduce the coupling [between
hardware and software], but at the [performance] cost of increased delay and variability"
(Stephens, R. Anderson, Jimenez, & L. Anderson, 2008). Striking a balance between
performance and commonality proved difficult.
Management structure
The management and funding of JTRS is closely tied to the way in which the acquisition was
conducted, and had significant impacts on the realized commonality. The management structure
for JTRS changed through its lifecycle to reflect learning on the best way to implement a
common complex system.
The initial structure was a Joint Program Office (JPO) funded by the services, with each service
taking the lead on particular "clusters" of JTR Sets. There was a profusion of working groups,
multiple chains of authority (see Figure 42) and fragmented responsibilities (see the range of
service leads in Table 10). The JPO was responsible for developing the architecture, managing
waveform acquisition and certifying completed JTRS hardware. Individual services were
responsible for acquiring JTR Sets to meet their needs, and integrating those radios with the
platforms they were to be used on. The services were also responsible for the ongoing
maintenance and support of those radios.
The 2003 GAO report heavily criticized this management structure: "the most significant
challenge we identified is the lack of a strong, joint-management structure". Despite the idea of
a joint structure, the Army was effectively in charge, and this led to a bias in the joint
development toward army needs: "Army, as the service acquisition executive, has greater clout
over requirements determination than other services" (General Accounting Office, 2003). The
report also recommended that the JPO be given acquisition responsibilities, however the DOD
disagreed and acquisition responsibility remained with the services.
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Figure 42: JTRS Management Structure (GAO 2003)
In 2005, the management structure was changed. The governance of the JPO became more
streamlined and more powerful. The following quote summarizes the changes: "Joint is difficult.
We came back with a recommendation to adopt a corporate model where we have a board of
directors. The board of directors is chaired by USD (A T&L) and the vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff... The beauty is that you have everybody in the room needed to make and enforce a
decision. " (US Navy, 2008). The improved decision making framework was important in
managing the common software.
JTRS Acquisition Strategy
With the foregoing technical and management background, it is now possible to discuss the way
in which the JTRS was acquired.
The acquisition began with requirements definition and negotiation between the services in the
late 1990s. The first aspect of the acquisition where corporations were involved was the
definition of the SCA. The SCA design was led by the government, but included contractors and
communications system experts also. The bulk of the architecture definition was undertaken in
this forum where most contractors participated voluntarily.
Several interviewees commented that it may not have been advantageous to allow contractor
experts wide freedom in scoping the SCA. There was little incentive for potential JTRS
contractors on JTRS to develop a perfect SCA. In the first place, common software meant fewer
future development projects than independent development. Even a partially hardware dependent
architecture meant work porting partially common waveforms between variants. Secondly,
contractors were keen to move to the development phase as quickly as possible because revenues
and profits were much higher in that stage than the meager consulting fees for architectural
definition. Finally, the open nature of the architecture definition meant that any technical insight
that companies thought might present a technical advantage in procurement would not be
revealed.
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After the architecture was largely in place, it was possible to let contracts for waveform and
hardware development. Table 11 presents a breakdown of the companies involved in the
hardware and software acquisition and their roles.
Table 11: Selection of contractors involved in JTRS Acquisition
Organization Hardware Software Major Subcontractors
JTRS HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Boeing GMR / Cluster 1 Wideband Northrop Grumman
Networking Rockwell Collins
Waveform BAE Systems
Harris
Lockheed Martin AMF / (Clusters 3 and Link 16 BAE Systems
4) (porting) General Dynamics
Raytheon
Northrop Grumman
General Dynamics HMS / (Cluster 5) BAE Systems
Rockwell Collins
Thales
Datalink Solutions (DLS) MIDS-JTRS MIDS JTRS joint
(JV between Rockwell development between
Collins and BAE ViaSat and DLS
Systems)
ViaSat MIDS-JTRS
JTRS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
ITT Soldier Radio
Waveform
Assurance Technology SINCGARS
Corporation (porting)
STOPGAP MEASURES FOR CURRENT WARFIGHTING
Thales CISHR - JEM / (interim
(Cluster 2) solution, not
fully JTRS
compatible)
ITT CISHR - Soldier Radio
Harris CISHR - Falcon 111
Subcontractors encouraged competition
Table 11 shows clearly that most developments have a prime contractor and several large
subcontractors. This occurs both because the projects are large and complex and because the
government encouraged leader-follower contracts during acquisition. For example, the content of
the acquisition strategy for the cluster 1 radios went beyond simple development. Boeing had to
qualify its subcontractors as manufacturers. "DOD has emphasized competitiveness in contract
awards to address affordability. Cluster 1 prime contractor is responsible for qualifying two
subcontractors to develop and build Cluster 1 JTRS radios" (General Accounting Office, 2003).
The subcontract awards were made in such a way that there was price competition between the
manufacturers, with the superior manufacturers obtaining larger shares of the production
contracts. On the acquisition of the CISHR, where both Harris and Thales are producing
acceptable variants, each receives production orders in a year based on its quality and value.
Prime contractors were likely to retain work in-house
The second clear point from Table 11 is that many subcontractors have multiple roles. For
example, Northrop Grumman, Thales, General Dynamics, BAE Systems and Rockwell Collins
are involved in multiple projects. This is not the usual case of a "common subcontractor"
because in at least the case of Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems the functional area the
companies worked on was different between the projects. The use of competitors as
subcontractors encouraged the prime contractors to keep work in-house for fear of giving their
subcontractors a competitive advantage. In the opinion of interviewees, this occurred even when
the subcontractors were better qualified to take on the work.
One counter example to this uncooperative approach was noted. On the MIDS-JTRS contracts,
DLS and ViaSat jointly developed the JTRS upgrade, but subsequently compete for orders.
Figure 43 shows how the MIDS upgrade to JTRS is being developed very closely between DLS
and ViaSat (Kim, 2009). Several interviewees stated that in instances where there were difficult
technical problems to be solved, DLS and ViaSat cooperated to find the best solution on
development. Their hypothesis for this unusual cooperation was that there was sufficient work in
the industry to keep both in business, so long as there were no new entrants. The cooperation
strategy between DLS and ViaSat seemed intended to maintain their joint lead over the
competition in the MIDS strand of JTRS.
7 DLS
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Figure 43: MIDS-JTRS was developed by both DLS and Via.Sat (Kim 2009)
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Development of both hardware and software by the same corporation decreased
commonality
The third point which is clear from the data in Table 11 is that the Boeing Cluster 1 acquisition
developed both new JTRS hardware and new JTRS waveforms. It was the first contract to be
awarded. Both hardware and software were awarded to the same team because the program
office was eager to have a working radio and waveform to demonstrate and coupling the
hardware and software to a single team appeared to offer lower development risk. Also, the
government was unwilling to assume the administrative burden of coordinating and integrating
the hardware and software systems.
Unfortunately, this approach was counterproductive to making the waveform common. In order
to speed development and increase performance, the Cluster 1 team worked around the edges of
the SCA and created dependence between the JTR Set and the waveform as shown on the right
hand side of Figure 41. For example, the waveform became dependent on whether the processing
architecture onboard the JTR Set was FPGA16 based or DSP' based. While the core of the
problem was an insufficiently specific SCA, permitting a single organization to develop both the
JTR Set and the Waveform under time and performance pressure contributed, because it
incentivized the Boeing team to improve performance by coupling hardware and software.
This example reinforces Boas' recommendation that common building blocks be developed by
separate contractors from those developing the projects they will be integrated into (Boas 2008).
The simultaneous development of common software and unique hardware led to dependencies of
the common software on the unique hardware.
Planned commonality decreased
There was also a decrease in the commonality of the waveforms across different JTR Sets as the
acquisition progressed. Figure 44 shows the theoretical conception of JTRS early in the program
(Bailey, 2008). Figure 45 shows the actual interaction between waveforms (across the top) and
JTR Sets (in the first column) (North, Browne, & Schiavone, 2006). The reason for the change
was that a block upgrade strategy was implemented in 2005 to keep the program within schedule
and cost caps. There was "roughly a 1/3 reduction in requirements" between 2003 and 2006
(North et al., 2006). This resulted in less interoperability between JTR sets than originally
intended, but enabled quicker delivery of some performance.
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Figure 44: Initial Conception of High Waveform Commonality (Bailey, 2008)
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Figure 45: Realized Commonality Was Lower Than Planned Commonality (North, Browne and Schiavone,
2006)
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Making the common waveforms open led to divergence
An important part of the acquisition strategy was the waveform "Information Repository". The
repository contained waveform software, which was open to any manufacturer who wished to
develop a new JTRS-compatible radio. One stipulation was that "any company that checks out a
waveform from the JTRS Information Repository must return the modified or improved waveform
back to the repository so future users can take advantage of those modifications" (Rosenberg,
2010).
Unfortunately, because of the hardware-software coupling described above, waveforms often had
to be modified by the hardware developer. For example, waveforms written for an FPGA
architecture would not work on a DSP architecture. When the waveform was returned to the
repository, it was difficult to identify which changes were actual improvements and which were
mere modifications to make it work on the new software. Version control also became a time-
consuming task for the managers of the repository.
In this respect, making the common aspects of the architecture open encouraged divergence. At
the same time, making the architecture open encouraged reuse that might not otherwise have
occurred. There was a trade between preserving perfect commonality which was unused, and
allowing some divergence to encourage reuse.
Acquisition strategy was affected by unplanned policy changes
The open information repository strategy was accelerated when unplanned policy changes
affected the acquisition strategy. The initial acquisition strategy was formulated in the late 1990s,
but the acquisition needs of the DoD rose sharply with sustained combat operations in the mid
2000s. This placed the DoD in a difficult position. It needed to deliver radios to the warfighters
who required them, but the JTRS radios were not yet ready. It could supply legacy radios, but
equipping teams with legacy radios likely to last a decade or more would diminish the production
runs of the JTRS radios when they became available.
The solution was to let "manufacturers outside JTRS programs of record borrow waveforms from
the repository and develop JTRS- compatible radios without the time and development costs
typically associated with programs of record" (Rosenberg, 2010). Several interviewees
expressed the opinion that Harris's development of the Falcon III occurred far more rapidly than
would have been possible under a government acquisition structure.
An additional contributor to the rise in contractor-funded development of radios was the edict
from OSD that no service was to buy new non-JTRS radios without a waiver from OSD. Some
interviewees suggested this waiver process was effective in allowing companies to build a
business case for investing in the development of JTRS radios. Others stated that so many
waivers were issued under the contract that the volumes of JTRS radios required by the services
have significantly declined. Both points of view may be right, in that the policy's existence
encouraged a business case which was undermined by the policy implementation.
This facet of the JTRS acquisition highlights the interaction between unplanned events and their
associated policy changes on the one hand and the acquisition strategy on the other. It also shows
that making common building blocks freely available encourages new entrants.
Contract types
One of the development contracts illustrated the weakness in using award fees to incentivize
contractors. The Boeing team were on a cost plus award fee contract. However, for a variety of
reasons the project went badly. The Boeing team reached a point of poor performance where it
was impossible to turn the project around and achieve any of the targets for award fees. At that
point, the incentive ceased to operate effectively.
Intellectual Property
The JTRS program realized early that the architecture and operating system must be "Open and
government owned" with "no proprietary information " (Badolato, 1998). Unfortunately, this did
not materialize in practice. The key obstacle was proprietary information in the low level
software code which communicates with the hardware. By allowing the hardware to be open to
any developers, some of the software required to run the hardware was by necessity proprietary.
When this software needed to be included within the JTRS information repository, which was
supposed to be completely open, it created significant difficulties. Allowing other contractors to
access existing waveforms was not easy, and the portability benefits of the waveforms were
almost lost. It appears that the solution was to negotiate on a case by case basis with each of the
owners of the proprietary information. In some cases the outcome was that information could be
released only to a limited range of people within the government. This hampered attempts by the
government to encourage commonality by sharing information about the products being
developed. The situation could likely have been avoided with a better early recognition of the
detail of the proprietary information likely to be included.
Competition in acquisition was preferred to commonality in logistics at high volumes
The services remain responsible for integration, operation and logistics of the JTR Sets which
they purchase. This creates a tension between acquiring a single type of radio from one
manufacturer (giving logistics and sparing benefits) or acquiring radios from two different
companies (giving competitive benefits and possibly a lower acquisition cost, but higher life
cycle costs). The services were free to decide which of these acquisition approaches were
preferred for that service's JTR Sets. For low value, high volume hardware, there is "a much
bigger payofffrom the savings in the acquisition compared to the logistics tail. Single channel
handhelds now cost less than $3,000. Many times it isn't economically viable to fix them. If we
were talking about the Joint Strike Fighter, we would not want to sustain two different aircraft
models, but in our radio world, we believe the business case is there to consume them" (Program
Executive Officer Bauman, quoted in US Navy (2008).)
Summary of Findings on JTRS Common Software Acquisition
Findings on inter-contractor behavior
Prime contractors may refuse to pass through work to better qualified subcontractors to avoid
giving their subcontractors experience.
Information sharing between contractors is minimal when contractors will compete for follow on
hardware contracts. However, the "cooperative competition" exhibited by DLS and ViaSat on
the MIDS-LVT is a counter-example.
Findings on contracting strategies
Continuous competition works well in high quantity production such as JTRS. Several
interviewees suggested it was not likely to be successful in lower rate production.
Cost plus award fee structures can lose incentive value when a contractor is so far behind on
development that there is no chance of recovering any award fee.
Intellectual property
Intellectual property is a significant barrier to establishing commonality across the work of
different contractors.
A negotiated intellectual property clause often places significant limits on what the information
can be used for, because the Government must sign a non-disclosure agreement that makes it
difficult to share the information.
Findings on joint architecture development between contractors
Contractors have a three pronged disincentive to ensure that any interface standard is
comprehensive and fully thought through prior to starting production:
- The contractors will earn more profit during the subsequent hardware and software
development phase, so there is an incentive to move to that phase as quickly as possible;
- A common architecture means less work in porting waveforms between variants for the
contractors;
- Any architectural suggestions which require the contractor to share proprietary
information are unlikely to be made, especially when competitive bidding follows the
architecture development phase.
Findings on software commonality
A static interface architecture alone is insufficient to ensure hardware or software commonality.
Software commonality needs more attention to version control as a method of divergence
management than hardware commonality. This is especially the case when contractors are meant
to make both bug fixes and application-specific improvements.
Software commonality on different hardware platforms has an associated performance penalty.
4.2 CASE STUDY 2: COMMERCIAL LAUNCH VEHICLES
Introduction
The second case study examined a launch vehicle manufacturer ("CS2") with both commercial
and government customers including NASA.
There were two separate lines of inquiry pursued in this case study:
7. Did CS2 in its role as a system integrator encourage and manage commonality among
its subcontractors? If so, how? And if not, why not?
8. Was CS2, in its role as a NASA or DOD contractor, involved in projects with
attempted commonality coordination among contractors? What worked well?
The first question was intended to assess industry practice in infusing commonality into the
supply chain. New methods used here could be evaluated for applicability in NASA's
exploration architectures. The second question was intended to give insight into the practicality
of proposed NASA commonality strategies from the perspective of a contractor which would
potentially work under the new acquisition strategies.
CS2's Products and Business Strategy
CS2 provides space launch services based on a family of launch vehicles with commonality. CS2
also produces bespoke vehicles based on this family to meet particular customer needs.
CS2 develops its vehicles with an extensive network of subcontractors, and views its role as a
system integrator: it coordinates the subcontractors and undertakes system engineering,
integration and reliability testing. CS2 produces a small number of systems in-house where it has
particular expertise, avionics being the most sophisticated of these.
CS2's Commonality Strategy
CS2 runs a common system program ("CSP") which encompasses both hardware and software.
Certain systems which are identified as common across most or all launch vehicles are managed
by a common system group. The CSP is independent of any one launch vehicle development
team and is instead matrixed across all development teams.
Each launch vehicle can be seen as a set of common systems, plus a set of similar systems based
on common modules, plus a set of unique systems, as shown in Figure 46. The CSP delivers
either fully functional systems or a selection of modules to the launch vehicle development team.
For example the common rocket motors are fully integrated and functional and are supplied from
the CSP essentially ready for integration into the launch vehicle stack. In contrast, the common
avionics suite is modular. The launch vehicle developers pick the appropriate modules for the
design and integrate those into a particular system configuration for that launch vehicle. Finally,
because the common systems and modules do not encompass all required functions of each
launch vehicle, some portion of uniquely developed systems are required.
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Figure 46: Each Launch Vehicle is comprised of unique, similar and common systems
CS2 initially attempted to use a simple distinction between "common systems" and "unique
systems", however, as detailed engineering analysis showed system commonality was
unworkable, module commonality was introduced as a third option. For example, the original
vision for common avionics was to have a single avionics system common across all the launch
vehicles. This proved too difficult to engineer, and the compromise position was the current
configuration of a suite of compatible avionics modules. The flight termination systems also
follow a modular approach. They are configured differently for each launch vehicle, but the
wiring assemblies, ordinance and batteries are common.
The division of responsibility between the CSP and launch vehicle development teams is shown
in Figure 47. The CSP is responsible for the procurement of the common systems and common
modules. The launch vehicle development team is responsible for integration of the modules and
the development of new hardware which does not have commonality with other vehicles.
From an organizational perspective, the CSP is structured as part of the supply chain arm of
CS2's business. Some pieces of common hardware, like avionics, are manufactured in-house
from supplied components. Other common systems are subcontracted to suppliers who make
subassemblies by integrating components from lower-tier suppliers. Figure 47 depicts a stylized
version of this supply chain. CS2 has approximately 35 companies involved in producing
components or sub-systems for the CSP spread across 17 states.
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Figure 47: Supply chain responsibilities for each launch vehicle
Benefits Delivered by Commonality
Members of both the CSP and the launch vehicle programs had a clear and consistent idea of the
benefits commonality achieved within CS2. The key benefits which the CSP achieved were, in
approximate order of importance:
Improved reliability;
- Lower cost; and
e Improved schedule performance.
The CSP attributed each of these benefits to specific causes. Improved reliability was achieved
because common components were flown more often which made more test data available for
common components and gave engineers a better understanding of how the hardware performed
in flight. Lower cost was achieved primarily through economies of scale, because subcontractors
could offer lower unit prices when given higher order quantities. CS2 found worthwhile savings
even in small absolute increases in production quantity. For example, an increase from 1 or 2 per
year to between 5 and 8 per year was found to give significant cost improvement. Lower cost
was also achieved because the launch vehicle teams did not have to maintain a standing army of
expert engineers for all of the common systems. Finally, the improved schedule performance was
due to both the ability to maintain inventories of common parts and systems which had long lead
times (in some cases over a year), and also a reduction in time spent on pre-sale contract
negotiation because common suppliers are already on a standing (indefinite quantity) contract
with CS2.
CSP Funding and Management
The CSP is funded by placing an adjustable mark-up on the variable recurring costs of common
systems procured through the program. As an example with a 50% mark-up, if a particular
launch vehicle development requires $1 million worth of flight termination hardware, that
hardware will be ordered through the CSP and the price to the program will be $1.5 million. The
development program is willing to pay the additional 50% because it avoids unique development
costs in addition to sharing in the company-wide benefits of reliability, cost and schedule.
If common systems are notionally suitable for an LV being developed, then the program must use
them. A formal review process manages requests for exceptions to the CSP. The review process
consists first of negotiations between the launch vehicle development team and the CSP manager.
If the issue is unresolved the resolution is escalated. The Vice-President of the development
program argues the reasons for beneficial divergence before a board consisting of the Deputy
General Manager, the Chief Engineer and the Vice-Presidents of Engineering and Mission
Assurance. If the board agrees that divergence is beneficial in this instance, the LV program is
permitted to design and build a new system.
CS2's Acquisition Strategy to Support Commonality
CS2 did not introduce any novel methods of increasing commonality by direct communication
between its subcontractors, instead concentrating on commonality at the system level. CS2 did
use a GFE-type strategy in one instance to improve commonality across systems, where the
reliability and cost benefits were very clear.
CS2's approach is closest to a "Common Building Block" strategy which has been well planned
and where divergence is well managed. In keeping with this approach, systems selected as
common are discrete. Additionally, CS2 is closely involved in the design of the common
systems. These two factors meant that CS2 could fully specify the common systems in
subcontracts. This strategy concentrates all commonality coordination at the system integrator
(CS2) level and therefore requires no coordination between subcontractors or contractual
commonality incentives outside the CS2 organization.
CS2 did display one instance where it mandated commonality across its sub-contractors. CS2
supplied all contractors which needed to use ordinance (essentially explosives and detonators) as
part of their sub-system assemblies with that ordinance. This approach is known as "Customer
Furnished Equipment" ("CFE"), and parallels the federal acquisition method of Government
Furnished Equipment ("GFE"). The reason for the bulk supply was because the ordinance was
required to operate with very high reliability and so CS2 wanted control over the testing and
verification of the ordinance prior to installation into the assemblies of the contractors. Testing
was also more cost effective if done on a larger batch of ordinance, so CS2 could actually obtain
cheaper prices for the sub-system assemblies at a given reliability level by supplying the
ordinance itself. The strategy of supplying CFE fit well with CS2's original strategy of tightly
specified common systems, because the CFE could be included simply as another aspect of the
specification.
CS2 also noted some negative impacts of commonality on its acquisition strategy. Using
commonality as a strategy increased the difficulty and expense of CS2 switching to use a
different supplier for any of its common systems. There were reliability benefits in particular
associated with CS2 remaining with the incumbent supplier. To minimize the risk of the
suppliers increasing prices in response to CS2's dependence, CS2 attempted to negotiate 3 to 5
year supply contracts. The contracts were for indefinite quantities but contained quantity-price
curves for each order period (often 1 year). The contracts also included year by year price
escalation to make multi-year contracts more attractive. Additionally, CS2 attempted to maintain
price competition by assessing prices of alternative suppliers and using these as leverage to
encourage the incumbent to reduce costs, though in some areas of niche supply this was not
always possible.
Variation in the product of a single contractor over time was also a threat to commonality. CS2
required detailed drawings and change reports from its suppliers and monitored these to ensure
consistency over time from a single supplier's products. A lack of consistency would lead to a
lack of commonality between launch vehicles built at different times, which would undermine the
reliability benefits of commonality.
Viewpoints from CS2 on Acquisition Strategies for NASA
From time to time CS2 performs system integration or hardware development work for NASA.
CS2 was therefore able to provide an industry perspective on how NASA could achieve more
commonality across its exploration architectures. The interviews revealed a range of attitudes
because the questions invited speculation and insight based on experience in the industry.
GFE
CS2 has worked extensively with GFE from both NASA and DOD, and therefore has views on
how a commonality acquisition strategy based around increased amounts of GFE might operate.
CS2 has been involved both as an integrator of GFE from the government and as a supplier of
GFE to the government.
When supplying GFE, CS2 was more concerned with liability than with the loss of intellectual
property. It was commercially comfortable with the intellectual property implications of GFE
because it would normally be obvious if any systems or designs supplied as GFE were copied and
legal action could be taken. CS2 also implied that government agencies could push for more
extensive rights to the intellectual property in a contractor design in circumstances where that
design was produced using government funding.
In terms of liability, however, CS2 was less sanguine. If a launch vehicle for which CS2 had
supplied GFE failed, the anomaly review would be orchestrated by the launch vehicle prime
contractor. That contractor would likely be a direct competitor of CS2. CS2 was concerned its
influence on the review would be minimal, yet the review would have a conclusive impact on the
apportionment of liability for the failure. Any appeal from the findings would be extremely
expensive because of the complexity, detail and specialist nature of launch vehicle failure
investigation. CS2 feared its supply of GFE made it vulnerable as a potential scapegoat for a
competitor's failure investigation. CS2 did note that there were a range of GFE opportunities,
and some represented a more "mission critical" role than others. The liability concern diminished
as GFE systems become less mission critical.
Liability also played a role in CS2's view on receiving GFE. In one example, if GFE integrated
into a CS2 launch vehicle failed, CS2 was not liable to its government customer for the launch
failure. CS2 as system integrator also had access to all manufacturing and test records for the
GFE system and could reject particular instances of the GFE based on those records. This
additional oversight by CS2 did not affect its rights under the limitation of liability to its
customer. It is unlikely CS2 would be comfortable launching the vehicle containing the GFE
without both a waiver of liability and access to the engineering records of the GFE.
In addition to the legal concerns relating to GFE, CS2 stated two engineering heuristics relevant
to GFE projects. First, the GFE should be fully designed, and preferably manufactured and
delivered, before systems which interface with the GFE are designed. This avoids the situation
where Company A builds to Company B's GFE specification, then the specification changes
slightly in detailed design and Company A must rework aspects of its dependent design. Second,
the GFE must capture all of the ancillary knowledge and equipment needed for the GFE to
properly function. This knowledge includes design rationales and detailed operating instructions,
as well as ground support and test equipment and procedures. CS2 gave one example where
portions of GFE avionics were deactivated because the CS2 design teams were unsure what
purpose those portions are intended to serve, and the government representatives who would have
been able to explain the design had retired.
Contract Incentives
CS2 firmly believed that financial incentives could modify contractor behavior. CS2 pointed to
underrun sharing in particular as a powerful incentive.
CS2 was also candid about the way firms assess incentives, suggesting that any incentive which
operates based on a fixed metric will be analyzed for opportunities to maximize the metric score.
This puts pressure on contract writers to develop incentives so that any contractor "optimization"
of the incentive profits still produces a result aligned with customer expectations. The more
specific the scoring criteria for the incentive fees, the greater the opportunity for contractors to
strategize to maximize incentive profits.
Contract incentives are not the only pressure on performance at CS2, however. Market forces are
an important concern in the launch vehicle market. Even without incentives for quality written
into the contract, CS2's future orders are threatened if its launch vehicles fail.
Contracts Involving a Directed Subcontractor
CS2 cautioned against contractual arrangements where a prime contractor is directed to use a
particular subcontractor. One executive went as far as to call this a "nightmare" scenario. The
prime has no leverage over the subcontractor, and so the usual business practices which allow the
prime contractor to control the costs and performance of the subcontractor do not work well. The
government has some leverage over the subcontractor, but is often unwilling or technically unable
to take on the day-to-day responsibilities of managing the subcontractor. There is a high
switching cost in changing a directed subcontractor because it involves tripartite negotiations
between government, prime and subcontractor, instead of an executive decision at the prime
contractor level. The high switching cost reduces the incentives on the subcontractor for
efficient, quality performance. The subcontractor is effectively in a monopoly with very high
barriers to entry for other firms.
Leader / Follower Contracts
When given the opportunity to discuss possible solutions to multi-party commonality contracting,
one executive at CS2 suggested a chain of reasoning which culminated in a suggestion for
"leader-follower" contracts.
First, he reasoned, specialization of work by function is an efficient way of introducing some
commonality into the system. Specialization simply means using the same teams or companies
for the same functional areas across the exploration infrastructure. For example, Company C
could develop ECLS Systems for the crew capsule, the lunar lander and the lunar surface
systems. The major drawback is that after committing to using Company C, the incentive for
Company C's ECLS System team to work efficiently diminishes, because of the high switching
cost discussed above.
To introduce competition, he suggested "leader-follower" contracts, used during the Apollo
Program and on the ICBM development projects. Often these contracts are used to set up a
second source of production, but they can also be used to simply assure an alternate supply if the
first source fails. A full description of this type of contract was provided in chapter 2.3. To
briefly recap, if Company C is the system producer, Company D is contracted to closely track
Company C's development efforts, understanding the design, its constraints and risks and
attending meetings and design reviews. This lowers the switching cost for the government,
possibly lowering the cost of acquisition of the system overall.
System oversight by the customer
A similar result to that gained from leader / follower competition could be achieved with diligent
and sophisticated system engineering oversight from the customer. Effectively the customer
would act as a check on Company C's production costs and timetables. Most interviewees at CS2
felt that to perform this engineering oversight well required active and ongoing engagement in
development projects. Many government system engineers, now largely contract managers in
their view, have not been given the chance to develop and / or continually practice these skills. A
possible alternative is to appoint a single corporation which does have the requisite skills and
experience as the system integrator. CS2 suggested that to preserve the integrity of the
corporation as an overseer in this system the system integrator must not be permitted to allocate
substantial non-integration work to itself.
Summary of key findings from CS2 Case Study
Question 1: How does CS2 as a system integrator encourage and manage commonality among its
own subcontractors?
1. CS2 implements commonality at the system or module level, where it controls the design
and the specifications. CS2 does not use direct communication between subcontractors
to increase commonality.
2. CS2 adopted a GFE model to supply common ordinance across subcontractors because
commonality of ordinance delivered obvious reliability and cost benefits.
3. CS2 believes the key benefits it obtains from commonality are, in order of importance,
reliability, cost savings and schedule improvements.
4. Commonality is only applied to a subset of launch vehicle systems, but is applied across
all launch vehicles.
5. On systems where commonality is applied, divergence is tightly managed and controlled,
but there are mechanisms which allow beneficial divergence to occur.
Question 2: What does NASA need to consider in managing commonality across subcontractors
like CS2?
1. A commonality acquisition strategy which uses GFE must address liability and
intellectual property, and is less likely to succeed if designs are continually changing.
2. Directed subcontracts are difficult to manage and should be avoided.
3. Specialization of contractors coupled with a leader / follower contract arrangement may
assist in developing commonality.
4. NASA requires strong systems engineering skills to effectively oversee a contractor
which is in an effective monopoly position as a part of the commonality strategy.
4.3 CASE STUDY 3: COMMERCIAL LAUNCH VEHICLES
Introduction
The third case study examined another launch vehicle manufacturer ("CS3"). CS3 flies a range
of payloads for customers including NASA.
The study aimed to answer two questions:
1. What strategies does CS3, as a launch vehicle integrator, use to encourage and manage
commonality across its product family?
2. What are CS3's views on the commonality and acquisition strategies that are likely to
work well for NASA?
The first question aims to assess industry practice in the same industry as CS2 to measure
variation in commonality practice between organizations. The second question aims to gather
further practical insight into feasible acquisition strategies from an organization with experience
in space flight hardware.
CS3's Products and Business Strategy
CS3 produces a fleet of launch vehicles and sells launch services to a range of customers. There
is significant commonality between variants in the fleet.
CS3 bases its business strategy around delivering high reliability launch vehicles. As a
consequence, it is closely involved with all stages of manufacture and development.
CS3's Commonality Strategy
CS3's commonality strategy has four distinct approaches. These approaches work together to
deliver higher levels of commonality than any one approach.
First, some commonality was designed into the launch vehicles during development. At first
glance, variants bear close resemblance to each other. Common engines and core diameters are
used across many variants in the fleet. Payload fairings are more diverse, but common fairings
are still applied across several models. However, during the course of detailed interviews it
became clear that the commonality was not as widespread as it superficially appears. In trying to
take an initial point design and broaden the market appeal for that vehicle, commonality was
sacrificed for performance. For instance, the tank skin thicknesses on otherwise common length
tanks change to optimize performance. In one case, the margin for structural weight was "a
matter of ounces ". The apparent platforming approach was in fact, in the words of one engineer,
closer to "taking a point solution, and walking it up". In the initial stages of family design,
commonality benefits were generally lower priority than payload and delta-v performance.
The second approach to commonality was an attempt to create, in the future, more commonality
between widely separated variants in the future. For example, there are currently two separate
sets of avionics used among different vehicle families. Going forward, CS3 plans integration of
those two separate sets into a single, common set of avionics. A similar process of convergence
is planned for the vehicle upper stages.
The third approach to commonality is recapturing commonality. In part as a consequence of the
push towards performance during initial development, divergence occurred. The systems and
components which diverged now represent opportunities to increase commonality between
variants in the future. For example, the different skin thicknesses could be made common in
future. This is possible because new technology allows increases in actual performance over
existing customer requirements, meaning some of the earlier trades towards uniqueness can be
reversed while keeping performance constant. A 50% reduction in the number of assemblies
used across the launch vehicle family is intended to be achieved after the retrospective
commonality program. It is interesting to note that CS3 has largely chosen to invest the
technology advances in commonality instead of increased performance.
The final approach to commonality at CS3 is ongoing process commonality in manufacture and
operations between variants. Best practice lessons are shared between the manufacturing teams
working on different launch vehicles, and similarly for operations. Processes are then made
common if possible at the level of best practice across all CS3's variants.
Attention to commonality was widespread at CS3. Every interviewee was focused on and
knowledgeable about commonality. The poster shown in Figure 48 was an early clue that CS3
practiced a commonality culture.18 The interviews confirmed the widespread conscious and
unconscious focus on commonality that characterizes a commonality culture. The emphasis of
this culture was predominantly on reuse and the consolidation of existing designs across the entire
product family. There were only a small number of instances where new systems were being
planned to be used across all future variants. Therefore the commonality strategy at CS3 is best
described as a commonality culture based around reactive reuse.
Figure 48: This poster promoting commonality at CS3 indicated a commonality culture
Benefits From Commonality Perceived By CS3
The commonality culture at CS3 is driven in part by the significant benefits perceived from
commonality. The cost and reliability benefits seen in other case studies were present, and CS3
also identified "flexibility" as an important additional commonality benefit.
18 Additional detail on the poster which would have identified CS3 has been removed.
The cultural emphasis on reuse stems from CS3's perception that commonality increases
reliability, and CS3's business model requires extremely high reliability in the launch vehicles.
This makes new development very expensive because of the extensive testing involved in proving
reliability. Even after testing, any new development presents a risk. In an industry where nothing
is considered as reliable as flight-proven hardware, CS3 was very cautious about new
development. Reliability was also increased by the process commonality mentioned above,
where best practices in manufacture could be applied to more vehicles.
A second benefit to increasing commonality which was rated almost as highly as reliability was
flexibility. Commonality between launch vehicles allows the reconfiguration of one vehicle to
take another payload with a minimum of changes if the original payload is delayed. For example,
building launch vehicle cores which have attachment points for boosters allows that core to be
used for a higher payload or delta-v mission if necessary. There is a performance drawback to
this commonality, because if the original mission launches as planned then the unnecessary
structural mass of the attachment points decreases the performance. The flexibility also improves
reliability. Interviewees cited cases of vehicles remaining in storage while their payloads were
readied (known with a mixture of affection and frustration as a "Hangar Queen "). The storage
time increases the risk that the vehicle will be damaged as work continues around it, and that
reliability will suffer because pieces of the vehicle need to be changed out, repaired or upgraded
because of time in storage. Each piece of repair or change involves rework to the vehicle and
increases the likelihood of an undetected mistake.
Obviously this rework also contributes to cost, which is the third benefit of commonality often
cited by interviewees. The usual cost savings of reduced design labor and economies of scale
were mentioned. Several interviewees also argued that the reduction in configuration
management, rather than reduced costs in manufacturing, was the dominant cost saving during
the manufacturing phase. The cost reduction due to common manufacturing, for example in
developing common skin thicknesses, was small because the high level of manufacturing
automation meant the changes were simply a matter of loading a new computer design file. The
real cost of the different variants occurred in the need to track quality assurance and testing
procedures because the manufacturing process for the variants were slightly different. Keeping
track of which variants had passed which tests and quality assurance processes was time
consuming and difficult.
Drawback to Commonality
CS3 acknowledged that there were ongoing financial costs in identifying, evaluating and
implementing commonality, but did not have estimates of the magnitude of those costs because in
its commonality culture managing commonality was not drawn out as a separate item. The larger
concern for CS3 was that moving to common systems decreased the reliability of their launch
vehicle services viewed as a whole, while increasing the reliability of any one component due to
the larger number of flights. Without commonality, CS3 have independently redundant
components viewed from the perspective of the launch fleet as a whole. A failure of a component
will only affect the subset of vehicles on which that component is used. The other vehicles can
still be flown. With commonality, CS3 have the potential for a single common component failure
to affect their entire fleet. This was a critical issue for CS3, and arguably the main brake on the
rate at which commonality was increasing across families.
Commonality Funding and Management
Commonality funding and management are not centralized in CS3. There is no individual
responsible for commonality across all product families. The closest instance was an individual
in charge of the program to retrospectively implement commonality across a subset of variants.
The lack of centralized, coordinated responsibility appears to be largely a result of the
commonality culture. The key individual in implementing commonality in each case was the
person in charge of the functional area, for example avionics or propulsion. Commonality was so
crucial to their oversight task that it was unnecessary to have a second person tasked solely with
commonality responsibility.
Similarly, no separate funding streams were identified which specifically financed commonality
improvements. It is hypothesized that this is because commonality and development funding
were so closely linked under the CS3 culture.
The final management observation stems from a restructuring which brought variants closer
across all phases of vehicle development and operations. This gave all levels of the organization
better visibility across different variants. Several cross-variant commonality opportunities were
investigated after the restructuring. Nothing had changed from a technical or mission
perspective, but the way in which the organization was structured clearly affected the incentive
for investigation of commonality opportunities.
CS3's Acquisition Strategy to Support Commonality
CS3's acquisition strategy supported commonality but did not identify any new methods for
doing so. There were two key elements in the acquisition strategy. First, much of CS3's
development and manufacturing was performed in house. CS3 was more involved than simply an
integrator, which gave the company more scope to engineer commonality solutions across the
entire launch vehicle. No interviewee particularly singled out improved commonality as a reason
for performing engineering in-house, and it is likely that other reasons than commonality drove
the in-house engineering.
Second, when dealing with suppliers, CS3 focused on building long-term relationships with its
suppliers rather than encouraging constant competition. This allowed CS3 to have a single
supplier consistently produce a particular common system without the price escalation commonly
associated with commonality. One interviewee stated that it was made clear that CS3 and its
suppliers "sink or swim together", which keeps downward pressure on supplier prices. The
alternative price control mechanism of competition was felt to be uneconomical in the low
production quantities of CS3.
Over time, CS3 is attempting to increase the commonality of their suppliers. In so doing, an
interviewee observed that "ifyou start with common systems, common components are easy ", but
that without common systems common components were very difficult. For example, if two
launch vehicle fairings are constructed from different materials or at different thicknesses it is
very difficult to source common ordinance that will reliably cut both fairings. However, if the
fairings are identical, sourcing common ordinance is easy.
Only in rare cases would CS3 procure material or components for its own suppliers ("Customer
Furnished Equipment" or "CFE"). Two cases were given, one of ordinance and one of a unique
alloy which had to be produced in mill-run quantities. The economic case for providing these
direct was overpowering. In all other cases, the chief reason that CS3 was reluctant to supply
CFE was to preserve the independent responsibility of the supplier. If CS3 supplied CFE, it left
itself open to claims by the supplier that the cause of any poor or late performance by the supplier
was that the CFE was late or inadequate. CS3 would prefer to be completely independent from
the supplier, allowing it to compel performance from the supplier without excuse.
Viewpoints from CS3 on Acquisition Strategies for NASA
In addition to asking about the state of commonality at CS3, interviewees were asked about
possible commonality acquisition strategies for NASA. The interviewees commented on GFE,
directed subcontracts, common suppliers and leader-follower contracts.
GFE
CS3 was able to comment on Government Furnished Equipment both from its perspective of
providing CFE to its suppliers and from its perspective as a possible recipient of GFE. The first
observation interviewees made was that the concerns described above that CFE leads to "finger
pointing" on liability and schedule also apply when GFE is supplied.
CS3 also related experience that showed it is critical GFE is introduced as early as possible. At
one of the launch sites from which CS3 and other launch vehicle providers operate, a proposal to
introduce a common, GFE flight termination system (FTS) onto all launch vehicles was mooted.
The benefit was to give the launch site operator and the government more confidence in the
proper functioning of the FTS of CS3 and other launch vehicle providers. However, supplying a
piece of GFE which met the interface and environment specifications of all launch vehicles
proved unworkable. In the view of CS3 it would have been possible to design a launch vehicle
around the common FTS if the common FTS had been necessary at the outset. Because the GFE
was suggested so late, retrofitting a common system into all vehicles was the only option, but it
was shown to be a very expensive and difficult exercise and the effort was abandoned.
Directed subcontracts
CS3 considered directed subcontracts "dicey " as a strategy for commonality. Figure 49 shows a
diagram of the directed subcontractor structure (right) compared with the conventional structure
(left).
Conventional structure Directed subcontractor
preferred by CS3 structure which hasbeen suggested to
increase commonality
Figure 49: Directed subcontractor structure
The major reason for aversion to this arrangement was the disruption of the market forces which
shape supply chains. Each contractor to CS3 had a relationship with its own subcontractors
which was usually based on rational commercial grounds: quality, cost and attitude of the
subcontractor. By forcing contractors to other subcontractors and "creating a conversation that
doesn't exist", there is a risk of upsetting a previously effective supply chain, according to the
interviewee most responsible for supply chain management.
Direction by CS3 also risks CS3 being blamed by its contractor for poor performance lower in the
supply chain. Under the directed subcontractor structure, CS3 instructs the contractor as part of
its contract to use Subcontractor B. If the product from the contractor is defective or late, then the
contractor may claim that Subcontractor B's poor performance is a result of CS3's selection of a
poor subcontractor and not poor supervision by the contractor of Subcontractor B. It is also likely
that such direction reduces the ability of the contractor to incentivize Subcontractor B to perform
well. CS3 becomes responsible for managing the relationship between the subcontractor and the
contractor.
Common suppliers
CS3 showed that having common suppliers does not guarantee commonality. As one example,
prior to CS3 having a strong emphasis on commonality across all its vehicle lines, it had two
separate contracts for helium pressurant tanks from a common supplier. Although the
requirements were very similar, the delivered products were different. Each was optimized to the
particular system despite the supplier having full visibility into the other design.
Leader-follower contracts
CS3 had limited experience with leader-follower contracts but offered two insights. First, the
quantities of production in space systems were unlikely to be sufficient to allow full
manufacturing competition. An interviewee offered as support the difficulty which Congress has
had in approving the alternative engine development for the Joint Strike Fighter (although this is
an example of full competition rather than a true leader-follower contract). The engines for the
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Joint Strike Fighter were produced in quantities at least an order of magnitude larger than most
space exploration systems.
Second, CS3 doubted whether sufficient incentive could be offered to a shadow follower to
reward good performance by the leader. In an architecture constrained by affordability it will be
difficult to justify large additional payments to the shadowing organization for no tangible output.
On the other hand, if the payments are too small, it may be difficult to attract competent
followers.
Summary of key findings from CS3 Case Study
Question 1: How does CS3 manage and co-ordinate commonality?
- CS3 focuses on four approaches to commonality:
o commonality in initial vehicle designs;
o recapturing commonality when technology improvements ease performance
margins;
o planning increased commonality by migrating uncommon systems to common
systems for future variants; and
o process commonality across manufacturing and operations without changing
design aspects.
- CS3 manages its commonality strategies like an organization with a commonality culture,
but focuses strongly on reuse of existing components and systems rather than the
establishment of forward platforms.
- There is no single position of commonality responsibility, and each functional group
within CS3 is itself responsible for commonality.
* CS3 sees reliability and cost benefits from commonality, as expected, but also sees the
flexibility of switching launch vehicles for a given payload as a significant benefit.
- The weighting of the benefits of commonality against the reliability drawbacks of
commonality is an important planning exercise for CS3
Question 2. What insights does CS3 have into commonality acquisition strategies for NASA?
- GFE can promote commonality but it must be identified early in the design phases of the
project so other aspects of the design can interface with it. Legal liability and
programmatic responsibility for the performance of the GFE must be allocated.
- It is unlikely that there will be sufficient production quantities to develop a leader-
follower contract structure in an exploration architecture.
* Mandating particular sub-contractors may have cost implications because it disrupts
established supply chains. It also requires allocation of legal liability and programmatic
responsibility for the work of the directed sub-contractor.
" Using a common supplier does not guarantee commonality in the absence of customer-
driven incentives for commonality.
CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL ACQUISITION STRATEGIES
The previous chapters of this thesis have canvassed a wide range of commonality acquisition
approaches, opinions and experiences. However these valuable resources need to be brought
together into coherent strategies in order to be useful to NASA. The purpose of this chapter is to
synthesize the learning on commonality acquisition presented in Chapters 2 to 4 into clear
strategies, and to rationally evaluate the synthesized strategies for their impact on commonality.
It is important to reiterate that acquisition strategies are not rigid, repeatable or scientific in the
same way as engineering assessments can be. The results of this chapter should not be used to
constrain the acquisition strategies used in the future. Rather they should be used to assess the
general effect of aspects of the acquisition strategy on commonality. A NASA acquisition expert,
armed with the insight into the industry players which comes from long acquisition experience
and with more detailed information about the architectural elements of the successor program to
Constellation, could use the evaluation framework in this chapter to assess the impact of
acquisition strategies on commonality. Lacking both the long-term insight into the industry and
the detailed architectural information, the recommendations in this chapter must be viewed as
preliminary.
5.1 OUTLINE
The assessment method used in this chapter is split into three parts, shown in Figure 50. First, the
Program Acquisition Structures and System Acquisition Structures developed in chapter 2.3 are
examined. Then, each of the structures are evaluated to examine if they better meet the
requirements of the NASA architecture and the requirements of best practice commonality. The
third step is to take each high-level strategy and augment it with more specific contract
improvements like financial incentives or particular intellectual property provisions. These
specific contract improvements are designed to ameliorate weaknesses in the high level strategies.
Chapter 2.1 Chapter 2.2 Chapter 2.3
Figure 50: Commonality acquisition structure evaluation process
5.2 HIGH LEVEL COMMONALITY STRUCTURES
The evaluation process begins with the Program Acquisition Structures and the System
Acquisition Structures discussed in Chapter 2.3 above. The possible architecture level structures
for commonality are shown in Table 12, and the possible system level structures are shown in
Table 13. For clarity, these will be referred to as "Acquisition Structures".
System-level Acquisition Structures affect contractor visibility and incentives on the same system
over time. For example, fully competing the ECLS systems for a crew capsule, then an in-space
habitat, then a planetary lander would produce different commonality between the ECLS systems
than having a specialist contractor work on all ECLS systems. However, the different System-
level Acquisition Structures would have only a minor effect on the commonality between
different systems, say ECLS and propulsion.
Architecture-level Acquisition Structures affect contractor visibility and incentives over the entire
architecture and over time. For example, having a sole prime contractor over each of a crew
capsule, an in-space habitat and a planetary lander would produce different commonality than
having a separate prime contractor for each with NASA defining system interfaces.
Table 12: Architecture Acquisition Structures
Architecture-level Description For detailed
structure discussion see
Multiple primes, with Description: NASA operates as the system p.68
NASA as system integrator of elements produced by prime
integrator contractors.
Effect on commonality: Low visibility of
commonality between elements. Low incentive
on any prime for commonality with others.
SETA Description: NASA has extensive assistance on p.69
the system integration task from a commercial
system integrator.
Effect on commonality: Commercial system
integrator can move between elements to
increase commonality visibility.
Alliance contract Description: NASA and a prime contractor p.70
between NASA and a establish an alliance contract and work together
single prime as joint system integrators.
Effect on commonality: Risk and reward sharing
means that the prime contractor and NASA both
benefit from beneficial commonality. This
provides a natural incentive to proper evaluation
of commonality.
TSPR Description: NASA acts solely as a customer, p.72
and a commercial company handles all system
integration.
Effect on commonality: The prime has good
visibility across all elements. Can be incentivized
by NASA to implement commonality.
Table 13: System Acquisition Structures
System-level Description For detailed
structure discussion see
Fully competitive Description: Each time a system is developed, p.75
any qualified contractor may bid. Previous work
will be taken into account, but is not
determinative.
Effect on commonality: Discourages
commonality across projects, unless
commonality is specified as a high-priority
selection criteria.
Joint venture (JV) Description: Two companies form a JV to p.77, p.119
produce multiple instances of a system they
otherwise would have competed to produce. The
JV is assumed to be one the companies willingly
undertake.
Effect on commonality: Gives visibility between
systems and economic incentive for commonality
if it is beneficial in the design / manufacture
phase. Often difficult to find willing JV partners.
May reduce competition, increasing prices.
Directed contractor Description: A prime contractor is directed to use p.79, p.120, p.150,
a particular subcontractor with previous p.157
experience in developing the system.
Effect on commonality: Encourages obvious
reactive reuse at component levels. Common
subcontractor without more is insufficient to
ensure common systems.
Long-term Supplier Description: A particular contractor is mandated p.82
as the only contractor to be used for a particular
system across the architecture.
Effect on commonality: As for directed
subcontractor. If requirements of future systems
are well specified in advance, may encourage
creation of common building blocks, rather than
reactive reuse.
Build-to-Print Description: Two contractors each undertake the p.83
development of the same system. The
contractors are given the same specifications of
form in the contract requirements to encourage
commonality.
Effect on commonality: Will encourage
commonality if the systems are simple, but
difficult to manage divergence.
GFE Description: A contractor or NASA develops a p.85, p.121, p.149,
system which will be supplied fully developed to p.156, p.157
other contractors as GFE to be integrated in their
systems.
Effect on commonality: System is likely to be
common, but system engineering around the
common system may be difficult and result in net
detriment from using GFE.
System Acquisition Structures and Program Acquisition Structures have weak interaction. For
example, a GFE System Acquisition Structure works better under a multiple-prime Program
Acquisition Structure than under a TSPR structure, because the government is more closely
involved in the former. However, the interaction is weak, and all System Acquisition Structures
are feasible with all Program Acquisition Structures. NASA could develop a sound commonality
acquisition strategy using any of the Program Acquisition Structures.
As has been shown in the previous chapters, the structural arrangement of NASA, prime
contractor and subcontractor is not the only determinant of a successful commonality strategy.
Significant improvements can be obtained by tailoring particular aspects such as contract pricing,
intellectual property, management approach and task phasing.
Table 14 to Table 17 show the aspects of acquisition which can be implemented independently of
the chosen system- or architecture- level strategy. Any of the acquisition aspects listed in the
table can be added to affect the commonality outcome. Often, adding these aspects will incur
greater costs to the acquisition as a whole, either in payments to the contractor or in NASA or
integrator management expense. The options listed in these tables will be referred to as
"Incremental Improvements".
The combination of Acquisition Structures plus Incremental Improvements will be referred to as
an Acquisition Strategy.
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Table 14: Incremental Improvements Relating to Contract Tasks and Structure
Contract tasks and structure
Acquisition aspect Description and commonality effect For detailed
discussion see
Single contract with Description: A single contractor is awarded both p.102
design and the design and production phases of the
manufacture phases contract.
Effect on commonality: The contractor is
incentivized to look at both the design and
manufacture phases in evaluating commonality.
Separate contracts for Description: One contractor undertakes design p.102
design and only. Then the contract is competed again for
manufacture manufacture. The design contractor may win
again.
Effect on commonality: The split between design
and manufacture means that the design
contractor is unlikely to look at full-lifecycle
commonality.
Leader / follower Description: A contractor is awarded design and p.104, p.151,
arrangement production work. A second contractor shadows p.158
the work of the first and can take over if the first
performs poorly.
Effect on commonality: Incentivizes thorough
search for commonality by leader to avoid
follower suggesting sensible commonality
opportunities missed by the leader. Adjunct to
specialization to keep competitive pressures on
the specialist. If switching occurs on one product
but not on others, may lead to divergence.
Contract for service Description: NASA buys a service, not a p.123
development project.
Effect on commonality: Incentivizes contractor to
consider full lifecycle effects of commonality,
assuming there is cost competition.
NASA obtains full IP Description: Contractor is required to give all p.108
rights design and process information to NASA.
Effect on commonality: Easier to reuse some or
all of the existing design. NASA will have to pay
contractor more however.
Contractor commonality Description: Contract phase specifically for p.104
exploration phases exploration of commonality opportunities.
Effect on commonality: Improves identification of
commonality opportunities. Difficult to tell in
advance if commonality will be useful.
Base assumption: Single contract with design and manufacture phases
Table 15: Incremental Improvements Relating To Contract Pricing and Incentives
Contract pricing and incentives
Acquisition aspect Description and commonality effect For detailed
discussion see
Cost-plus-fixed-fee Description: Contractor is paid a fixed fee, plus its p.91
contracts costs are reimbursed.
Effect on commonality: Contractor has less
disincentive to search for commonality because
government pays labor costs of commonality
search. However government also pays labor costs
of new design so there is incentive to develop new
design on government funds.
Fixed price contracts Description: Overruns or underruns on the contract p.91
accrue to the contractor.
Effect on commonality: Contractor more likely to
look for and evaluate commonality benefits during
lifecycle phases it is responsible for. More likely to
discard commonality effects in later lifecycle phases.
Cost sharing Description: Only a portion of the overruns or p.92
underruns on the contract accrue to the contractor.
Effect on commonality: Gives a result between
cost-plus and fixed-price contracts. Where the
result lies depends on the amount of cost sharing.
Price redetermination Description: The fixed price for the contract is p.97
adjusted after an initial period of experience by the
contractor.
Effect on commonality: Allows contractor to explore
commonality ideas without impacting profit. Then
incentivizes use of the common ideas under fixed
price contracts.
Incentive awards for Description: Contractor earns extra profit for p.94, p.122, p.150
commonality meeting commonality targets. Targets could be
process related, fixed percentage commonality or
based on lifecycle costs.
Effect on commonality: Incentivizes reactive reuse
and building block or forward commonality on
systems within the visibility of the contractor.
Incentives based on fixed levels of commonality
may encourage absolute commonality rather than
beneficial commonality.
Award fee strategies Description: Contractor is evaluated by NASA at the p.95, p.143
conclusion of the project, and awarded a bonus
payment based on how well the contractor met
customer expectations (including commonality).
Effect on commonality: Encourages contractor to
consider what the customer wants from
commonality and perform accordingly. Does not
correct structural problems like lack of visibility.
Future projects buy-in Description: Contractor or center develops a p.123
system, and receives "buy-in" later from other
centers / contractors if the system is useful in their
developments.
Effect on commonality: Encourages design to
consider future systems and reduce system cost.
Does not improve visibility.
Base assumption: Cost plus fixed fee contract
Table 16: Incremental Improvements Relating To Management and Systems Engineering
Management and Systems Engineering
Acquisition aspect Description and commonality effect For detailed
discussion see
Early contractor Description: Design contract is given to contractor p.75
involvement with early, while requirements for other parts of the
evolving requirements architecture are evolving.
Effect on commonality: Difficult to plan for future
systems because requirements are uncertain. Difficult
to make performance-cost trades for existing systems
because performance requirements change.
Fully defined up-front Description: Design contract is not given to contractor p.121, p.128
requirements until architecture is fully defined.
Effect on commonality: Systems can be planned for
future requirements as well as current requirements.
Performance-cost trades on current systems are more
accurate.
Smart buyer strategies Description: NASA as customer is very familiar with p.117
(expert NASA system the costs and performance limitations of the systems it
engineers) is buying
Effect on commonality: NASA can "sanity-check"
performance-cost trades involving commonality. Gives
NASA a better repository of existing projects in the
minds of its engineers which it can recommend
investigation of. Indirectly assists other commonality
strategies like specialist contractors by reducing price
risk associated with monopoly.
NASA / System Description: NASA (or its system integrator contractor) p.107, p.151
Integrator insight on a stations insight engineers with all contractors.
continuous basis Effect on commonality: Site-based insight engineers
network with other site-based insight engineers to
assess commonality opportunities. Increases visibility
for widespread forward commonality.
Strong commonality Description: The NASA commonality team is well p.128
team resourced and well led with strong high level
management support and authority to force
commonality. It is not responsible to any one project.
Effect on commonality: The commonality team is able
to force commonality evaluation, performance-cost
trades and forcibly control divergence on individual
projects in the interests of the architecture as a whole.
Fully funded projects Description: Projects are fully-funded up-front and p.125
therefore have less need to show yearly progress in the
form of flight tests etc to gain subsequent funding
Effect on commonality: Assists in keeping
requirements well defined and unchanging. Allows
common articles to be produced first, and design based
around those articles, rather than simultaneous
development.
Base assumption: Early contractor involvement with evolving requirements
Table 17: Incremental Improvements Relating To NASA-Wide Organizational Changes
NASA-wide organizational changes
Acquisition aspect Description and commonality effect For detailed
discussion see
Formalized re-use Description: Centralized program at the center p.116
programs or NASA wide level handles inventories of
' components and systems, aggregating bulk buys
and promoting reuse of spares. (eg JPL Flight
Hardware Logistics Program)
Effect on commonality: Lowers barriers to
reactive reuse. Possible cost savings of several
percent.
Centralized technology Description: Requests for new developments are p.118
development sent to a single NASA or contractor point which
can search for new commonality between
variants. (eg Air Force Research Laboratories)
Effect on commonality: New developments with
commonality potential can be aggregated
together. Most effective at the commonality
level. May concentrate too much
Centralized, neutral Description: Information on existing p.118
organization as developments are fed to a neutral organization
knowledge repository which does not compete with contractors.
Designs are cross-checked for commonality with
existing designs of other contractors, allowing
NASA to approach the existing designer for
reuse.
Effect on commonality: Improves visibility for
reactive reuse. Does not incentivize
commonality search or evaluation.
Base assumption: None of the above structures are included.
Armed with these lists of Incremental Improvements and the preceding lists of Acquisition
Structures, the best Acquisition Strategies can be identified. This analysis is conducted in the
tables in Appendix B.
Each of the tables in Appendix B assesses one Program Acquisition Structure or System
Acquisition Structure. First, the Acquisition Structures are assessed against the NASA
acquisition requirements and the commonality best practice for each of reactive reuse, common
building block and widespread forward commonality. Each Acquisition Structure is assessed
assuming it uses only the base assumptions from the tables above. Then, where Incremental
Improvements were considered to improve particular aspects of the commonality process, those
improvements are noted in the table. Where Incremental Improvements were considered to
improve the commonality process as a whole they are noted at the bottom of the evaluation
column.
Entries marked in green (prefaced by (I) for black and white prints) perform a process
satisfactorily. This means that the process can be undertaken and relevant heuristics are met.
Entries in yellow (prefaced by (U)) show that it is uncertain whether the process can be
performed satisfactorily, usually because there is a tension between a positive and a negative
force for commonality, the magnitudes of which depend on the actual situation. Entries in red
(prefaced by (W)) are unlikely to perform the process satisfactorily. Either there are significant
barriers to undertaking the process or gathering inputs, or important heuristics are not met. A
fourth category of entries are marked in grey, indicating that the Acquisition Structure has little
effect on the execution of this process.
The final assessment for each Acquisition Structure is based on how difficult it is to set up and
manage (Acquisition Affordability) and how much resistance establishing it is likely to meet
(Political Risk and Regulatory Feasibility).
There is no distinction between Acquisition Structures which are very positive and those which
are weakly positive, and similarly for negative processes. This is not a quantitative exercise, and
disagreements over the proper categorization are to be expected. On the whole, however, the
process separates good Acquisition Structures for commonality from poor ones. Detailed
comparisons among the good or poor architectures are irrelevant, because fine distinctions will be
swamped by other factors including the cost of managing the acquisition, the political appearance
of the acquisition structure and the regulatory risks inherent in the structure.
Summaries of the results of the analyses are presented in Table 18 to Table 20. For each of
reactive reuse, common building block and widespread forward commonality, the tables show
whether the strategy is considered to be appropriate, borderline or ineffective, from the
perspective of commonality. The Incremental Improvements which are considered necessary to
deliver the strategy are marked inside each box.
More precisely, the color definitions also penalize structures which require extensive Incremental
Improvements to make them workable, as shown below.
The Acquisition Structure plus the
Incremental Improvements deliver
a good structure. The incremental
Improvements required are not too
extensive.
Either (1) the improvements listed
turn this into a reasonable (but not
good) structure; or (2) the
improvements turn this into a good
structure but the improvements
are wide-ranging and difficult to
implement
Regardless of the improvements,
this structure is unlikely to be
effective.
The usual NASA approaches to commonality of the relevant type on the Constellation program
are boxed in dashed lines19. The same (I), (U) and (W) code is used to indicate the color on black
and white prints.
In evaluating the preferred architecture, it is also important to consider the political and
regulatory feasibility of each architecture. Table 21 presents a summary of the feasibility as
determined by the tables in Appendix B. Each of the Acquisition Structures received a color code
based on the "broad acquisition evaluation" criteria in Appendix B, then the lower score of the
System-level and Architecture-level structure was used to indicate that architecture. For example,
a Fully Competitive system level structure (Green) with a Sole Prime architecture level structure
(Yellow) receives a Yellow overall score. The political and regulatory feasibility in Table 21 is
19 Note that the scoping interviews suggested widespread forward commonality was not attempted, so the reactive reuse
structures are marked here, and show that expecting widespread commonality when using the same structures is
unrealistic.
considered as an "overlay" to the summaries in Table 18 to Table 20. Strategies which are very
well suited to commonality may not be particularly feasible from a regulatory point of view, and
will therefore score well in Table 18 to Table 20 but poorly in Table 21.
Reactive Reuse Acquisition Strategies
Program Acquisition Structures
LMultiple primes I NASA With SETA Assistance
IFirm requirements; architecture IFirm requirements; architecture
Iwide knowledge repository; strong Iwide knowledge repository; strong
Icommonality team; strong NASA IP Icommonality team; strong NASA IP
Fully Competitive Inegotiation (U) Inegotiation (U)
JV across wide range of systems; V
formed by market; fixed price IV across wide range of systems; JV
contract; expert system formed by market; fixed price
2 Joint Venture engineering (U) contract (1)
Fixed price contract; expert system
0 lengineering; strong commonality
Directed Contractor Iteam (U) IFixed price contract (1)
Fixed price contract; expert system
engineering; strong commonality
4 Long-Term Supplier team (U) Fixed price contract (1)
Firm requirements; architecture Firm requirements; strong
wide knowledge repository; strong commonality team; strong NASA IP
Build-to-Print commonality team; (U) negotiation (U)
Not recommended due to INot recommended due to
ipartitioning between GFE team and partitioning between GFE team and
GFE 'development team (W) Idevelopment team (W)
Corporate-NASA Alliance Single TSPR Prime
Firm requirements; architecture Firm requirements; architecture
wide knowledge repository; strong wide knowledge repository; strong
commonality team; strong NASA IP commonality team; strong NASA IP
negotiation (U) negotiation (U)
JV across wide range of systems; JV JV across wide range of systems; JV
formed by market; fixed price formed by market; fixed price
contract (1) contract (1)
Fixed price contract (or other Fixed price contract; good system
alliance incentives) (1) engineering (I)
Fixed price contract (or other
alliance incentives) (1)
Firm requirements; strong
commonality team; strong NASA IP
negotiation (U)
Fixed price contract; good system
engineering (1)
Firm requirements; strong
commonality team; strong NASA IP
negotiation (U)
............
Common Building Block Acquisition Strategies
Program Acquisition Structures
Multiole nrimes NASA With SETA Assistance Corporate-NASA Alliance Single TSPR Prime
Fully Competitive
Joint Venture
Directed Contractor
Long-Term Supplier
Build-to-Print
Lost snaring tor tuture building
block instances (or other incentive
to commonality); expert systems
engineering; strong commonality
team (U)
Workable with strong commonality
team on aspects of architecture
with firm, unchanging
requirements (U)
IFirm requirements; good system
Iengineering; lifecycle cost
lincentives; strong commonality
Iteam; liabilty / responsibility
GFE larrangements; protection of IP (I)
Firm requirements; lifecycle cost
incentives; strong commonality
team (U)
Workable with strong commonality
team on aspects of architecture
with firm, unchanging
requirements (U)
Firm requirements; lifecycle cost
incentives; strong commonality
team (U)
Workable with strong commonality
team on aspects of architecture
with firm, unchanging
requirements (U)
Firm requirements; lifecycle cost
incentives; strong commonality
team (U)
Workable with strong commonality
team on aspects of architecture
with firm, unchanging
requirements (U)
-I
IFirm requirements; lifecycle cost
lincentives; strong commonality Firm requirements; lifecycle cost
Iteam; strong authority for expert Firm requirements; strong incentives; strong commonality
Isystem integrator (1) commonality team; (1) team (i)
...
NASA With SETA Assistance Corporate-NASA Alliance I Sinele TSPR Prime
Fully Competitive
Joint Venture
Directed Contractor
Long-Term Supplier
Build-to-Print
Coordinated incentives across the Full lifecycle cost incentive on Full lifecycle cost incentive on
primes. Leader / Follower system integrator and specialized system integrator and specialized Full lifecycle cost incentive on
arrangements to keep costs low. subcontractor. Leader/ follower subcontractor. Leader / follower prime. Leader/follower
Good system engineering; Firm arrangements. Firm requirements arrangements. Firm requirements arrangements. Firm requirements
GFE
Widespread Forward Commonality Acquisition Strategies
Program Acquisition Structures
- .&M4 - - ", ", - ___ - - - I I - I,-,, - "I '. -
Table 21: Summary of Political and Acquisition Policy Feasibility and Likelihood
Structure political and acquisition policy feasibility and likelihood
Multiple primes NASA With SETA Assistance Corporate-NASA Alliance Single TSPR Prime
Fully Competitive (1) (1) (W) Difficult across expl. arch. (U)
Joint Venture Assuming the JV exists (U) Assuming the JV exists (U) Assuming the JV exists (W) Assuming the JV exists (U)
Directed Contractor Is occasionally used (U) (U) (w) Difficult across exp. arch. (U)
Long-Term Supplier w (w) (W) (w)
Build-to-Print (1) (1) (W) Difficult across exp. arch. (U)
GFE Is occasionally used (U) (U) (w) Difficult across exp. arch. (U)
5.3 SELECTION AND DISCUSSION OF PREFERRED ACQUISITION STRATEGIES
The preferred Acquisition Strategies are shown in green in Table 18 to Table 20. This section
describes why those strategies were selected.
Results are independent of Program Acquisition Structure
The first point to note is that the results are broadly independent of the Program Acquisition
Structure. The reason is that the Program Acquisition Structure has two effects on commonality,
and the analysis at this level of detail was unable to distinguish the Program Acquisition
Structures on these effects.
The first effect is system engineering. A strong system engineering team improves the ability of
systems to make cost-performance trades, useful in all three of the identify / implement / evaluate
commonality stages, and provides lifecycle information which is valuable in the "evaluate" stage
of the commonality process. It is not possible to say whether a NASA system engineering team
leading multiple primes, the services of a dedicated SETA, a single TSPR contractor or a new
fusion of these in an Alliance contract would be most effective at performing system engineering.
The second effect is cross-contractor willingness to share information and intellectual property.
On the one hand it is possible to argue that sharing is more easily incentivized in the TSPR and
Alliance structures where, theoretically "everyone is on the same team". On the other, the
skeptical attitude to sharing shown through the contractor interviews and in Scherer's qualitative
analysis suggests that the transfer of valuable intellectual property between contractors would still
be limited within a TSPR-led consortium or an Alliance.
Therefore this analysis proceeds on the basis that the preferred commonality acquisition strategies
are independent of the Program Acquisition Structures chosen. If more detailed analysis or
deeper experience show that the Program Acquisition Structures affect systems engineering or
willingness to share intellectual property then those structures which score better on those fronts
will be better acquisition structures for implementing commonality.
Reactive reuse
For reactive reuse there are three good system-level strategies shown in Table 18. The best
strategies, in approximate order of preference, are a directed contractor, a joint venture or a long
term supplier at the system level. The directed contractor and joint venture score moderately well
on the assessment summarized in Table 21, reflecting their moderate reduction in competition,
while the long-term supplier scores poorly reflecting the truly anti-competitive nature of such a
structure.
Under a directed contractor structure, which occurs when a contractor with experience building a
previous system with significant anticipated commonality is chosen to build the new system, the
contractor has the visibility to undertake the reuse because its institutional memory extends to the
previous system. This gives the contractor a very good understanding of the systems, how they
work and how easily they can be reused on other applications. The contractor is likely to own the
intellectual property to its own designs, and take responsibility for them, removing two of the
usual barriers to reuse.
However, as the case studies and scoping interviews showed, simply having the same contractor
build two systems is insufficient for commonality. The reuse options can be improved by placing
the directed contractor on a fixed price contract. The fixed price contract incentivizes low up-
front costs and low testing and commissioning costs, and the contractor is likely to explore reuse
opportunities to achieve these cost savings without compromising reliability. The incentive
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structure could be extended one step further by including an award fee tied to a life-cycle cost
model. This would encourage reuse from designs actually in use to increase operational-phase
commonality and reap the associated life-cycle cost benefits. It would not matter if the lifecycle
cost model contains estimates and uncertainties, so long as it incentivizes trades being made in
the general directions that lower lifecycle costs in comparison with development costs.
One drawback with the idea of a directed contractor is the possibility that the contractor exploits
NASA's dependence on its experience and negotiates a higher fixed price. To some extent such
price rises should be expected, and as long as the rise does not exceed the net commonality
benefit, NASA still benefits from the directed contractor strategy. NASA maintains some price
leverage because it can switch to an alternative contractor (although it loses the commonality
benefit) if prices become too high. Additionally, as an insurance policy against this strategy,
NASA could negotiate a NASA-wide license to the intellectual property rights for use by NASA
on the exploration architecture. This would give NASA the option of continuing to build
common systems itself. Taking that idea one step further, NASA could require the right to
license another commercial company to use that intellectual property. This would preserve the
option for NASA of moving to a second source for manufacture, which would be particularly
important for systems which NASA does not have the capability to manufacture in-house.
Joint ventures are a second option for encouraging reactive reuse. A joint venture occurs when
two organizations which would otherwise have independently bid for and developed unique
systems instead bid as a single entity to develop both systems together. The discussions with
practitioners showed that joint ventures are only good strategies if they exist naturally, and such a
natural existence cannot be widely assumed. However, acquisition personnel should be aware of
possible opportunities to encourage the formation of joint ventures to supply systems with
commonality potential. The joint venture is likely to increase the visibility between the different
contractors within the joint venture, which will improve the identification of commonality
opportunities.
The third feasible strategy for reactive reuse is a long-term supplier. The supplier is likely to
reuse aspects of previous designs to reduce cost and risk. In terms of reactive reuse, the
advantages are the same as for the directed contractor discussed above. The distinction between
the two in commonality advantages only becomes clear in the building block and widespread
forward commonality strategies.
However, the disadvantages of the long-term supplier are more pronounced than for the directed
subcontractor. Establishing a long-term supplier is a sole-sourcing approach which operates over
a longer timeframe than the directed subcontractor. This makes it more challenging to justify
under the current Federal Acquisition Regulations. The long-term supplier also has more power
because NASA becomes more dependent on continuity of supply from the long-term supplier. If
leader-follower contracts are needed to introduce competition into what would otherwise be an
effective monopoly, the costs of the follower contracts may significantly reduce the net benefit
from the overall commonality strategy. A combination of fixed price contracts and award fees
based on lifecycle cost, similar to that used for a directed subcontractor, will be effective in
incentivizing the implementation of feasible reuse opportunities.
A fully competitive structure offers minor benefits to reactive reuse. The high level of
competition incentivizes up-front cost savings and reuse of heritage parts or systems is one way
to achieve this. However, the fully competitive structure does not give companies insight into or
intellectual property rights in any designs which were not built by them in the past. This is likely
to lead to significant overestimates of commonality initially, which are later pared back to better
reflect reality.
Build-to-print, where the government designs the system in advance, is likely to be only
moderately successful in encouraging reactive reuse. The key drawbacks to build-to-print are that
the government may only have a superficial understanding of the systems previously built for it,
or may not have the intellectual property to the designs even if it has the understanding.
Additionally, build-to-print is a strategy which places significant up-front work on the
government.
For reactive reuse, GFE is considered an infeasible strategy because it offers only a mechanism
for re-use of existing government equipment once the opportunity has been identified, rather than
being a strategy which could provide incentives to search out and evaluate a range of reuse
options. GFE is a more appropriate choice for implementing building block commonality.
Therefore, considering Table 18 and overlaying Table 21, the best strategies for reactive reuse are
likely to be a directed subcontractor at the system level, with a program level structure
comprising multiple-primes or NASA with a SETA contractor. Joint ventures occur too rarely to
be a widespread strategy, and long-term suppliers pose too many regulatory obstacles.
Building block commonality
For building block commonality, the right strategy is less clear than for reactive reuse. Table 19
shows that the choice is between a straightforward but inflexible build-to-print structure, a more
complex but more versatile GFE structure, and a long-term supplier which presents competition
difficulties. On balance, each of these strategies has its place in a common building block
strategy, as shown in Figure 51.
High
Buikd-to-Print
Design GFECertainty
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Comon Long-term
Building Supplier
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Low Projected System High
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Figure 51: Suggested System Acquisition Structures for Common Building Block
For designs where the common design is clear-cut and divergence is therefore unlikely, a Build-
to-Print strategy is a good strategy. A build-to-print strategy, which occurs when the government
specifies a design which contractors then manufacture, uses multiple system-level contractors for
the system manufacture and is attractive from the point of view of competition as shown in Table
21. It is also easy to understand, manage and implement. Contractors are comfortable with the
risks presented by the government defining a design, in particular because it is clear where the
liability and programmatic responsibility for the design lies. The key disadvantage to the build-
to-print strategy is that the design must be performed early, and coordination of design changes in
the face of divergence is difficult. These disadvantages become more pronounced as the initial
certainty over the common design decreases.
For a moderate level of uncertainty in the design, a GFE strategy is preferred. Although the GFE
should still be contracted and produced early relative to the systems it will be integrated with, it
has a single organization in charge of the common system until integration. This increases the
barrier to individual projects optimizing the building block for performance in their projects at the
expense of program-level benefits to commonality. The GFE contractor acts as a central and
independent repository for change requests which allows divergence to be managed in a more
considered fashion.
On the other hand, a GFE strategy is not a preferred approach under the current NASA
acquisition policies. It requires significant NASA management time to co-ordinate the GFE
contractor and the individual projects. There is risk that the GFE may not integrate properly with
the individual projects, requiring rework. The need to produce GFE before other interconnected
systems could stretch schedules, which is also unattractive from NASA's point of view. From a
contractor perspective, GFE is also unattractive because it intertwines liability for systems
between the government as intermediary, the GFE supplier as the developer and the system
integrator. In particular, GFE suppliers are unwilling to supply flight critical systems when their
influence on failure investigation panels is limited, and integrators are unwilling to give their
competitors which supplied GFE weight on panels because of the sensitive nature of those
investigations.
A final alternative is to use a long-term supplier. The advantage of the long-term supplier for
common building blocks is that the supplier knows they have a long-term contract and so the
supplier can be incentivized to invest in commonality early in the program, developing sensible,
sustainable common building blocks for future years. The long term supplier can develop
common building blocks where divergence is constantly managed over time, in contrast with
GFE where the specifications of the GFE to be provided are rigid and difficult to change on an
ongoing basis. The flexibility the long-term supplier offers is particularly useful when the initial
knowledge about the design is low. The disadvantages of the long-term supplier in terms of its
monopoly position which were discussed above under reactive reuse are still present. The cost of
managing the long-term supplier, either by introducing a follower or by accepting the price rises
that stem from the monopoly, make this strategy a useful one only when there are high
anticipated benefits from the commonality.
All of the structures, but particularly Build-to-Print and GFE are helped by a strong commonality
team. The role of this team is to manage divergence, forcing systems integrating the GFE to
resist modifications unless justified by benefit across the architecture. The commonality team
must have the authority to impose these architecture-level decisions. Divergence management is
particularly important given that there will be long offsets between the initial development of the
common building block and the development of the final systems to use the common building
block.
Strong system engineering is also important to ensure that the building block is being designed
for the right requirements, and that the interfaces for the building block remain consistent over the
offsets of several years. This is one of the reasons why a strong program level system
engineering is so important.
Finally, in the case of the GFE contractor and Long-Term Supplier, incentives are needed to
manage divergence and produce a system that is appropriate for future applications. The best
way to do this is to use a cost-plus contract with incentives based on lifecycle cost. The lower the
estimated lifecycle cost of the system to NASA, the better the GFE contractor should be
rewarded. A fixed-cost contract is likely to discourage the contractor from fully exploring
opportunities for future commonality. The contract administrators on the cost-plus contract must
understand that the contractor must be allowed to make commonality investments in the
development of the initial building blocks, and should be prepared to see the contractor present a
different cost profile to unique development. More radically, NASA could pay an award fee
based on commonality at regular intervals during the contract. For example, the contractor could
have the opportunity to earn an additional 5% per year based on NASA's assessment of its
attention to commonality. In both of these strategies, strong system engineering is needed to
correlate good (not merely adequate) performance with contract rewards. NASA should not be in
a position where the contractor is explaining to it why it deserves the award fee; the instruction
should flow the other way.
If a SETA contractor is used at the program level, part of its responsibility should be to backstop
NASA's assessment of award fees, and to maintain independent lifecycle cost estimates for the
common building block and the systems which use it. For these reasons the SETA contractor
must be independent from the GFE contractor or Long-Term Supplier, and should not be
involved in any design and construction at all.
Table 21, in summarizing the political and policy feasibility of the systems, shows that the order
of preference between system-level strategies is Build-to-Print, then GFE, then a Long-Term
Supplier. At the Program-level, a multiple-prime structure or a NASA-with-SETA structure are
preferred.
Therefore, the recommended strategies for developing common building blocks are, in order of
preference, Build-to-Print, GFE and a Long-Term Supplier. If it is difficult for the government to
fully specify the initial design at the outset, GFE may be preferable to Build-to-Print.
Widespread forward commonality
Table 20 shows that only a Long-Term Supplier is feasible for widespread forward commonality.
No other structure gives the forward-looking incentives to invest widely in commonality.
However, Table 21 shows that a Long-Term Supplier is infeasible under the current political and
acquisition policy environment. This leads to the conclusion that NASA should not attempt
widespread forward commonality as a general strategy, although it may be justifiable in very
limited areas, for example where market conditions mean that there is only one effective supplier
in any case.
If NASA were to attempt this structure, it would need to retain very close control and supervision
over the structure to minimize allegations of anti-competitive behavior by the specialist
contractors. The Long-Term Suppliers must be incentivized to minimize lifecycle costs across
the whole portfolio of systems they develop. Award fees should be based on lifecycle costs and
include the lifecycle implications of commonality with previous systems. At an extreme,
contracts for service could be used where the contractor is responsible for the lifecycle costs
itself. Program management must independently track the lifecycle costs.
The contractors must also be incentivized not to abuse their monopoly positions by increasing
prices. Leader-follower contracts are one way to maintain downward pressure on the costs of
acquiring the systems, if the commonality benefit is expected to outweigh payments made to the
follower.
Finally, strong system engineering is required to keep requirements as firm as possible, allowing
the Long-Term Supplier to forecast needs and develop systems which invest in forward
requirements.
5.4 BLENDING THE COMMONALITY STRATEGIES INTO AN INTEGRATED WHOLE
For systems where extensive work has already been done on similar systems, requirements
change slowly and up-front costs are most important, reactive reuse is dominant and a directed
subcontractor approach should be used.
For systems where new development is needed, but there are common functions and
environments across different applications, a common building block approach is likely to be best
and a Build-to-Print strategy or GFE providers should be selected.
No acquisition strategy was found which was feasible for widespread forward commonality, and
it is not recommended that NASA attempt such an approach.
5.5 COMMENT ON CURRENT NASA STRATEGIES
The current NASA strategies were shown in dashed outline in Table 18 to Table 20. On average,
the strategies are reasonable (yellow) for reactive reuse and some common building block
strategies, but poor (red) for the widespread forward commonality. In part, this explains why
NASA has had more success with reactive reuse and common building block strategies.
However, it may also indicate that NASA's acquisitions are not well suited to widespread
forward commonality, so there has been little pressure on NASA to evolve acquisition structures
that promote widespread forward commonality.
In light of the research conducted for this thesis, it is likely to be both. There is little doubt that
NASA can obtain most of its theoretical potential commonality benefit through reactive reuse and
common building block strategies. The comments from the Constellation commonality team and
the launch vehicle case studies supported this.
Given this, it is not essential to remold NASA strategies to accommodate widespread forward
commonality approaches. However, more can be done to support system acquisitions where
reactive reuse or common building block strategies are expected.
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing the recommended acquisition strategies for
commonality within NASA, and listing the key findings of the thesis research before
recommending the next steps in finessing the detail of the best acquisition strategies. The further
work is probably best conducted from within NASA, given the detailed information on
architectures that is required.
6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A COMMONALITY-FOCUSED ACQUISITION STRATEGY
If NASA is serious about pursuing commonality as a major component of its exploration strategy,
current acquisition practice is at odds with architectural direction. The approach that sees NASA
as system integrator across multiple prime contractors, with each system competitively awarded
as it becomes needed, imposes significant obstacles to commonality best practice.
However, commonality is not a goal in itself. The acquisition strategies recommended for
commonality may cost more than the benefits of commonality. The strategies are designed to
encourage developers to only pursue commonality where it is cost effective, but the
implementation of the strategies themselves may be costly. The current NASA strategy based on
competition has been somewhat effective in developing complex spaceflight systems over the
past fifty years, and commonality based acquisition may well do worse.
An acquisition strategy for NASA in 2011 should give thought to the following recommendations
which, taken together, would support commonality better than traditional approaches.
1. NASA should focus on reactive reuse and common building block strategies for
commonality. The NASA acquisition task is too broad to suit widespread forward
commonality.
2. To implement reactive reuse, NASA should first identify any systems which are likely to
have significant commonality with existing systems. Then NASA should assess whether
it is possible to have a directed contractor develop that system.
3. To implement common building block commonality, NASA should focus on identifying
a small number of high-value candidate systems for common building block
commonality, and performing evaluation of commonality potential. For the potentially
common systems, NASA should establish one of two acquisition strategies:
a. For systems which NASA can design now and which will not change across the
different projects in the exploration architecture NASA should begin a "Build-to-
Print" acquisition strategy, complemented by lifecycle incentive payments and
commonality award fees.
b. For systems which NASA can identify as potentially common, but where a
separate contractor possesses the experience to design these systems or where
there is likely to be design changes through development, NASA should develop
acquisition structures to supply these systems as GFE. Again, lifecycle incentive
payments and commonality award fees will improve investment in forward
commonality.
4. The program-level contract and management structure must be built around a strong
system engineering team which has the vision and authority to force projects and systems
into performance-cost compromises that best represent value for the program.
5. NASA must build a strong commonality management team which has the authority and
experience to compel projects to take actions in the interests of the architecture as a
whole, even to the detriment of the project. That team should be involved from the outset
of the project, and their authority written into all architecture contracts.
6.3 FURTHER WORK
There is scope for further work to be conducted to build on this thesis. However, most of the
work is at a level of specificity most suitable for internal investigation at NASA, or by
researchers with complete access to NASA architecture plans. The three areas of future work are:
1. The acquisition strategies developed in this thesis work best if it is known in advance
whether reactive reuse, building block commonality or widespread forward commonality
will be most effective. Given the likely architectures NASA will adopt, which
commonality strategy should NASA shape its acquisition strategy towards? This analysis
should be based in part on the quantities and frequencies of production needed from the
essential exploration elements.
2. The acquisition strategies most suitable for commonality must be balanced against
acquisition strategies which have other benefits such as simplicity, affordability or
flexibility. What are the expected benefits of commonality across NASA's exploration
architecture, and how do these compare to the expected benefits from adopting
acquisition strategies less suitable for commonality?
3. GFE is proposed as a solution for building block commonality. There are a number of
NASA projects which have used GFE in the past, particularly on Constellation. These
projects would be a good source of detail and refinement on the GFE strategy.
6.4 CONCLUSION
There is no doubt there is potential for extensive use of commonality in space exploration
architectures, and strong potential benefit to be gained. Implementing that commonality,
however, requires support throughout development, and that support begins with an appropriate
acquisition strategy. No acquisition strategy is perfect for commonality, and of those that work
well some are at odds with the Federal Acquisition Regulations or NASA Procurement Policy.
There are, however, some strategies which work better than the traditional model of full
competition on all systems. The most promising strategies are to encourage reuse by preserving
the same system-level contractors over time, and to establish common building blocks by
developing them as build-to-print designs, GFE projects or through long-term suppliers.
Commonality is not a panacea for all exploration architecture ills. It requires careful forethought
and ongoing dedication to implementation. Commonality's reputation has suffered in the past
from overstated benefits and unforeseen drawbacks. In truth, its benefits are unlikely to be
spectacular, yet they are achievable and realistic and should not be discarded lightly. The cost
conscious space exploration of the twenty-first century cannot afford to ignore them. Appropriate
acquisition strategies lay the first stones along the path to space system commonality.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF SPECIFIC SCOPING INTERVIEWEES
Role / Title Organization Project Expertise
Professor, Space Systems Acquisition Defense Acquisition Defense Aerospace Systems
University
Electra Project Lead JPL ELECTRA (Common
Software Defined Radio for
Mars)
Engineer, Office of Chief Engineer JPL JPL Avionics Hardware
Research Associate Lean Aerospace Defense Acquisition Projects
Institute, MIT
Former Project Manager NASA Glenn Research Fluids and Combustion
Center Facility on Station
Cost Estimation, NASA ESMD NASA HQ Constellation Project
Associate Administrator, Acquisition NASA HQ NASA-wide
Supportability, Operability, Affordability NASA HQ Constellation Project
System Integration Group Lead
Manager, Exploration Systems Analysis NASA HQ Ongoing ESMD
Architectures
Section Manager General and Project NASA JPL JPL-wide
Accounting
Supervisor, Flight Hardware Logistics NASA JPL JPL FHLP
Program (FHLP)
Manager, FHLP NASA JPL JPL FHLP
Procurement Acquisition Manager NASA JPL Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter
JPL Acquisition Team NASA JPL JPL Flight Hardware
Logistics Program
Environmental Systems Lead NASA JSC Altair Lunar Lander
Former Chief Operating Officer Rolls Royce North GE-Rolls Royce joint work
America on F136 engine for F-35
Colonel (ret) USAF USAF Space Acquisitions
APPENDIX B: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ACQUISITION STRUCTURES
NASA Acquisition Requirements
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle (1) Splitting the work over several primes means
complex, expensive systems workload on each is less
Effective over development
times of at least a decade (I) Proven reasonably effective on (eg) Saturn LV
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
(1) NASA works closely with contractors
(1) NASA works closely with contractors
(U) NASA may spend all its time managing
contracts and lose system engineering skills
Overcome inter-center .
parochialism. (U) May run mto similar "silo-ing" problems asISS
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
(1) Each center can help manage a prime
Robust to year-by-year changiesI
Robs ty( c ngs ) This system has delivered space systems with
ifluctuating funding before
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
(I) Primes come and go as new projects start, so
internationals could be included
Allw commeral space (1) Prime contracts could be replaced with
companies to fit in overim commercial services over time
Architecture Level Strategy: Multiple Primes
|r
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
culture
React roueomn _on u ng ockI
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Cost/perf across whole systems that can beouplaned
family and lifer ycle frarc rjan n th pri am--
most concernedwit interface,
Frequent, often culture rte hnlotJlgcmo
Functions and
constraints of potential (W) Primes are un~kel to see
common syst em s outside their own system
N/A
(U) Primes have a good
Requirements from understanding of their own
interconnected systems interconnected systems, but no
understanding of the internal
system engineering of other primes
Identify functional (W) Primes do not see the
similarity / difference Rntoilr(wmnso h
bwmene hlin other syseams.
Perform systems ([) Primes are capable of doing the
engmneening system engineering on their own
Assess modifyingl system, but cannot touch the other
Anticipated use case
for all new systems
Unique lifecycle cost of
all new systems
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if
commonality is
beneficial
(U) Good at evaluating design /
manufacture costs. No incentive to
look at full lifecycle. Hampered by
lack of inputs.
(1) Primes will have cost and
reliability targets to meet, so will Infrequently entered
try to ree where nossible e
(U) Primes will have requirements Functions and
Requirements of for their system, but historically constraints of potential (W) Prins are unlkely to see
proposed system these can change drastically common systems outside their own system
(W) The Primes will only have
exposure to systems they (or theirN/
Form / function of subcontractors) have designed inN/A
existing systems the past
(U) Primes have a good
Requirements from understanding of their own
(I) Primes are good at system interconnected systems interconnected systems, but no
2 Requirements from engineering across their work understanding of the internal
c interconnected systems package system engineering of other primes
Assess performance
difference
Perform systems
___ engineering
o Assess modifying
existing item
Anticipated use case
for new system
Lifecycle cost estimate
of unique new system
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonality
is beneficial
(I) Primes are good at this, but need
to be incentivized to make
performance-cost trades where
necessary
(I) Primes are likely to have good
cost data on their systems, and will
be able to get use case from NASA.
Firm requirements help use case.
(U) Good at evaluating design /
manufacture costs. No incentive to
look at full lifecycle.
Identify functional (W) Primes do not see the
similarity / difference functional requirements of the
y building block In other 
systems.
Perform systems (I) Primes are capable of doing the
engineering system engineering on their own
Assess modifying system, but cannot touch the other
particular instances svstem
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonality
is beneficial
(U) Good at evaluating design /
manufacture costs, No incentive to
look at full lifecycle. Hampered by
lack of inputs.
N/A Continuous Identify
N/A Low icentive to identify/evatuate
IN/A
(W) Pirimesmay not have access to
Manufacture / Modify 11P for reuse; "a be concerned
existing syste m abou Hai
Manage divergence Noincentive to manage divergence
Incremental Firm requirements
Improvements to Architecture-wide knowledge
Strategy repository
Strong commonality team
N/A Continuous Evaluate
Effect of divergence on (W) Cannot see other family Effect of divergence on {
other family members members. other family members i
(W) Which prim manufactures?{Manufacture / Modify W tk i for Manufacture mostly
existing system resnsilmi aten-scoste common systems
Manage divergence Manage divergence
No incentive to manage divergence and convergence
Incremental Incentives
Improvements to
Strategy IP protection
Good svstem eneineerine
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
KEY
(1) Process / input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
input will be achieved
(W) Uncertain whether process/
i- -N - -,kA
Broad acquisition considerations
Acquisition Affordability This isa standard acquisition atfucture, so the affordability is unlikely to be different from space systems in the past.
Political Risk Low
Regulatory Feasibility This structuer Is tried and tested. There would be very little regulatory resistance.
Additional comments
_W
.............. 1 1 _ . . - ....  .. .
React we 
reuse
C 
b d 
b
Architecture Level Strategy: NASA with assistance from SETA
Note: Assumes system integrator is incentivized towards affordability goals
NASA cquisition Requirements Reactive reuse Common building block Widespread Forward Commonality
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
(I) Work split between primes; system
Integrator takes some responsibility too
(1) System integrator is a more subtle role than
lead prime, and less likely to be politically
troublesome. Also easier to replace.
(I) This removes bottlenecks at the prime level
by having multiple primes, and NASA level by
having an assistant integrator. Ukely to be
expensive, however.
NASA isin some contact with the contractors; it
may even be able to focus more on engineering
and less on system engineering
NASA isin some level of contact with
contractors
(U) The system integrator will have HSF
experience, however they will tend to lose that
experience over time as they focus more on
project management-than production.
Overcome rc m (U) System integrator may act as a go-between
to smooth any inter-center rivalries
Allocate some work across a
ten NASA centen
Robust to year-by-year changes becaseW**hetre 4Wt fovrght My
in funding moa funding 4rp aueo funding dops
because lesn bebllt each ye ar.
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors There are still multiple primes taking on work.
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
culture
Requirements ofi
proposed system I
Form / function 01
existing systems
(1) Individual primeswill be
Interested in cost/relability up-
Generaly old designs suitable for
reuse are not more likely to come
out due to system integrator
Requirements from (1) System integrator can provideEl interconnected systems this information
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Infrequently entered
(1) System integrator is incentivized
to look across the whole family.
Assuming system integrator has
authority to tweak requirements
and contracts (closer to a prime)
then it can effectively enforce the
hmlvilew. .
Functions and
constraints of potential (I) System integratorcan
common systems communicate this
Many systems /
components
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Frequent, often culture
(1) System integrator Is incentivized
to look across the whole family.
Assuming system integrator has
authority to tweak requirements
and contracts (closer to a prime)
then it can effectilvely enforce the
.ucon andFunctions and
constraints of potential (1) System integrator can
common systems communicate this
4 i- I
Requirements from (1) System integrator caninterconnected systems communicate this
Requirements from
interconnected systems
I-
Identify functional Identify functional
Assess performance similarity / difference similarity / difference
difference
Primes can perform this function. Primes can perform this function.
Perform systems May need additional lifecycle cost Perform systems May need additionallifecycle cost
Perform systems engineering incentives to achieve this (or give engineering incentives to achieve this (or give
engineering Primes can perform this function. the system integrator authority to the system integrator authority to
Assess modifying Up-frontcost/reliability is probably Assess modifying direct the prime, and incentivize Assess modifying direct the prine, and incentivize
existing item enough to incentivize this. particular instances the system integrator) particular instances the system integrator)
Anticipated use case Anticipated use case for Anticipated use case
for new system System integrator should be all new systems (I) System integrator can for all new systems (1) System integrator can
Lifecycle cost estimate responsible for lifecycle costs and Unique lifecycle cost of communicate this and track Unique lifecycle cost of communicate this and track
of unique new system use cases. all new systems lifecycle costs all new systems lifecycle costs
Evaluate commonalityEvaluate commonality Evaluate commonalityvlaec nlt benefits and detriments benefits and detriments
benefits and detriments (U) Good at evaluating design / (U) Goad at evaluating design (U) Good at evaluating design
manufacture costs. No incentive to manufacture costs. No incentive to manufacture costs. No incentive to
colt atfull lifecyde. Evaluate if commonality look at full lifecycle. Evalte if atfull lifecycle.
Evaluate if commonality is benetiial beneficialis beneficial
N/A Continuous Identify
0 N/A
E N/A other family members communicatetis otherfamilymembers cotnhiicatethis
(U) Primes may not have access to (W) Which pr me m anufacture
Manufacture / Modify IP for reuse; may be concerned Manufacture / Modify M a mostly
existing system about liability existing system -h
Manage (ISystem ntegrator can manage Manage divergence ( tegratorcnimanae
Maaedivergence No incentive to manage divergence Manage divergence diegneand convergence dvrec
Incremental Incremental System inttegrator must have Incremental
Improvements to Lifecycle cost incentive Improvements to significant authority Improvements toSEffect ofSystem integratdorigNASA may need Ssmnea
ty GFE type solution-
KEY
(1) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
innut will he achieved
I
........ 
......
Broad acquisition considerations
(U) The sole prime will realize synergies and management efficiencies, but the lack of effective competition may lead
Acquisition Affordability to poor cost, performance or schedule results.
Political Risk bids
(W) it wiN be d kifilt to guaraintes the roie of the primef %vr-h time* perio w0thot recmeigthe contract
Regulatory Feasibility Policy chainges ay trra rebi fthe cointract.
Interviewees suggested the prime contractor should not be allowed to allocate work to itself. Also, lifecycle cost
incentives may be difficult because the prime is likely to collect all the information required for assessing lifecycle
Additional comments costs.
Architecture Level Strategy: Single TSPR Prime
Note: Assumes the prime hos at least development cost/schedule incentives
NASA cquisition Requirements Reactive rouse Common building block Widespread Forward Commonality
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
(U) This is significant work for a single prime to
take on. It is probably a more difficult
integration task than anvthine DreviousIv.
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor .
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
(U) The system integrator will have HSF
Give System integrator(s) experience, however they will tend to lose that
enough HSF experience xperience over time as they focus more on
project management than production.
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
-funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
paroch Ism
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
contractor
(U) NASA has less control over who builds what
at the same time, the more commercial
structure favors the lower bidders with less
regard for nationality.
(U) NASA has less control over the integration
of commercial space companies, and
competitive pressures may keep them out;
however iftheir product is truly better the
prime is likely to award them the contract.
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
culture
(1) Assuming some cost / schedule
incentives, prime is likely to
encourage cost / reliability reuse
over corporations seeking new
developments f the existing wll
do
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
(1) Assuming cost / schedule
incentives from NASA as customer,
prime can look over whole
exploration architecture and
develop building block strategies.Infrequently entered Needsconsistent, fixed
Many systems /
components
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Frequent, often culture
rt F * 4~'~ I.
Requirements of
proposed system
Form Ifunction of
existing systems
Requirements from
interconnected systems
(U) The sole prime loses NASA's
historical perspective on good
designs. Reuse from other parts of
the system is likely to be
encouraged.
(I) The sole prime is relatively good
at managing the systems
engineering communication
Functions and (I) Prime is likely to be in charge
constraints of potential over full architecture d velopment.
common systems If incentivized, prime could look
forward to future functions.
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
(1) Prime can achieve this with
adequate incentives. Likely to still
overstate benefits at outset (egJSP). Incentivesshould cover full
liecycle.
(I) Prime is likely to be in charge
over full architecture d velopment.
if incentivlsed, prime could look
forward to future functions.
(I) The sole prime is relatively good (I) The sole prime is relatively goodRequirements from at managing the systems Requirements from at managing the systemsinterconnected systems interconnected systems
Identify functional Identify functional
Assess performance similarity / difference similarity / difference
difference
(1) With incentives, the sole prime I (1) With incentives, the sole prime is (1) With incentives, the sole prime h
able to undertake this. Perform systems able to undertake this. Perform systems Able to undertake this.
Perform systems engineering engineering
e-engineening
Assess modifying Assess modifying Assess modifying
existing item particular instances particular instances
Anticipated use case Anticipated use case for Anticipated use case
for new system (U) Prime may be less concerned all new systems for all new systems
o Lifecycle cost estimate about lifecycle costs unless it is Unique lifecycle cost of (1) Prime develops use case and Unique lifecycle cost of (I) Prime develops use case and
of unique new system incentivized. all new systems cost analysis for all systems all new systems cost analysis for all systems
E Evaluate commonality Evaluate commonality
- Evaluate commonality benefits and detnments benefits and detrimentsa benefits and detnments () Assuming inputs are available,
the prime wil be relatively good at
evaluation Evaluate if commonalityvaluate ift Ecommonality isEvaluate if commonality is beneficial () With incentives, the sole primes beneficial ()Withinctivesthesoleprimesis beneficial able to undertake this. ale to undertake t.
N/A Continuous Identify
N/A (1) Primewil perform thee tasks if
N/A Continuous Evaluate likely incentive payoffs outweigh
N/Amanagement costs
Effect of divergence on (1) Sole prime Is liktely to be able to Effect of divergence on (1) Sole prime is lkely to be able to
other family members assess divergence Impsacts across other family members assessclivergence impacts across
-
(W) May be difficult for prime tosecurechitecturegtte wrthttectted
Manufacture / Modify () IF will begenerated uring t Manufacture mostly (1) w wi begenerated uring the
Manufacture /Modify NAAkrovretadcmeiie existing system time the is In~ control and common systems time the prime Is In control and
existing system e e igi e .therefore can be plannedfr therefore canbeplnned for
(1) Divergence will Impact up-front (1) Divergence wiell impart ulpfronit
WillMaag mangeergegeneceuWill manage divergence if Manage divergence cost on futsre systems, therefore Mngdieececost on future systems, therefore
Manage divergence incentivied to do so prime likelyto controlt. and convergence prime elyto controlIt
Incentives on cost / schedule /Incentives on cost / schedule
Incremental reliability Incremental reliability Incremental Full lifecycle cost incentives
Improvements to Incentives on lifecycle cost Improvements o Incentives on lifecycle cost Improvements o
Strategy Wide IP rights for NASA, passed Strategy Strategy
through to sole prime. I_____I 
____I____I_
Broad acquisition considerations
(U) The sole prime wil realize synergies and management efficiencies, but the lack of effective competition may lead
Acquisition Affordability to poor cost, performance or schedule results.
(W) There ks high nnlitiral risk. Primes nnt rhocen will lkk ennourge rnngeass na at of th wnnngPolitical Risk
Regulatory Feasibility Poicy changes may trier a red of the contract
Interviewees uggested the prime contractor should not be allowed to allocate work to itself. Also, lifecycle cost
incentives may be difficult because the prime is likely to collect all the information required for assessing lifecycle
Additional comments costs.
KEY
(1) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
input will be achieved
(W) Uncertain whether process/
1* I 4
I(W) *wesybkee the work towards ane prim
I I ....... ...
Architecture Level Strategy: Commercial and NASA in Alliance
NASA cquisition Requirements Reactive rmuse Common building block Widespread Forward Commonality
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
(U) Only one or two prime contractors at most
under this structure. High workload for those
companies.
(U) This is roughly double the duration of a
usual alliance contract - but that does not
necessarily make it unworkable.
(1) Contractor and NASA work extremely closely
under this structure
(I) Contractor and NASA work extremely closely
under this structure
(l)System integrator likely to be a blend of NASA
and contractor personnel
(U) Contractor will take significant risk, which
may require private funding
Subcontnators under the alliance will stll be
able to be funded
(U) NASA and contractor will share the impact
of funding changes, so may be robust.
However, contractor must first accept the risks
of project funding cancellation.
Subcontractors under the alliance will still be
able to be funded
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
culture
(1) Assuming some cost / schedule
incentives, both prime and NASA
are likely to encourage cost/
,an1unei... 
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Many systems /
components
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
(1) NASA wil push paftners/ (1) ASA will push partners /
Infrequently entered contractors to realize cost/ Frequent, often culture contactors to realize cost /
erfnema n e nerrnIet efarvel nrarne r omduct lifacude.
Functions and Functions and
Requirements of constraints of potential (1) NASA / Prime alliance can gather constraints of potential (1) NASA / Prim allance can gather
proposed system common systems information on systems common systems information on systems
Form / function of (1) NASA can contribute itsN/A
existing systems knowledge on existing systems.
(1) The sole prime is relatively good (1) Prime and NASA both skilled In (1) Prime and NASA both skiled in
Requirements from at manang the systems Requirements from system engineering/ requirements Requirements from system engineering / requirement
Rieronnetensytms o ineing sminterconnected systems interconnected systems
Identify functional Identify functional
Assess performance similarity / difference similarity / difference
difference (I) With incentives, the sole prime is
Perform systems able to undertake this. Perform systems Perform systems
engineering engineering (1) Prime and NASA both skilled in engineering (1) Prime and NASA both skilled in
Assess modifying Assess modifying system engineering / requirements Assess modifying system engineering / requirements
existing item particular instances communication particular instances communication
Anticipated use case Anticipated use case for Anticipated use case
for new system (1) NASA will be concerned with all new systems (I) NASA has long-range view of for all new systems (1) NASA has long-range view of
Lifecycle cost estimate lifecycle costs and help with Unique lifecycle cost of systems to perform lifecycle cost Unique lifecycle cost of systems to perform lifecycle cost
of unique new system modeling all new systems and use case studies all new systems and use case studies
Evaluate commonality Evaluate commonalityEvaluate commonality benefits and detriments benefits and detriments
benefits and detriments (1) Assuminginputs are available, (1) Assuming inputs are available, (I) Assuming inputs are available,
the prime will be relatively good at the prime will be relatively good at the prime will be relatively good at
evaluation Evaluate if commonality evaluation Evaluate ifevaluation
~ Evauatecommonalify is
Evaluate if commonality is beneficial beneficial
is beneficial
N/A
N/A Continuous Identify
/AN/A Continuous Evaluate (I) The alliance will lecentivize these
N/A if necessary
E Effect of divergence on Effect of divergence on
.a other family members (1) The alliance has visibility over other family members (1) The aillance havisibility over
other family members and can other family members and can
N/A assess divergence asses avrgence
Manufacture / Modify (U) NASA will need to acquire IP
existing system rights for the reuse
Meaae divergence
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
(1) Up-front cost-reliability benefits
motivate minliizing divearge e
Strong negotiation of IP rights
IP will be created during project,Manufacture / Modify i toidecde who
existing system manufactures
Manage divergence
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
(1) Overall alliance perspective on
lifecycle costs incentivizes
minimizing diveence
IP willb created during project,Manufacture mostly Alliance wil need to decide who
common systems
(1) overall alliance perspective onManage divergence lifecycle costs incentivizes
and convergence minimizinadiveraence
Manavedive-nce mnimIncrementalnc
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
A - __ _ __ _ __ _I - __ _ __ _ __ _
KEY
(1) Process / input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
a
Broad acquisition Considerations
(U) When alliance contracts work, they perform well. However, when they fail they usually turn spectacularly-
Acquisition Affordability wrong. This approach would be a gamble by NASA.
Political Risk the alliance struiiture indxsightil itfalls.
(W) This structure ddes not apparta have been tried In US Govemnrt Contracting. It willprobably meet
Regulatory Feasibility significnt res ice.
lAdditional commentsI
System Level Structure: Fully Competitive
Common buildine bok
Rectv reus Como buldn blc
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle (I) Se ected contractors are likely to
complex, expensive systems be competent.
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in (U) Changing contractors makes
contractor reliability reliability difficult
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between up-front and
recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
rsoousi so year-oy-year cnangesRobust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow international partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
culture
Requirements of
proposed system
(I) Up-front cost / reliability Is likely
to incentivize contractors to
consider some reactive reuse
(1) Contractor can see its own
requirements
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Infrequently entered
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
Many systems/
components
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Frequent, often culture
Functions ant
constraints of potentia
common system!
Form / function of (W) Contractor Is unlikely to have a N/A
existing systems good view of many existing systems
I Requirements from
interconnected systems
Assess performance
difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
existing item
Anticipated use case
for new system
E Lifecycle cost estimate
s . of unique new system
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
O Evaluate if commonality
is beneficial
N/A
Manufacture / Modify
existing system
Manage divergence
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
(1) Contractor can see Its own
Interconnected systems
Contractor is capable of making this
trade
(U) The contractor may not have
enough information about the use
case or lifecycle cost to undertake
analysis
(1) Contractor Is capable of making
this trade, incentivized by up-front
cost/ relablilty
Centra.lized knowledge repository
Good systems engineering
IP Provisions
Incentives for up-front cost /
reliability like fixed price
Requirements from (W) Contractor cannot see other Requirements from (W) Contractor cannot see other
interconnected systems Interconnected systems interconnected systems interconnected systems
Identify functional
similarity / difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
oarticular instances
Anticipated use case for
all new systems
Unique lifecycle cost of
all new systems
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonality
is beneficial
Effect of divergence on
other family members
Manufacture / Modify
existing system
Manage divergence
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
Assuming it had the inputs,
contractor is capable of making this
trade
Contractor is capable of making this
trade
The fully competitive strategy is not
a good starting point for building
block commonality so no
improvements were considered.
Identify functional
similarity / difference
Perform systems
engineenn
Assess modifying
Darticular instances
Anticipated use case
for all new systems
Unique lifecycle cost of
all new systems
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if
commonality is
Assuming it had the Inputs,
contractor is capable of making this
trade
Contractor is capable of making this
trade
Continuous Identifi
Continuous Evaluate
Effect of divergence or
other family members
Manufacture mostly
common systems
Manage divergence
and convergence
The fully competitive strategy is notIncremental a good starting point for building
Improvements to block commonality so no
Strategy improvements were considered.
KEY
(1) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
input will be achieved
(W) Uncertain whether process/
NASA cquisition Requirements Reactive reuse
Broad acquisition considerations
Acquisition Affordability
Political Risk
Regulatory Feasibility
Additional comments
.
*
(W) No visil"tyW No visibility
,
(W) No visibility
(W) No visibility across the rest of
the product family or lIfecycle
System Level Strategy: Joint Venture
NASA Acquisition Requirements Reactive reuse Common building block Widespread Forward Commonality
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems (1) Jincreases resources
Effective over development (U) Vs are more likely to fragment than sole
times of at least a decade companies
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
(U) V creates new culture, risk of quality
changes; however can also pool knowledge
(I) N allow two companies to survive even if
market wouldn't support them independently
Single systems or
components
Up front cost I reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
culture
Requirements of
proposed system
Form / function of
existing systems
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole JV not incentivized to look forward
Sikf ufit c family and lifecycle across the lifecycle without cost
reliability savings, esp if fixed $ incentive
Infrequently entered
Depends on customer
(1) N has good visibility across its
members' prut
Requirements from (1) Relies on system engineering,
v.E interconnected systems improved ifV does system eng
Functionsand (t)Niellk.lytobekn~monopolyFunctions and (1) JV is likely to bein a monopoly
constraints of potential position so comfortable to look
common systems forward to future systems.
N/A
Requirements from (I) Relies on system engineering,interconnected systems improved ifN does system eng
Many systems /
components
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Frequent, often culture
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
N nlikely to take on system
Requirements engineering outside its own
interconnected systems
Assess performance identify functional IV notincentiviz.4tolook forward Identify functional
difference identify commonalitiesto similarity/ difference rsthlecyewithoutcost similarity/difference
aamsystems (I ilPerform systems Perform systemsacostelfyc whutot
engineering realize up-ront CO svings bt engineering engineeringic v
Asesmdfigwill not go further in the lifecycleAssess modifying illotgofuhei efe e Assess modifying Assess modifying
existing item particular instances particular instances
Anticipated use case Anticipated use case for Anticipated use case
4 for new system Depends on ystemsengneering all new systems for all new system~s
ifecycle cost estimate (sJV should be able to estimate Unique lifiecycleicoste to lnok foward ttitive to look foUfrw
a e costPerformisystemse acrUssutheifeecyce eowttofutocost
W *g of unique new system uniqueost all new systems funugensystes all new systemse
L Evaluate commonalify Evaluate commonality Evaluate commonality
Lu benefits and detriments benefits and detriments benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonality N i c spable tEaut if commonality ifEvaais beneficial i t is enia cm nal
N/A N/A Continuous Identify (U) Noincentiveto conttinulaflye
Anticiy/pavtuafuseutcnoserrfor
N/A N/A Continuous Evaluate to it within tie system
(1) IV has a good view of thwet
Effect of divergence on Effect of divergence on of vergen ithinRts own5
other family members No incentive to look forward to
a neN/A future systemsth
0b () Prevents twdcoipletely(U) V should have the P and Manufacture/Mododifferent systems fnom sy M est
liability for the system; but shared Manufacturei/eModifybhoweverMunnufecyce costof
anlexisting system b commonsystems (U) V not incentivizedto manage
Manufctur / Mdify se culd e coteste witout l~dtS tiEvaluatedvercecemionoslplu
existing system strong NASA negotiators. subontractoroutcome
Nlo incentiveto mnbge Manage divergence
ManEvauat ifegec
EvManage divergence No incentive to te anage divergence vergence. and convergence 
i V to include system engineering if V incentive to look across full JV incentive to look across full
Incremental possible Incremental lifecycle Incremental ( incentive to corwanualo
Improvements to dV to be across wide range of Improvements to Improvements to
Strategy systems Strategy future systems strategy future systems(V needs incentive to reuse
Manufactue/Modif Strong commonaltiy team t I I
Broad acquisition considerations
(U) The JV may decrease competition and therefore increase pnces. It may also reduce duplication of eftort and
management overheads. Good system engineering and insight from NASA will reduce the drawbacks from a lack of
Acquisition Affordability competition, but NASA time and resources decrease affordability.
(U) Creating or allowing JVs will attract attention from policiticians and industry groups. There is an element of
Political Risk political risk.
It is feasible to use Vs as acquisition strategies. The V should only be used where the market is willing to form the
Regulatory Feasibility N without pressure from NASA
The N is of limited use because of the few times it can be used. However, it is an effective commonality vehicle if it
Additional comments is combined with the right incentive structure.
KEY
(I) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
inn"ii will ho arhi"ev*
System Level Strategv: Directed Contractor
NASA Acquisition Requirements Reactive reuse Common building block Widespread Forward Commonality
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability c
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
1) NASA's previous work with this
ubcontractor will be retained
1) NASA has previously worked with this
ontractor and is confident in output
(U) Retaining an existing contractor makes it
likely the supervisory work will be done by the
same NASA center, but this may not be
widespread
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time
Single systems or
components
g Up front cost / reliability
Requirements from
interconnected systems
Assess performance
difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
existing item
Anticipated use case
for new system
Lifecycle cost estimaie
of unique new system
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonalityiL is beneficial
(1) A subcontractor is likely to see
benefit in reusing its own designs;
it has visibility, and reliability, at
least, as an incentive (cost also
under fixed price contract)
(1) The directed subcontractor has
good visibility into itsown designs
and the new requirements.
(W) The structure doesn't assist
with performancost trades
(1) Subcontractor should be well
placed to assess its previous design
Subcontractor can't go outside its
own system to do sys eng trade
(I) Subcontractor should be well
placed to assess modification cost
Requires goodsystem engineering
(1) Subcontractor should be well
placed to assess unioue cost
(U) Subcontractor has most of the
information to do this, but is not
incentivized to consider beyond its
own involvement in the lifecycle.
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Infrequently entered
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
N/A
Requirements from
interconnected systems
Identify functional
similarity / difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
Darticular instances
(U) Directed subcontractor can took
back in time at previous projects
but cannot look forward because it
is only engaged to work on a single
system at a time.
Anticipated use case for '-'
all new systems
Unique lifecycle cost of (1] Sul:
all new systems future
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments (W) G
to cmr
Evaluate if commonality instari
is beneficial acrOs
Many systems /
components (U) Can only operate on the
Cost/perf across whole systems / components which are in
family and lifecycle its system; no incentive to look
Frequent, often culture forward; low barriers to forwardFreqent ofen ultr ,nxxinathil,h
(W) Directed subcontractar cannot Functions
o fconstraints of pote
stems. I common syst
N/A
(W) The structure doesn't assst
Requirements from With perforimancost trades
interconnected systems across subconitractor-prime
- bounidares
identify functional
similarity / difference(USucnrtocaotlk
Perform syste ms (U)waSubcontrc canotook
engineening fo rrd buthn dto system s
Assess modifying : n ihnisonsses
particular instances
Anticipated use case (W) Subcontractor unfikelyto
fralnwssesdevelop a spurn that looks
fralnwssesforward to new future system
Unique lifecycle cost of (1) Subcontractor could consider
all new systems future costs if incentivized to
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments (W Directed M~bontractor is
toW concentrate en the parucu
Evaluate if instancedtherthan weghftn
commonality is actoss the$ whole faipilly
beneficial
Contnuos Idntiy () No incentive to continually
N/A N/A Continuous Evaluate
May be able to assess impact of
Effect of divergence on divergenceonexisting system, butother family members notother family membersN/ohe fa il e bersytem
(U) Subcontractor already has all
I Manufacture / Modify the IP and liability for the system. Manufacture mostly
Manufactre / m However, without incentives aManufacture / Modify (I) Subcontractor already has all the common subcontractor is unlikely
existing system 1P and liability forthe system. to produce common systems
Manaee~~~ div r ontratomnderec not ncotlu
_1 , u
Incremental
Improvements to Fixed price contract
Strategy Good sys eng,
Manage divergence(W ot
Incremental
Improvements tc
Strategy
Directed subcontractor is not a
good strategy for developing
common building blocks if the
systems which use the building
blocks are offset significantly in
time
dentify / evaluate, but no barriers
to it within the system
Manage divergenci
a d o I
Incremental Directed subcontractor is not a
Improvements to good strategy for developing
Strategy widespread forward commonality
as there is no forward-looking
component
KEY
(1) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
input will be achieved
(W) Uncertain whether process /
Broad acquisition considerations
(U) Relationship with directed contractor must be carefully managed because the contractor can be in a monopoly
Acquisition Affordability position. Difficult to tell whether efficiencies from single contractor outweigh the lifting of market price pressures.
(W) Directing particular subcontractors favors the incumbent contractors and so it is open to political attack. Also
Political Risk p ms th oeietiinefrnintesplchiofherm,
Regulatory Feasibility take longer than that to develop.
Implementation of a directed subcontractor arrangement raises issues of responsibility between government and
Additional comments prime contractor. May consume management time or sour relationship between government and prime.
n c nvegen
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System Level Stratexy: Lona-Term Supplier
NASA Acquisition Requirements Reactive reuse Common building block Widespread Forward Commonality
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
I) Learning benefits should make work faster
) NASA's previous work with this
ubcontractor will be retained
1) NASA has previously worked with this
ontractor and is confident in output
U)Winning contractor has a long term revenue
stream; however also reduces competition,
which may send some contractors out of the
ndustry.
(U) A specialist subcontractor would have
multiple centers working with the specialist
over time. This could increase cooperation or
ereatp moire frictinn between centers.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow intemational partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
Isolated incidents or
(I) Specialist has good visibility over
previous projects
(U) Depends on risk-reward profile
(how risk averse isspecialist?)
I) Both predawith secialist
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Infrequently entered
(I) High cost systems with common
potential are the type that a
specialist would be created for.
infrequent entry works well with
the high cost of setting up a
Many systems /
components
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Frequent, often culture
(I) Within its own system, the
specialist can plan commonality for
thefuture. This maymiss more
wipcaeed enmmnnalitv thauch.
.- r-- - - . - -
(U) Specialist knows it will obtain
Functions and (I) Specialist knows it will obtain Functions and future work and therefore can
constraints of potential future work and therefore can constraints of potential demand / acton information on
Requirements of (1) Specialist can see its own common systems demand / act on information on common systems future systems. However cannot
proposed system requirements future system see outside its own system
Form / function of (1) Specialist has good visibility over N/A N/A
existing systems its own previous projects
Requirements from Depends on quality of system Requirements from Depends on quality of system Requirements from Depends on quality of system
interconnected systems enginterconnected systems interconnected systems
Assess performance (I) Speclst should be well placed Identify functional (1) Specialist can assess future Identify functional (U) As for common building block,
difference to assess its previous design similarity / difference systems as it has insight into them similarity / difference but with additional drawback that
Perform systems Specialist can't go outside its own Perform systems Specialist can't go outside its own Perform systems specialist may not be incentivized
engineering system to do sys eng trade engineering system to do sys eng trade engineering to develop the recurring,
Assess modifying (1) Specialist should be well placed Assess modifying (1) Specialst should be well placed Assess modifying continuous evaluation of
existing item to assess modification cost particular instances to assess modification cost particular instances commonality needed.
Anticipated use case Dependspanqualityof system Anticipated use case for Dystem Anticipated use case Depe
for new system engineering all new systems engineering for all new systems engineering
Unique lifecycle cost of Unique lifecycle cost ofE Lifecycle cost estimate (I) Specialist should have the all new systems (1) Specialist should have the all new systems (1) Specialst should have the
s of unique new system engineering detail to assess this engineering detail to assess this engineering deta to assess this
Evaluate commonality Evaluate commonality (U) As for common building block,
Evaluate commonality benefits and detriments (1) Specialist will evaluate the benefits and detriments but with additional drawback that
benefits and detriments Specialist-is capable of doing this, development cost benefits over all specialist may not be Incentivized
but needs incentive to evaluate the the elements in the system. Still Evaluate if to develop the recurring,
Evaluate if commonality ful lifeccle rather than just Its own i nalrequires incentives to evaluate full commonality is continuous evaluation of
ris beneficial d manufacture . isbneiia e beneficial commonality needed.
N/AContinuous Idenify (U) Needs incentives to do this that
N/A Continuous Evaluate may not bepresentotherwise.
(1) Specialist has a good view of the
Effect of divergence on (I) Specialist can look forward to Effect of divergence on Impact of divergence within its own
other family members impact of divergence on future other family members system. Good sys eng helps expand
E N/A _systems this view.
Manufacture / Modify (l) Specialist already has all the IP
existing system Iand liability for the system.
Manage divergee
(U) Specialist not incentivized to
manage divergence if cost plus
Manufacture / Modify
existing system
(U) Specialist already has all teIP
and liability for the system.
However, without incentives a
common subcontractor is unlikely
to produce common systems
.I(U) Specialist not incentivized toManage divergence 1manag divergence if cost plus
Manufacture mostly
common systems
Manage divergence
and convergence
Manage- divergence-
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
Fixed cost contracts
Incentives to consider reuse
Good system engineering
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
Firm requirements
Good system engineering
Incentives to develop building block
Incentives to manage divergence
Broad acquisition considerations KEY
(U) Relationship with specialist subcontractor must be carefully managed because the contractor can be in a
monopoly position. Difficult to tell whether efficiencies from single contractor outweigh the lifting of market price (1) Process / input likely to be
Acquisition Affordability pressures. Leader-folower contracts are an option here to increase cost but reduce risk achieved
W Th Ida o a pecilis suconractr o acuistio timfrarie ofdecalie is" t prookesigifiant(U) Uncertain whether process /F
Political Risk debate in NASA Senate / Conglressional hearings. input will be achieved
Regulatory Feasibility (W The lac of come*iio in this st""*"'" wo"l ma" i* ' 'd"ffi"u*" **ucur ""* g """ tr u thAI^twilbahee
Additional comments
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
(U) Specialist not incentivized to
manage divergence if cost plus
Firm requirements
Good system engineering
Incentives to assess full lifecycle
commonality impact
Incentives to manage divergence
,: I . ....................
System Level Strategv: Build-to-Print
rri
NASA Acquisition Requirements
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow international partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
(1) NASA's specification of form I
implies deep input into the design a
(I) Selecting two contractors for
one system divides the work.
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
isolated incidents or
culture
Requirements of
proposed system
Form / function of
existing systems
g Requirements from
.l interconnected systems
Reactive reuse
The system integrator
(requirements writer) manages the
entry gateway, contractors have no
choice
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Infrequently entered
(I) The contractor is given direct constraintsu o ptnt al
insight into the system that is to be common systems
mVade commn snrough te
specification of form. Assumes
system integrator has correctly
Identified commonality
Assess performance (U) The contractor isnot given any
difference latitude to perform system engineering
Perform systems Ibecause the form is specified. This is
engineering
Assess modifying
existing item
Anticipated use case
for new system
Lifecycle cost estimate
of unique new system
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonality
is beneficial
acceptable only if the evaluation was done
at the system integrator level before
requirements were written
(U) The contractor has no latitude
to perform commonality
evaluation. This is acceptable only
if the evaluation was done at the
system integrator level before
requirements were written.
N/A
Requirements from
interconnected systems
Identify functional
similarity / difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
particular instances
Anticipated use case for
all new systems
Unique lifecycle cost of
all new systems
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
Evaluate if commonality
is beneficial
Common buildine lok
The system integrator manages the
entry gateway, contractors have no
choice
(U) The contractor is given direct
insight into the system that is to be
made common. Breaks down if
there are any future systems that
may need to use the same system
and the system integrator hasn't
identified them.
(U) Relies on system integrator to
make the cost-perfomance trades.
(U) The contractor has no latitude
to perform commonality
evaluation. This is acceptable only
if the evaluation was done at the
system integrator level before
requirements were written.
Many systems,
component
Cost/perf across wholi
family and lifecyck
Frequent, often culturn
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
N/A
Requirements from
interconnected systems
Identify functional
similarity / difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
particular instances.oatcua isane
Anticipated use case
for all new systems
Unique lifecycle cost of
all new systems
Evaluate commonality
benefits and detriments
r-valuale R
commonality is
N/A N/A Continuous identify
N/A N/A Continuous Evaluate
Manufacture / Modify
existing system
Effect of divergence on
other family members
Manufacture / Modify
existing system
(W The contractor has no
appreciation for synerigies with the
Effect of divergence on
other family members
Manufacture mostly
common systems
other commown system and s Manage divergence (W) The contractor has no insihi Manage divergence
cannot manage divergence Into the other common system and_ and convergence ,
Manage divergence effectively. so cannot manage divergence. so cannot manage divergence.
Incremental Good system engineering (identify Incremental Good system engineering (identify Incremental
Improvements tc the right opportunities) Improvements tc the right opportunities) Improvements to
Strategy Strong commonality team This is an unrealistic structure for(divergence) (divergence) St Widespread Forward Commonality
Broad acquisition considerations
Puts significant work on the system integrator in defining precisely the requirements and managing the
Acquisition Affordability contractors through development
Political Risk Presents very low political risk
Reasonably feasible, except that the FAR prefers to see major projects undertaken with function-based
Regulatory Feasibility requirements, not form-based.
0 Additional comments
Commonality exploration phase
KEY
(I) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
input will be achieved
(W) Uncertain whether process
Common buildina block
r --- I
;r I I
I -
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System Level Strategy: GFE
NASA Acquisition Requirements
Fund research and development
Tolerate cost/schedule overruns
exceeding initial estimates.
Prime contractors can handle
complex, expensive systems
Effective over development
times of at least a decade
Deliver first flight within a decade
Allow NASA to impart its HSF
experience to contractor
Give NASA confidence in
contractor reliability
Give System integrator(s)
enough HSF experience
Balance between architectural
up-front and recurring costs.
Not depend heavily on private
funding in the product lifecycle
Allow corporations to make a
profit on small projects
Overcome inter-center
parochialism.
Allocate some work across all
ten NASA centers
Robust to year-by-year changes
in funding
Allow work to be divided
between the major contractors
Allow international partners to fit
into the acquisition over time
Allow commercial space
companies to fit in over time.
(W) Scheckdesusn the GFE projectwill
(U) GIFE at start may be obselete by the end of
the project
(W) The GFE must be deveoned first, stretchinnel
the timetable.
(1) NASA only has to become confident in GFE
once.
(I) System integrators could take on small GFE
projects
(U) Hardware developed by one center would
be integrated into projects at other centers.
This could either increase cooperation or create
more friction between centers.
Reactive reuse
Single systems or
components
Up front cost / reliability
improvements
isolated incidents or
culture
Requirements of
proposed system
Form / function o
existing systems
Requirements from
C interconnected systems
Assess performance
difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
existing item
From a reuse perspective, GFE Is
simply a contractor developing a
system. It doesnt offer any
particular advantages over a
competitive contract.
The GFE contractor is not selected
for particular insight into any
previous systems.
(1) There is a slight incentive
towards identifying good reuse
opportunities because the effort of
identification by the contractor will
be spread over several systems.
High cost systems with
clear comm potential
Cost/perf across whole
family and lifecycle
Infrequently entered
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
N/A
Requirements from
interconnected systems
Identify functional
similarity / difference
Perform systems
engineering
Assess modifying
particular instances
Common building block
(1) GFE will be used across the
family, and is usually established
for projects with clear commonality
potential. Cost of setting up GFE
structure is ok -CBB is Infrequently
entered.
(U)it is relatively easy to give the
GFE contractor visibility across all
the potential future projects. May
not have a good view of
interconnected systems and
associated performance-cost trade
however.
(I) Single contractor performing
trades across all common systems
helps the systems engineering
process.
Many systems)
component!
Cost/perf across whok
family and lifecycle
Frequent, often culture
Functions and
constraints of potential
common systems
N/A
Requirements from
interconnected systems
Anticipated use case Anticipated use case for Requires this from the system Anticipated use cas
for new system all new systems integrator / customer for all new system
Lifecycle cost estimate Unique lifecycle cost of (I) As system developer, can Unique lifecycle cost c
. of unique new system all new systems compare unique with common all new system
Evaluate commonality Needs additional contractual Evaluate commonalit
- benefits and detriments incentives to actually make this benefits and detriment
evaluation as the customer wouldEvaluate commonality lk;ohrieteei ogiacbenefits and detriments k otherwise there noud ce
as to how the peujonniance-cost
trade should be made. EvaluateEvaluate if commonality commonality
Evaluate if commonality is beneficial beneficia
is beneficial
Effect of divergence on
other family members
C N/A
Manufacture / Modify
- Manufacture / Modify existing system
existing system
Manage divergence
' Manage divergence
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
GFE offers minimal advantages for
reactive reuse
Effect of divergence on (U) Difficult for the GRE
other family members organization to continue doing this
for smaller and smaller systems
Manufacture mostly W*d - 4t0iriWi
common systems 4 1
Manage divergence M
and convergence
GFE not a good strategy for
widespread forward commonality
Incremental
Improvements to
Strategy
Firm requirements
Incremental Good system engineering /
Improvements to integrator
Strategy Incentive towards beneficial commc
Good commonality management / t
Liability / responsibility arrangemen
Broad acquisition considerations
Relationship with GFE contractor must be carefully managed because the contractor can be in a monopoly position.
Acquisition Affordability Difficult to tell whether efficiencies from single contractor outweigh the lifting of market price pressures.
Political Risk GFE contracts can be spread around different contractors. Political risk is minimal.
Regulatory Feasibility reduce the am nt of GK iroided,
Additional comments
KEY
(1) Process / Input likely to be
achieved
(U) Uncertain whether process /
